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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Bonnie Sheehey 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Philosophy 
June 2019 
Title: Reparative Critique in Jamesian Pragmatism, Foucauldian Genealogy, and 
Contemporary Political Philosophy 
 
My dissertation develops and defends a concept of reparative critique that presses 
critical philosophy beyond its affinities with negative judgment. In the wake of Post-
Kantian philosophy, critique has become associated with the work of negative judgment 
that aims to denounce or condemn some object or position. Unlike forms of negative 
critique, which are guided by affects of suspicion and paranoia, reparative critique is 
informed by a range of affects like hope, care, and concern that highlight the 
transformative dimension of critical inquiry. I advance the argument of the dissertation 
toward two main aims. In Part One, I defend and flesh out the practice of reparative 
critique by turning to the work of two figures from the history of philosophy: William 
James and Michel Foucault. These figures are exemplary, I argue, for the way they 
engage critique as a reparative exercise. In the introduction I situate these thinkers’ 
contributions to critique by way of the signal and originating work on philosophical 
critique by Immanuel Kant. In spite of their differing philosophical backgrounds and 
concerns, James and Foucault offer varieties of reparative critique that cohere along the 
conceptual lines of action, affect, and transformation. I reinterpret Foucault’s genealogy 
and James’s pragmatism in two separate chapters to develop the agential, affective, and 
transformative dimensions of reparative critique.  
 v 
In Part Two of the dissertation, I draw on the historical precedents supplied by 
James and Foucault to put reparative critique to work for contemporary political 
philosophy. In the first of these chapters, I use the frame of recent debates over the status 
of ideal theory in political philosophy and argue that reparative political critique must be 
realist, rather than idealist, in orientation. I then deploy this realist method of reparative 
critique in the chapters that follow to analyze the problem of racial bias and 
discrimination posed by the operation of power in digital technologies like predictive 
policing algorithms. After clarifying how these algorithms exercise power through a 
racialized and paranoid temporality, I then outline a set of ethical strategies for 
transforming the practice of predictive policing.  
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CHAPTER I 
REPARATIVE CRITIQUE 
 
Introduction 
  
 At least since the philosophical revolution of Immanuel Kant in the late 18th 
century, philosophy has concerned itself with, and even identified itself as, the work of 
critique. Critique informs the philosophical methods of analysis in a variety of traditions, 
from Frankfurt School critical theory to Foucauldian genealogy to critical race theory to 
deconstruction to pragmatist cultural criticism. It guides the attitudes, questions, styles of 
interpretation, and habits of thought of scholars engaged in philosophical, literary, 
cultural, and social studies. Its adjectival form – ‘critical’ – finds a ubiquitous presence in 
journal titles, conference themes, courses, edited volumes, manuscripts, and peer-
reviewed articles. Indeed, one can hardly avoid the imperative of engaging the work of 
critique if one is trained in philosophy or a philosophically informed discipline. Critical 
work has become as natural and automatic as a habit, appearing to need no other 
justification than the persistence of dogmatism and domination – two things that critique 
has traditionally defined itself against.1 That critique has become habitual was recognized 
as early as the mid 1950s by Roland Barthes, who lamented that “any student can and 
does denounce the bourgeois or petit-bourgeois character of such and such a form (of life, 
of thought, of consumption)” and that “denunciation, demystification (or 
                                                        
1 Critique’s historical opposition to dogmatism and domination can be found in the work of Kant, Hegel, 
Marx, Nietzsche, Foucault, and Frankfurt School critical theorists like Benjamin, Adorno, Horkheimer, and 
Habermas.  
 
 2 
demythification) has itself become discourse, stock of phrases, catechistic declaration.”2 
Critique, as Barthes observes, has become the very thing it originally distanced itself 
from: the natural, the dogmatic, the given, the taken-for-granted.  
Part of the attraction of critique is that it enjoys a flexibility of objects and 
meanings that affords a range of advantages to the critic. These advantages include 
intellectual esteem and a kind of political righteousness, for the critic positions herself as 
against the “status quo.”3 In spite of promising these and other advantages, critique has 
recently come under question by a range of scholars offering their own critiques of 
critique. This critical gesture on the part of contemporary scholars is anticipated by 
Kant’s inaugural claim in The Critique of Pure Reason that everything could be 
submitted to critique, including the critical faculty itself.4 
Contemporary challenges to critique can be summarized along two lines. First, 
there are those theorists who question critique’s uncritical position vis-à-vis some 
problematic practice from within a specific tradition of critical theory. These are 
immanent challenges addressed at the level of critique’s tacit collusion with beliefs and 
practices that present normative problems for critique. I call these “challenges of 
critique’s complicity.” This immanent maneuver of questioning critique from within can 
be witnessed in Amy Allen’s recent interrogation of the colonial commitment to the 
historical fact of progress within the tradition of Frankfurt School critical theory.5 Or 
consider critical race theorist Charles W. Mills’ call for the deracialization of critical 
                                                        
2 Barthes, Image Music Text, 166.  
 
3 See Felski, Limits of Critique, 7.  
 
4 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Axi.  
 
5 Allen, The End of Progress; See also Allen, “Adorno, Foucault, and the End of Progress.”  
 3 
theory in light of its failure to seriously engage with questions of race.6 Another example 
of this type of critical challenge can be found in anthropologist Talal Asad’s suggestion 
for a genealogy of critique that would problematize Western critique’s unquestioned 
fidelity to secularism.7 These scholars criticize some tradition of critique for its 
unchallenged complicity with the bleaker sides of Western modernity.  
Other theorists challenge critique for the affects, attitudes, epistemologies, styles 
of argumentation, and practices of interpretation that it commits critics to. Many of these 
scholars see a consistent style of interpretation across multiple critical practices that can 
be captured by what Paul Ricoeur calls the “hermeneutics of suspicion.”8 These critics 
present challenges addressed at the meta-level of critique that question its very operation 
as a negative exercise. I call these “challenges of critique’s negativity.” Scholars as 
diverse as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Bruno Latour account for critique’s negativity in 
terms of its activity – what it does – and in terms of the attitudes or affects that inform its 
activity. Examining critique’s activity involves looking at the different practices 
implicated in the performance or doing of critique. These include practices of reading and 
interpretation, rhetoric, writing, pedagogy, as well as habits of relating between critics 
and their objects. Attending to critique’s attitudes means considering the variety of 
moods, sensibilities, and affects that motivate and inflect the work of critical inquiry. If 
the negative activity of critique takes shape in practices of denunciation, demystification, 
                                                        
6 See Mills, “Criticizing Critical Theory.”  
 
7 See Asad, “Free Speech, Blasphemy, and Secular Criticism.”  
 
8 See Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy; Sedgwick, Touching Feeling; Love, “Truth and Consequences;” 
Felski, Limits of Critique; and Anker and Felski, Critique and Postcritique. 
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and debunking, then the negative attitude of critique crystallizes in affects of paranoia, 
suspicion, and fear.  
For Sedgwick, a hermeneutics of suspicion invests the critic with a paranoid 
affect such that the critic assumes a vigilant, overly anxious, and fearful posture toward 
their object of critique. She argues that such a negative, paranoid posture has become too 
closely identified with the habits, affects, and labor of critique.9 Drawing on the affect 
and psychoanalytic theories of Silvan Tomkins and Melanie Klein respectively, 
Sedgwick clarifies the problematic features of paranoia in terms of its affectivity and its 
monopolistic grasp on critical practices. Paranoia expresses the destructive impulse of the 
critic to immobilize her objects of criticism by exposing the hidden truth of their noxious 
qualities or effects. Sedgwick portrays the negativity of what she calls “paranoid reading” 
as consisting in a mimetic, circular, self-perpetuating, and other-defeating activity that 
flourishes by stamping out possibilities of alternative ways of reading and understanding.   
Latour asks provocatively after the failed efficaciousness of critique as an 
epistemically and politically privileged task.10 Why, he inquires, has critique “run out of 
steam?” For Latour, critique has lost its force because it has become primarily a practice 
of negative judgment. That is, critique has come to refer to work that seeks to debunk, 
denounce, or deconstruct a position, object, or belief and in so doing has become an 
exercise in negative judgment. Latour questions the authoritative and heroic posture that 
the critic assumes with respect to “naïve believers.”11 He argues that the “courageous 
                                                        
9 Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 126.  
 
10 See Latour, “Why Has Critique.”  
 
11 Latour, “Why Has Critique,” 239. Latour’s argument here resembles the one made by Jacques Rancière 
in The Philosopher and His Poor against the critical sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. See Rancière, 
Philosopher and His Poor.  
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critic” turns the false objects of naïve believers into fetishes that she then explains are 
structured by facts of domination, economic oppression, or other types of power 
relations. This maneuver is attractive for the critic (and humiliating for the naïve believer) 
because it means she is always right. It is the critic who shows the truth of the fetishes of 
naïve believers as really determined by powerful structural forces.12 Yet, as Latour points 
out, such a position does not thereby guarantee epistemic authority or political privilege 
to the critic. Indeed, the critic’s tools can just as easily be adopted by her adversaries to 
advance arguments of their own.13 Not only this, if the critic’s work is simply one of 
demystifying, debunking, or deconstructing the “false” beliefs held by others, then this 
work amounts to little more than a glorified version of conspiracy theory.14 
In light of these contemporary challenges, scholars are left with the urgency of 
addressing the present torpor of critique given the centrality and significance of critique 
to current philosophical work. Those who practice critique and do not address these 
challenges run the risk of blindly perpetuating a fraught habit. To guard against the 
                                                        
12 Latour explains, “When naïve believers are clinging forcefully to their objects, claiming that they are 
made to do things because of their gods, their poetry, their cherished objects, you can turn all of those 
attachments into so many fetishes and humiliate all the believers by showing that it is nothing but their own 
projection, that you, yes you alone, can see. But as soon as naïve believers are thus inflated by some belief 
in their own importance, in their own projective capacity, you strike them by a second uppercut and 
humiliate them again, this time by showing that, whatever they think, their behavior is entirely determined 
by the action of powerful causalities coming from objective reality they don’t see, but that you, yes you, the 
never sleeping critic, alone can see.” See Latour, “Why Has Critique,” 239.  
 
13 Latour uses the example of a Republican strategist who capitalizes on insights supplied by critics like 
Latour himself concerning the social construction of scientific facts to emphasize that global warming lacks 
scientific certainty. See Latour, “Why Has Critique,” 226. Another example might be found in Luc 
Boltanski and Eve Chiapello’s account of the recuperation of “artistic critique” – a form of critique that 
fueled the anticapitalist work of French intellectuals in 1970s France – by a new spirit of capitalism. See 
Boltanski and Chiapello, New Spirit of Capitalism.  
 
14 Latour, “Why Has Critique,” 228.  
 6 
perpetuation of a potentially problematic critical habit, it is thus urgent that critics begin 
to conceptualize ways of responding to the crises of critique.   
In responding to these challenges, scholars have presented different strategies for 
addressing the problematics of critique. I summarize these strategies before situating my 
own in relation to them. The strategies (offered across a range of disciplines and fields 
including literary theory, queer theory, anthropology, and philosophy) can be categorized 
in terms of either transcending critique – that is, moving beyond critique to some 
different kind of practice – or transforming critique – that is, rethinking and reworking 
the practice of critique itself. For those defending the former strategy, critique is 
understood as overly limiting in some capacity and thus in need of supplementation or 
even replacement by some other theoretical practice. Those defending the latter strategy 
stress the multiplicity and malleability of critique, the idea that critique does not consist 
in one defining activity and attitude, but that it alters and shifts as it is practiced by 
different actors in various spaces and times.  
The first strategy is highlighted in the work of literary theorist Rita Felski. In her 
2015 book, The Limits of Critique (a title that interestingly captures the critical attitude 
just as it calls this attitude into question), Felski argues for a transcending of critique 
through the practice of what she calls “postcritical reading.”15 She does not offer a 
critique of critique so much as she presents a redescription of critique through Ricoeur’s 
notion of the “hermeneutics of suspicion.” For Felski, critique is identical to the 
hermeneutics of suspicion. In lieu of the suspicious interpretive style of critique, she 
                                                        
15 Felski, Limits of Critique 12.  
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offers postcritical reading as an alternative interpretive practice.16 Postcritical reading 
declines the interrogative and overly-suspicious bearing of the critical reader without 
thereby being uncritical. It is “a matter of attaching, collating, negotiating, assembling – 
of forging links between things that were previously unconnected.”17 Postcritical reading 
is thus additive and affirmative where critique is subtractive and negative.  
The alternative strategy of transforming critique assumes a variety of forms in the 
work of a diverse set of scholars.18 Sedgwick offers one strategy for reworking critique 
by attending specifically to the affects that guide different critical practices of reading. 
Sedgwick’s affective attention not only allows her to differentiate between forms of 
critical practice; it also allows her to trace consistencies across an array of texts that 
represent disparate critical traditions. Thus, Sedgwick finds both in the New Historicism 
of D.A. Miller and in the gender theory of Judith Butler a common critical interpretative 
practice that she refers to as “paranoid reading.” Paranoid reading maps onto Ricoeur’s 
“hermeneutics of suspicion.” It is a totalizing, mimetic, self-perpetuating critical practice 
that habituates the critic toward suspicion, vigilance, and distrust as she seeks to expose 
the hidden truths of texts.  Sedgwick contrasts this critical reading strategy with another 
“reparative” version that is guided by such affects as hope, joy, and love. Here the critic 
                                                        
16 See Felski and Anker’s introduction in Felski and Anker, Critique and Postcritique.  
 
17 Ibid., 173.  
 
18 In addition to the strategies discussed here, different strategies of transforming critique can be found in 
the work of Michel Foucault and Talal Asad. Where Foucault reworks critique by historicizing it as a 
practice and by redescribing it as an attitude, a virtue, and an art, Asad reworks critique by provincializing 
it, taking it as a contextually divergent practice. See Foucault “What is Critique?” and Asad “Free Speech, 
Blasphemy, and Secular Criticism.”  
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assumes a reparative posture toward her texts and objects by finding sustenance and 
pleasure in them.19  
Another method for transforming critique can be gleaned from Latour, who 
suggests a transformation in terms of the activity, attitude, and targets of critique.20 Its 
targets should cease to be “matters of fact” – simple, naturalized objects that act solely as 
mirrors for the projections of human agents or as intermediaries for social forces – and 
should rather be taken as “matters of concern” – things that gather a multiplicity of actors 
around a common issue or point of interest.21 The attitude of critique, Latour argues, 
should shift from one of iconoclastic contrariness to one of fragile care and caution.22 
Finally, he posits that the activity of critique should transform from one of subtraction to 
one of multiplication. Rather than seek to detract the reality of people’s beliefs and 
practices by revealing their illusory nature, the critic strives to construct the associations 
of participants brought together through a matter of concern. The renewed critic is “not 
the one who debunks, but the one who assembles.”23  
I follow Sedgwick and Latour in problematizing critique’s drift toward the 
negative. Deploying Sedgwick’s vocabulary of paranoia and reparation, I differentiate 
two forms of critique – paranoid critique and reparative critique – to address the 
question of critique’s contemporary torpor. Paranoid critique is the name I give to those 
                                                        
19 Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 150. 
 
20 By positioning Latour in the camp of those who aim to transform critique, I disagree with scholars like 
Ashley Barnwell and Rita Felski who suggest that Latour attempts to move beyond critique. See Barnwell, 
“Entanglements of Evidence,” and Felski, Limits of Critique.  
 
21 Latour, “Why Has Critique,” 245-6.  
 
22 Ibid., 246.  
 
23 Ibid.  
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critical practices whose activity is primarily one of denunciation and whose attitude is 
primarily one of suspicion. It is these paranoid practices of critique that have “run out of 
steam,” to use Latour’s phrase. Reparative critique is the name I give to another variety 
of critical practices whose activity is mainly one of creation and whose attitude takes 
shape in the affects of hope, care, and concern. The strategy I thus deploy for responding 
to the problem of critique’s negative status is to reparatively reassemble critique rather 
than abandon or transcend it.  
I pursue the strategy of transforming critique for two reasons. First, I worry that 
the strategy of transcending critique depends on first stabilizing it, or determining what it 
is once and for all, such that it can then be overcome. Against this stabilizing gesture, I 
understand critique as a historically variable and contextually divergent practice. If 
critique is not a single, stable, self-identical thing that is unquestionably Western, secular, 
and modern, then it is something left open to continuous reworking by different historical 
actors. This does not, however, mean that critique is left without temporary definition or 
consistency. One might, for example, find family resemblances across a plurality of 
critical practices as with any other language game.24 Like a habit, critique can assume a 
hardened regularity in response to certain objects. This regularity manifests itself in 
specific rhetorical devices, patterns of questioning, and knee-jerk reactions to particular 
authors and texts. Yet, like a habit, critique is also malleable; it is capable of being 
refashioned if one is willing to put in some work and effort. 
Second, I am uncertain that critique can profitably be contrasted with those 
concepts and practices that are claimed to be “post-critical.” Felski, for instance, contrasts 
                                                        
24 I take the vocabulary of “family resemblances” and “language games” from Ludwig Wittgenstein. See 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §65-71.  
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the “powerfully normative concept of critique” with the more unassuming concept of 
hermeneutics.25 Preferring the language of hermeneutics over that of critique, Felski 
compares the rigid, analytical, authoritative vocabulary of critique with the flexible, 
affective, humble vocabulary of hermeneutics.26 A disparity between critique and affect 
is also invoked by Elizabeth S. Anker and Rita Felski in their introduction to the edited 
volume, Critique and Post-Critique, from 2017. Contextualizing the reassessments of 
critique by a variety of recent scholars, Anker and Felski note the challenge of critique’s 
rationalism advanced by certain theorists associated with the affective turn.27 They cite 
Sedgwick as one theorist working against the tradition of rational critique.28 Critique is 
here portrayed as the rational counterpart to affect. Affect, in turn, is understood as post-
critical in the sense that it transcends the cognitive, the logical, and the analytical. If, 
however, critique marks not a single, monolithic concept that stands as a proxy for the 
rational, or the modern, but a dynamic practice that assumes a multiplicity of moods, 
methods, rhetorical strategies, and styles of interpretation, then it does not make sense to 
contrast critique with something like affect or hermeneutics.  
My strategy assumes that it is possible to speak of affects of critique. A focus on 
affect enables us to see that critique is not simply a rationalistic exercise, but that it is 
motivated, inspired, guided, moved, and modulated by passion and pathos. Invoking what 
Roland Barthes once called “affectionate criticism,”29 I translate Sedgwick’s concepts of 
                                                        
25 Felski, Limits of Critique, 9.  
 
26 Ibid., 9-10. 
 
27 Anker and Felski, Critique and Postcritique, 10.  
 
28 Ibid., 10-11. 
 
29 See Barthes, Grain of the Voice, 330.  
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paranoid and reparative reading into different affective styles of critique. I do not equate 
critique with paranoia or with a hermeneutics of suspicion as Felski does.30 Rather, with 
Sedgwick, I believe there are different practices of critique that are inflected with and 
informed by a range of varying affects. The idea is that we can learn something about the 
work of critique by focusing on its affects, and we can learn something about the affects 
of critique by focusing on its activity or work. This tactic of distinguishing affective 
practices of critique has the advantage of interrupting the reflex identification of critique 
with suspicion, and expands the field of possibility for engaging in critical inquiry. In 
speaking of “critical practices,” I hope to distance critique from a monolithic concept that 
is uniformly exercised by critics. Indeed, the same critic often exercises different 
affective activities of critique in their work. It is thus not the point to say that one or 
another critic is paranoid or reparative; the point is to draw out the nuances, distinctions, 
and specificities of different critical practices as they get deployed to address a particular 
problem or concern.  
In the remainder of this introduction I provide a frame for pursuing these 
arguments. I first clarify what I take “critique” to be by distinguishing it from criticism. 
My understanding of critique is inspired by the formulation offered by Kant in The 
Critique of Pure Reason. I glean three features of philosophical critique from this text – 
reflexivity, a limit-attitude, and suspicion. On my view, suspicion need not be construed 
as a necessary element of critique. To indicate the problematic aspects of a critical 
practice that is guided by suspicion, I draw on Eve Sedgwick’s informative essay, 
“Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading.” Sedgwick differentiates these methods of 
                                                        
30 See Felski, Limits of Critique.  
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reading by focusing on their following five aspects – temporality, affectivity, 
epistemology, morality, and agency. I expand on these qualities before fleshing out my 
translation of Sedgwick’s critical reading methods into the practices of paranoid and 
reparative critique. To then develop reparative critique as a coherent critical position, I 
turn in subsequent chapters to the work of two diverse philosophical figures: William 
James and Michel Foucault. Not only can the work of these figures be productively 
interpreted through the concept of reparative critique, but each figure also contributes 
valuable insights and resources for critique’s much-needed reparative turn.   
 
1. What is Critique? 
 In order to develop reparative critique as an alternative critical practice, it is 
necessary for me to first clarify what I mean by ‘critique.’ In his informative conceptual 
history, Critique and Crisis, Reinhart Koselleck traces the historical and etymological 
proximity of critique to an encounter with moments of crisis. Historically, these terms did 
not separately designate an objective state of affairs or a more subjective style and 
process of thinking as they do now. Rather, as Koselleck notes, the Greeks used a single 
concept, ‘krisis,’ to refer to an ‘objective’ situation and a ‘subjective’ activity.31 
‘Critique’ derives from the Greek ‘krisis,’ which stems from the verb krino: to 
differentiate, select, judge, decide.32 This verb implies the acts of separating, selecting, 
deciding disputes or contests, bringing to a trial, and passing judgment.33 The Greeks 
                                                        
31 Koselleck, Critique and Crisis, 103, n.15. 
 
32 Ibid.  
 
33 See the entry for κρίνω in Lidell & Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon, available at 
http://perseus.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.40:10:171.LSJ.  
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used the verb krino and its cognate noun krisis as jurisprudential terms that referred at 
once to a situation – a dispute – and to the practices that would address and decide the 
dispute, practices like distinguishing, parsing, selecting, and judging. For the Greeks, 
these practices involved dividing the right from the wrong, the just from the unjust, the 
true from the false, the beautiful from the ugly, and evaluating reasons, evidence, and 
argumentation.34 ‘Critique’ and ‘crisis’ sustained a connection in the Middle Ages 
through their medical usage. As Koselleck observes, these terms were (and continue to 
be) employed to designate “the crucial stage of a disease in which a decision had to be 
made but had not yet been reached.”35 Hence our use of such phrases as “critical 
condition” to describe someone in need of urgent medical attention and evaluation. In the 
17th and 18th centuries, ‘critique’ and ‘crisis’ drifted apart. No longer implying the gravity 
of a decision to be made, ‘critique’ and its linguistic cousin, ‘criticism’, came to signify 
the art of judging and “objective evaluation,” especially of religious texts, works of 
literature and art, but also of individuals and nations.36 Hence our contemporary 
deployment of expressions like “textual criticism,” “literary criticism,” and “art 
criticism.”  
To clarify my use of critique, I find it helpful to distinguish critique from 
criticism. Many theorists have maintained the distance between these concepts by 
highlighting critique’s disengagement with certain kinds of judgment. René Wellek 
describes criticism as the analysis of concrete works of literature and their aesthetic 
                                                        
34 Koselleck, Critique and Crisis, 103-4.  
 
35 Ibid., 104, n.15.  
 
36 Ibid., 105.  
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evaluation.37 Wellek differentiates criticism from “theory” or a type of study concerned 
with principles and categories.38 For Judith Butler, critique is not to be confused with 
criticism insofar as where the latter typically takes an object, the former is “concerned to 
identify the conditions of possibility under which a domain of objects appears.”39 Butler 
invokes the philosophical conception of critique forwarded by Kant in the 18th century to 
contrast critique and criticism. André Tosel notes Kant’s importance in transforming the 
practice of critique from one of textual criticism to a specific task of philosophy.40 
Critique need not be taken as a negative judgmental exercise of what Raymond Williams 
calls “fault-finding.”41 Indeed, if ‘criticism’ typically signifies a negatively judgmental, 
destructive practice, ‘critique’ marks a practice that calls the condemnatory exercise of 
criticism itself into question. As Drew Milne argues, one operation of critique “is to 
criticize the functions that criticism is made to serve.”42 One way of specifying the 
difference is to say that while criticism strives to make an evaluation of an object, text, or 
artwork according to specific criteria, critique strives to raise particular questions 
concerning the conditions that make those very objects and the criteria of their evaluation 
possible.43 The former activity does not require a process of inquiry to meet its aim while 
the latter does.  
                                                        
37 Wellek, Concepts of Criticism, 36.  
 
38 Ibid.  
 
39 Butler, “Sensibility of Critique,” 109.  
 
40 Tosel, “Spinoza or the Other Critique,” 30.  
 
41 Williams, Keywords, 84.  
 
42 Milne, “Introduction,” 5.  
 
43 My point in differentiating these terms is not to say that critique disengages completely from all acts of 
judging. Rather, my point is that the practices of critique and criticism do not share the same aims. The 
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Like Butler, my understanding of critique is inspired by the conception offered by 
Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. I garner three features of critique from these texts 
that can be summarized as those of reflexivity, a limit-attitude, and suspicion. I detail 
each of these as they appear in Kant’s First Critique. My conception of critique embraces 
the elements of reflexivity and a limit-attitude, but distances itself from the element of 
suspicion. I do not take suspicion to be a necessary feature of the critical attitude or to be 
necessarily included as part of the definition of critique. After explaining these ideas in 
the following section, I develop a justification for separating critique from suspicion by 
drawing on the work of Eve Sedgwick.  
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant famously describes critique as a type of 
philosophical inquiry aimed at determining the limits of our theoretical reason through an 
examination of reason’s conditions of possibility. Critique serves as Kant’s philosophical 
response to the dual dangers of dogmatism and skepticism that informed the metaphysics 
of his time.44 He contrasts critique specifically with dogmatism in his second preface 
from 1787. While dogmatism “is the pretension that we can make progress by means of 
no more than a pure cognition from concepts (i.e., philosophical cognition) in accordance 
with principles... without inquiring into the manner and the right by which reason has 
arrived at them,” critique is precisely the inquiry that examines the right and the manner 
                                                        
object of critique, I take it, is not to ultimately pass judgment, to say either ‘yes’ or ‘no’, to find fault or to 
express praise. One aim of critique is to precisely suspend the imperative that would require one to pass 
judgment in the sense of taking a position, being either ‘for’ or ‘against’ an object or practice. Another aim 
of critique is to “make harder those acts which are now too easy,” in the words of Foucault. That is, critique 
strives to make some of our smooth practices stutter and some of our habits of thought hesitate. See 
Foucault, “Is it Important to Think?,” 456.  
 
44 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Aix. An unfounded metaphysical dogmatism could be found in the work 
of rationalist thinkers like Gottfried Leibniz and Christian Wolff, while the skepticism of empiricists like 
David Hume threatened to undermine any claims to metaphysical knowledge.  
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by which reason arrives at such concepts and principles.45 In addition to opposing critique 
with dogmatism, Kant specifies his concept of critique through the features of reflexivity, 
an inquiry into limits, and suspicion.   
First, Kant characterizes critique in terms of its reflexivity. The critique of pure 
reason takes shape as the examination of reason by itself. That is, reason is both the 
subject and object of critique. It is both that which is “on trial” and that which is deciding 
the outcome of the trial, to use Kant’s juridical language.46 The reflexivity of critique 
captures this movement of reason turning upon itself. Kant thus portrays the self-
examination at the heart of the critical task: “It is a call to reason to take on once again 
the most difficult of all its tasks – viz., that of self-cognition – and to set up a tribunal that 
will make reason secure in its rightful claims and will dismiss all baseless pretensions, 
not by fiat but in accordance with reason’s eternal and immutable laws.”47 That critique 
constitutes a reflexive type of investigation can also be gathered from its self-legislating 
function. That is, critique does not find its authority from a political or religious 
sovereign, but from its own authorizing capacity.48  
Secondly, Kant understands critique as an inquiry into limits. This critique is not 
an evaluation of “books and systems” – a practice that might be construed more properly 
in terms of criticism – but the “decision as to whether a metaphysics as such is possible 
or impossible” and the “determination of its [reason’s] sources as well as its range and 
                                                        
45 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxxvi.  
 
46 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Axi-xii.  
 
47 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Axii.  
 
48 Ibid.  
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boundaries.”49 Kant here portrays critique as a transcendental inquiry that strives to 
establish the universal and necessary limits or boundaries of reason. According to Diana 
Coole, by casting the exercise of critique as the determination of a limit, Kant regards 
critique as a negative philosophical activity.50 This negativity can also be gathered from 
the legitimating function Kant attributes to critique.51 That is, not only does critique 
establish the boundaries of what humans can legitimately claim to know, it also forbids 
the transgression of such boundaries and limitations. Critique takes on a kind of 
disciplinary function with respect to knowledge claims. It will thus restrict certain uses of 
reason such as the speculative use that makes claims about knowing things in 
themselves.52 Positively, critique will endorse other uses of reason, including the critical 
use of reason itself.  
Third, Kant attributes a suspicious mood to critique. In a frequently-cited footnote 
from his 1781 preface, Kant writes:  
Our age is properly the age of critique, and to critique everything must submit. 
Religion and legislation commonly seek to exempt themselves from critique, 
religion through its sanctity and legislation through its majesty. But in doing so 
they arouse well-deserved suspicion and cannot lay claim to unfeigned respect; 
such respect is accorded by reason only to what has been able to withstand 
reason’s free and open examination.53 
                                                        
49 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Axii.  
 
50 Coole, Negativity and Politics, 14, 55. For more on Kantian critique as a purely negative task, see 
Bristow, Hegel and Philosophical Critique, 55. 
 
51 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxv. Another way of understanding critique’s negativity is to see the 
way in which Kant distances critical inquiry from “doctrine” or positive theory building. A doctrine strives 
for a comprehensive system of pure reason. Critique serves a preparatory or propaedeutic function in that it 
aims to delimit and correct certain a priori cognitions. Yet, this negativity of critique does not mean that 
critique is unproductive or without positive benefit: “For such a critique would serve only to purify our 
reason... and would keep our reason free from errors.” See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B25.  
 
52 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxvi.  
 
53 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Axi. Italics in original.  
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What is interesting about this footnote is the combination of the affect of suspicion and 
the extensive scope of what may be subjected to critique. Suspicion here fuels the 
restlessness of critique’s incessant interrogative activity.54 Nothing is free of critique’s 
vigilant gaze. The more those entities like the church or the state try to excuse themselves 
from critique by appealing to either their holiness or their power, the more they provoke 
the suspicion of critique.  
 Following the characterizations of critique offered by Kant, we can say that 
critique is an attitude and practice of inquiry that combines reflexivity, a limit-attitude, 
and suspicion. My conception of critique embraces the features of reflexivity and a limit-
attitude. I take critique to be a reflexive practice that engages subjects in a type of 
reflective self-relation. That is, critique consists in a turning upon oneself and submitting 
one’s actions, beliefs, desires, thoughts, and times to question. I also take critique to be a 
mode of philosophical inquiry that asks after the conditions and limits that constrain our 
present practices, selves, and forms of thought. This inquiry can take a transcendental 
form whereby one examines the universal and necessary conditions of possibility of some 
object or practice. It can also take on a historical form whereby one investigates the 
singular and contingent conditions of possibility of some practice or object.55 
                                                        
54 William F. Bristow notes the entwinement of philosophical critique and suspicion in Kant’s work and in 
that of Hegel, who directs a suspicion against Kant’s methodology of critique and its procedure of 
justification. Bristow even invokes Ricoeur’s “hermeneutics of suspicion” to describe the attitude of Kant’s 
and Hegel’s versions of critique. See Bristow, Hegel and Philosophical Critique, 50-53.  
 
55 For an elaboration of the difference between these two kinds of critical inquiry – transcendental and 
historical – see Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?,” 315. Foucault describes critique as a “limit-attitude” 
that consists in “analyzing and reflecting upon limits.” But whereas Kant was interested in “knowing what 
limits knowledge must renounce exceeding,” Foucault’s interest lies in tracing those historical limits that 
are possible to transgress or “cross-over.” For a comparison of Kant’s and Foucault’s understanding of 
limits, see Hanssen, Critique of Violence, 69-74. 
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Although Kant includes suspicion as a mood informing the work of critique, I do 
not take suspicion to be a necessary feature of the critical attitude or to be necessarily 
included as part of the definition of critique. Thus, rather than identify critique with one 
affect, we might distinguish different practices of critique by attending to the variety of 
affects and moods that inform and guide critical inquiry. I initiate just this in the next 
section, where I differentiate the practices of paranoid critique and reparative critique and 
disclose some of the problematic features of suspicion.  
 
2. Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading  
 In two essays from 2003 and 2007, Sedgwick develops a vocabulary for 
distinguishing two critical interpretive practices, which she names “paranoid reading” 
and “reparative reading.” She links the method of paranoid reading with Ricoeur’s 
“hermeneutics of suspicion,” arguing that the centrality of suspicion in contemporary 
critical practice has included a simultaneous privileging of the concept of paranoia.56 
Paranoia here captures the problems of suspicion when taken to the extreme. Reparative 
reading, by contrast, draws on other affects (like hope and love) to dispose critics to 
alternative modes of interpretation and critique. In this section, I clarify each of these 
critical reading practices in terms of their temporal, affective, epistemic, moral, and 
agential features.  
With Heather Love, I emphasize that Sedgwick’s primary concern in 
differentiating these two critical practices is not to abandon or replace the one with the 
other, but rather to at once disrupt the identification of criticism with paranoia and to 
                                                        
56 Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 125.  
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open up space for alternative critical methods such as that offered by reparative reading.57 
Sedgwick hopes to add reparative reading as a possible interpretive strategy among 
others. She thus enacts a reparative posture toward paranoid critical practices in not 
dismissing them outright and in clarifying that “paranoia knows some things well and 
others poorly.”58 As Love observes, “Practicing reparative reading means leaving the 
door open to paranoid reading.”59 Sedgwick performs both strategies of criticism in her 
essays, oscillating between an aggressive and reflexive posture toward paranoia found in 
the work of herself and others and a reparative posture that avows this aggression and the 
ambivalent anxiety that arrives with a receptiveness to surprise, chance, and uncertainty.  
 Sedgwick contextualizes her changed relations to paranoid thinking and reading 
in her two pieces by referencing the social and political as well as the personal and 
existential conditions that occasioned them. She describes the intensification of paranoid 
thinking among queer theorists as a critical response to the growing AIDS epidemic in 
the 1980s, identifying herself as one such theorist who deployed paranoid interpretive 
strategies in their work.60 Sedgwick poignantly expresses the intense dread and stress 
experienced by queer people that imprinted a “paranoid structuration onto the theory and 
activism of that period.”61 She accounts for the shift in the tonality of theory and activism 
in the mid-1990s with the introduction of the first plausible treatment for HIV. She 
                                                        
57 Love, “Truth and Consequences,” 238.  
 
58 Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 130.  
 
59 Love, “Truth and Consequences,” 239.  
 
60 Sedgwick, “Melanie Klein,” 638-40. Sedgwick notes that her use of paranoid reading is best witnessed in 
her Epistemology of the Closet from 1990.  
 
61 Sedgwick, “Melanie Klein,” 639.  
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writes, “The brutally abbreviated temporality of the lives of many women and men with 
HIV seemed suddenly, radically extended if not normalized. Along with many, many 
others, I was trying over that summer to assimilate an unaccustomed palette of feelings 
among which relief, hope, and expansiveness and surprise set the tone.”62 This shift was 
accompanied by Sedgwick’s diagnosis with breast cancer and the relation she developed 
with the exigencies of her disease. She recounts the arousal, not of dread, but of her 
“lifelong depressiveness” upon being diagnosed.63 Discontented with the prevalence of 
self-perpetuating modes of thought like paranoia, Sedgwick undertook a string of 
experiments in her writing and pedagogy that “aimed at instantiating, and making 
somehow available to readers, some alternative forms of argument and utterance.”64  
 
2.1 Paranoid Reading  
 In her essays, “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading” and “Melanie Klein 
and the Difference Affect Makes,” Sedgwick outlines five features of what she calls 
“paranoid reading.” These are the features of temporality, affect, epistemology, morality, 
and agency that contribute to the problematic status of paranoia as the privileged practice 
of criticism.  
In its temporal aspect, paranoia entails a rigid temporality structured by an 
anticipatory relation to the future. In its affective dimension, paranoia consists in a theory 
of negative affects – that is, affects motivated by the avoidance of pain and the 
                                                        
62 Ibid.  
 
63 Ibid., 640. See also Sedgwick’s autobiographical account of the therapy she undergoes for depression 
after being diagnosed with breast cancer in Sedgwick, Dialogue on Love.  
 
64 Sedgwick, “Melanie Klein,” 640. As Sedgwick makes clear, paranoia and reparation are as much 
practices of writing as they are methods of reading. 
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forestalling of ‘bad’ surprises. In its epistemic aspect, paranoia prioritizes knowledge that 
strives for totalization, reduction, and exposure of hidden truth. The morality of paranoia 
depends on a splitting and reduction of objects into exclusively ‘bad’ and ‘good’ parts. 
Finally, the agency of paranoia vacillates between omnipotence and powerlessness. I 
detail each of these aspects of paranoia below before accounting for the alternative 
features that comprise a reparative critical practice.  
 
2.1.1 Temporality of Paranoia  
Sedgwick highlights the anticipatory temporality of paranoia. She notes that the 
first imperative of paranoia is “There must be no bad surprises.”65 This aversion to 
surprise informs the temporality of paranoia as it burrows backward and forward in time 
to anticipate threats. For this, the paranoid subject draws on the past as a resource for its 
present avoidance and future prevention of threatening surprises. Importantly for the 
paranoid subject, threats or bad surprises cannot be treated as uncertain or contingent lest 
the subject become vulnerable and susceptible to countenance the dangers of their arrival. 
Rather, “paranoia requires that bad news be always already known” such that these 
uncertain happenings do not come as surprises but as inevitable threats.66 The paranoid 
subject relates rigidly to the future, embodying a vigilant and controlling posture toward 
the future that forecloses the future as a site of possibility, chance, uncertainty, and 
surprise. Sedgwick thus aligns paranoid reading practices with a notion of the 
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“inevitable.”67 Paranoia consists in a closed temporality in that it closes the subject off 
from the contingency of the future by treating the future as an inevitability. Sedgwick 
explains, “No time could be too early for one’s having-already-known, for its having-
already-been-inevitable, that something bad would happen. And no loss could be too far 
in the future to need to be preemptively discounted.”68 Paranoia ensures that it will never 
be too early to anticipate a bad surprise by acting as if the bad surprise will have already 
been. Sedgwick uses the example of Judith Butler’s “unresting vigilance for traces in 
other theorists’ writing of nostalgia for... an impossible… moment” prior to the 
“imposition of the totalizing Law of gender difference” in Gender Trouble.69 We might 
also think of the Derridean maneuver of anticipating the troublesome vestiges of a 
metaphysics of presence that haunt the words of other philosophers.70 Such paranoid 
gestures make it impossible not to predict the arrival and concomitant dispelling of those 
things deemed threatening. The danger for the paranoid critic is not anticipating a threat, 
being caught off guard or surprised by it. To ward off this danger, the paranoid critic 
assumes the presence of the threat on the ground that it “can never be finally ruled out.”71 
Thus, the critic reads with a suspicious eye alerting her of those assailing concepts and 
tropes that she has already expected to see, and proceeds predictably to critique them.   
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70 I’m thinking especially here of Derrida’s critique of Foucault in essays like “Cogito and the History of 
Madness” and ““To Do Justice to Freud”: The History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis.” See 
Derrida, “Cogito,” and Derrida, “Justice to Freud.”  
 
71 Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 133.  
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2.1.2 Affectivity of Paranoia  
Sedgwick draws on the work of American psychologist Silvan Tomkins to clarify 
the affective dimension of paranoid reading. She identifies paranoid reading with what 
Tomkins calls a “strong theory” of negative affects. A strong affect theory is one that 
aspires to wide generality. It is, according to Tomkins, “capable of accounting for a wide 
spectrum of phenomena which appear to be very remote, one from the other, and from a 
common source…As it orders more and more remote phenomena to a single formulation, 
its power grows.”72 A strong affect theory is described here as monopolistic and 
reductive. It reduces all phenomena to a single formulation and it expands its reach as it 
categorizes more and more experiences under a single formulation. In contrast to this, a 
weak affect theory is one that stays local, attending to the specificities and nuances of 
near rather than remote phenomena.73 For Tomkins, a negative affect theory like 
humiliation gains in strength as its strategies for affording protection through the 
successful avoidance of the negative affect continue to fail. That is, the negative affect 
strengthens as its protective strategies fail. Negative affects are thus self-reinforcing. 
Sedgwick uses this point to illuminate the intensifying and contagious feature of 
paranoia. Paranoia intensifies as its anticipatory strategies fail to shield the subject from 
bad surprises. One can never be paranoid enough because any unwanted surprise 
experienced by the subject only reinforces the subject’s paranoia. This self-reinforcing 
feature of paranoia also has the monopolizing effect of treating all objects – both known 
and unknown – as suspicious and potentially threatening. Paranoia is strong to the extent 
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73 Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 134.  
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that it enables more and more experiences to be categorized as instances of bad surprises 
and to the extent that it encourages more and more anticipation of such surprises before 
they occur.  
Sedgwick also follows Tomkins in describing paranoia as a strong theory of 
negative affects. Negative affects are those that motivate subjects toward the avoidance 
of pain or harm. For Tomkins, such affects serve an evolutionary function in that they 
orient subjects away from those stimuli that threaten their survival. These are affects like 
fear-terror, distress-anguish, anger-rage, disgust, and shame-humiliation. Since negative 
affects are experienced as painful themselves, the subject is disposed to seek a 
minimization of negative affect rather than seek the maximization of positive affect. 
Indeed, as negative affects grow in strength, they strive to anticipate negative affects to 
such a degree that they can entirely block the “potentially operative goal of seeking 
positive affect.”74 Tomkins notes such a mechanism at work in paranoia: “The only sense 
in which [the paranoid] may strive for positive affect at all is for the shield which it 
promises against humiliation. To take seriously the strategy of maximizing positive affect, 
rather than simply enjoying it when the occasion arises, is entirely out of the question.”75 
Paranoia here constitutes a negative affect insofar as it motivates the subject to avoid pain 
by anticipating and forestalling it. Not only this, paranoia prevents the subject from 
pursuing the intensification of positive affect.  
Positive affects, in contrast, are those that motivate subjects toward the pursuit of 
pleasure. Tomkins identified affects like interest and enjoyment-joy as positive affects. 
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Sedgwick adds love and hope to the repertoire of positive affects. These are affects that 
position subjects toward a “sustained seeking of pleasure.”76 Sedgwick aligns this with 
what Foucault calls “the care of the self,” or “the often very fragile concern to provide the 
self with pleasure and nourishment in an environment that is perceived as not particularly 
offering them.”77 
 
2.1.3 Epistemology of Paranoia  
 Sedgwick opens “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading” by invoking a 
worry about the epistemic privileging of paranoia on the part of the critic that appears 
with the identification of theory with paranoia itself. On this view, to do critical-
theoretical work is to be paranoid. The explicit alignment between theory and paranoia 
can be found in the psychoanalytic work of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan, which 
serves as a rich source of inspiration for contemporary critical theory. Freud reflexively 
points out a similarity between his own theorization of paranoia in The Schreber Case 
and the delusions of his patient, Judge Schreber, but assures his readers that he developed 
his theory before knowing of Schreber’s case.78 Lacan goes further, suggesting that all 
forms of knowing are paranoiac.79 This epistemic privileging of paranoia is problematic 
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78 Freud writes, “Schreber’s ‘rays of God’, composed of a condensation of solar rays, nerve fibers and 
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Schreber’s book came to my notice.” See Freud, The Schreber Case, 66.  
 
79 Lacan writes that there are “paranoid affinities between all knowledge of objects as such.” See Lacan, 
“The Other and Psychosis,” 39.  
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not only because it limits the affective range of other motivations for knowing, but also 
because it places its faith in a model of knowledge that takes the form of exposure or 
revelation. As Sedgwick points out, “for someone to have an unmystified view of 
systemic oppressions does not intrinsically or necessarily enjoin that person to any 
specific train of epistemological or narrative consequences.”80 To think that one must be 
paranoid to critically inquire into forms of oppression because it gives one access to 
otherwise hidden truth is a self-serving gesture of the theorist that obfuscates the 
multiplicity of methods, motivations, and moods that guide a variety of critical practices. 
In its epistemological dimension, Sedgwick argues that paranoia places its faith in 
knowledge understood as the exposure or revelation of truth. The paranoid subject places 
a remarkable stress on the efficacy of knowledge per se. That is, the paranoid critic 
believes that there is something to be gained epistemically in the procedure of exposing 
or revealing hidden truths about social and political reality. This unveiling of hidden truth 
can take the form of exposing injustices or violences that are assumed to be concealed or 
otherwise undetected by everyday practitioners. This is a self-congratulatory epistemic 
practice that assumes a naïveté on the part of the audiences of these demystifications and 
a privileged authority on the part of the critic who reveals them. The paranoid critic here 
supposes that their revelation will disturb or surprise their audience and shock them into a 
more enlightened epistemic position. But, as Sedgwick forcefully observes, not only does 
the exposure of injustices not always register as surprising, in those cases where it does, 
the epistemic consequences of such an exposure are not self-evident. It is not always 
clear what is to be gained in the demystification of supposedly hidden injustices. 
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Furthermore, it is not obvious that the energies of an activist intellectual are best spent in 
tracing and exposing the “truth” about concealed forms of oppression, especially when 
such a practice rests on a “cruel and contemptuous assumption that the one thing lacking 
for global revolution... is people’s (that is, other people’s) having the painful effects of 
their oppression, poverty, or deludedness sufficiently exacerbated to make the pain 
conscious (as if otherwise it wouldn’t have been) and intolerable (as if intolerable 
solutions were famous for generating excellent solutions).”81 Motivated by the 
anticipation of disasters or threats, the paranoid knower places her confidence in the 
efficacy of exposure and expresses a suspicion toward other practices of knowing that are 
differently motivated.  
 
2.1.4 Morality of Paranoia  
In addition to the affective, temporal, and epistemic aspects of paranoia, 
Sedgwick clarifies the problematic moralizing tendency at work in the paranoid position. 
The dangerous moralizing tendency of paranoia takes shape in the splitting of part-
objects into exclusively good or bad objects. Not only this, the subject splits herself into 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ parts according to her aggressive and loving impulses that she directs 
toward the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ part-objects. These ‘good’ and ‘bad’ objects refer to entirely 
different objects for the subject in the paranoid position. Through projection, the subject 
attributes the harmful and persecutory features of the primary bad object to other external 
objects. The paranoid subject feels threatened by these ‘bad’ objects that permeate her 
external world. This frustrates the subject’s ability to create bonds with whole objects and 
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people. Furthermore, the paranoid self is unable to comprehend or tolerate moral 
ambivalence and ambiguity. As Sedgwick notes, following Klein, the toleration and 
embrace of moral ambiguity comes only as the subject integrates the good and bad part-
objects into a “compromised” whole.82  
 
2.1.5 Agency of Paranoia  
Finally, Sedgwick depicts paranoia’s troubling sense of agency as occupying the 
extreme positions of powerlessness or omnipotence. Dreading her own destruction by 
another, the paranoid subject experiences herself as either powerless in the face of ‘bad’ 
objects that threaten her from without, or as omnipotent in her internalization and 
idealization of ‘good’ objects that safeguards her against destruction by denying the 
existence of ‘bad’ objects. The paranoid position is thus marked by an all-or-nothing 
conception of agency. This conception of agency shifts with the reparative position. With 
the difficult understanding that “good and bad tend to be inseparable at every level” 
comes also a recognition that “power is a form of relationality that deals in, for example, 
negotiations, the exchange of affect, and other small differentials, the middle ranges of 
agency – the notion that you can be relatively empowered or disempowered without 
annihilating someone else or being annihilated.”83 The reparative position thus trades in 
an all-or-nothing view of agency for one that is complex, dynamic, nuanced, and 
negotiable. The reparative subject recognizes herself as one who acts in relation to others, 
who suffers the unintended consequences of the actions of others, and who makes others 
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suffer the unintended consequences of her own actions. Depending on her intersubjective 
relations, this subject is sometimes empowered and sometimes disempowered. Neither 
wholly omnipotent nor completely powerless, a subject in the reparative position 
experiences the relational dynamics of power.  
 
2.2 Reparative Reading  
While Sedgwick does not fully elaborate the features of reparative reading in the 
same terms as those used to clarify paranoid reading, one can develop these features 
nonetheless from what she briefly mentions about reparative reading. First, it is important 
to note that the reparative position is a fragile, “anxiety-mitigating achievement” that the 
subject only sometimes and just temporarily succeeds in occupying.84 We should thus 
think of reparative reading as a practice that subjects assume for specific purposes and 
one that they can only temporarily sustain. It is less a general theory of interpretation than 
it is one of many viable interpretive strategies. In the work of reparation, the subject is 
motivated by the pursuit of sustenance and pleasure. She seeks to assemble the fragments 
of part-objects and to find enjoyment and nourishment in those renewed objects. 
Sedgwick ties reparation to creative activity. This work consists in an attempt to make 
bearable the very things that we suffer by mending and breathing new life into them. The 
repaired object, however, does not resemble a preexisting object because the new object 
is “compromised.”85 As Sedgwick notes, “there is nothing intrinsically conservative 
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about the impulse of reparation.”86 Reparation is thus not the return to a prior condition or 
state, but the construction of something new or different that brings pleasure and 
nourishment to subjects.  
Building on Sedgwick’s passing comments about reparative reading, I here clarify 
this practice in the same terms used to discuss paranoid reading – temporality, affect, 
epistemology, morality, and agency. These features will be helpful for developing 
reparative critique as a critical practice that includes reading as one of its activities, in 
addition to a range of other activities.  
 
2.2.1 Temporality of Reparation 
If paranoia consists in an anticipatory relation to the future that expects the 
inevitability of threats or bad surprises so as to preempt and ward them off, then 
reparation relates more openly to the uncertainty and contingency of the future. Sedgwick 
identifies the central temporal distinction between paranoia and reparation as the 
difference between the inevitable and the contingent. She explains: 
[T]o read from a reparative position is to surrender the knowing, anxious paranoid 
determination that no horror, however apparently unthinkable, shall ever come to 
the reader as new; to a reparatively positioned reader, it can seem realistic and 
necessary to experience surprise. Because there can be terrible surprises, however, 
there can also be good ones. Because the reader has room to realize that the future 
may be different from the present, it is also possible for her to entertain such 
profoundly painful, profoundly relieving, ethically crucial possibilities as that the 
past, in turn, could have happened differently from the way it actually did.87 
 
Reparation here is tied to a notion of the contingent. While paranoia prevents the subject 
from experiencing a surprise as a surprise, the reparatively positioned subject opens 
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herself to the novelty that can arrive with unexpected surprises. That is, the reparative 
reader expresses an openness to the unknown and the unanticipated, even though in doing 
so, she risks her own security and safety. This affirmation of contingency takes shape not 
only as a welcoming-if-risky embrace of an open future, but also informs how the 
reparative reader relates to the past. As Sedgwick notes, the reparative reader 
countenances the contingency of the past, the idea that the past “could have happened 
differently from the way it actually did.”88 This realization of past contingency, however, 
leaves the reader with a range of profoundly ambivalent affects. She is at once mournful 
and hopeful, regretful and reassured. Importantly for Sedgwick, the possibility that the 
past could have been different is “ethically crucial” for the reparatively positioned 
subject. This is because without a recognition of past and future contingency, the subject 
cannot undertake or undergo the work of reparation. What motivation would one have to 
repair that which was fated to break or to find something redemptive even in our mistakes 
if those same mistakes will only inevitably be repeated? Why regret something if there 
were not even the possibility of things happening differently?  
 The often-disorienting recognition that the past could have been and that the 
future could be otherwise is what thus marks the temporality of reparative reading. This 
flexible, open temporality counters the rigid, closed temporality of paranoia. The 
significant difference between an open and closed temporality concerns the possibility of 
change or whether things are fated to remain the same. A paranoid temporality closes the 
future and the past off from the possibility of change, while a reparative temporality 
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leaves this possibility open. This open temporality likewise informs the reader’s open 
posture toward texts as sites of novelty, surprise, chance, and possibility.  
 
2.2.2 Affectivity of Reparation 
 If Sedgwick depicts the affectivity of paranoia as a strong theory of negative 
affects, using the language of Silvan Tomkins, then we might understand the affectivity 
of reparation to consist in a weak theory of positive affects. Indeed, Sedgwick 
consistently deploys this contrast in her 2003 essay (“Paranoid Reading and Reparative 
Reading”). Negative affects, like humiliation or suspicion, are self-reinforcing strategies 
for forestalling or avoiding pain. Interestingly, these affects are self-reinforcing because 
they are self-defeating. That is, they gain in strength as their protective tactics fail. 
Positive affects, like joy or interest, are self-fulfilling strategies for seeking or pursuing 
pleasure. They are self-satisfying or internally gratifying because their arousal and reward 
are identical.89 Positive and negative affects can be linked with either a strong or weak 
theory according to Tomkins. Recall that a strong affect theory is one that expands its 
scope by reducing more remote phenomena to a single formulation. A weak affect theory, 
in contrast, is one that stays local. It is typically descriptive rather than explanatory and it 
is attentive to the specificities and nuances of near rather than remote phenomena.90 
Sedgwick references the “devalued and near obsolescent” interpretive skill of imaginative 
close reading as a possible example of a weak theory within literary criticism.91  
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 I find a danger, however, in keeping with Tomkins’ vocabulary of ‘negative’ and 
‘positive’ affects to describe the affective difference between paranoid reading and 
reparative reading. I find this distinction troubling for two reasons. First, the contrast 
risks essentializing features of affects that might otherwise be taken as historically and 
contextually contingent.92 Second, it risks invoking a moralizing distinction between 
those affects deemed ‘bad’ and those regarded as ‘good.’ This move risks obfuscating the 
ambiguity and ambivalence that often accompany our affective responses to particular 
situations. That is, we need not interpret anger as always or necessarily “bad” and love as 
always or necessarily “good,” but should strive to consider these affects in their 
complexity, ambiguity, and contextuality. 
Consequently, I understand reparation as aligned with a range of affects that are 
not straightforwardly positive or optimistic. Reparative affects are inflected with an 
ambivalent tonality. For Sedgwick, these are affects that enable the subject to avow the 
reality of moral ambiguity – the idea that ‘good’ and ‘bad’, recovery and loss, exist in the 
self-same objects and situations. These include affects like remorse, grief, love, and hope. 
Thus, Sedgwick describes the reparative affect of hope as “often a fracturing, even a 
traumatic thing to experience” because it leaves the subject vulnerable to the risks and 
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uncertainties of the future. Hope is not a self-assured, optimistic attitude on this account, 
but a “fluttering,” ambivalent embrace of chance.93  
 
2.2.3 Epistemology of Reparation  
As a knowledge practice, the work of reparation requires a kind of fallibilism on 
the part of the knowing subject. Reparative knowing involves a recognition that humans 
make mistakes, commit errors, and inflict harm on others unintentionally. Yet, unlike the 
paranoid knower, the reparative knower does not take these mistakes as inevitabilities or 
as signs of weakness, but rather treats them as contingencies that can have redeeming and 
pleasantly surprising effects. In this regard, Sedgwick cites Joseph Litvak’s description of 
queer reading and writing practices that aim at “taking the terror out of error, at making 
the making of mistakes sexy, creative, even cognitively powerful.”94 The reparative 
knower embraces uncertainty as instructive and nourishing insofar as it indicates the 
limits of her knowledge and incites her to inquire and experiment with her epistemic 
limits.  
 Reparative knowing does not share the same relation to truth as paranoid 
knowing, nor does it understand knowledge in terms of exposition. Paranoia places its 
faith in a knowledge practice that consists in exposing hidden or buried truth. Through 
the act of revelation, the paranoid critic grants herself epistemic privilege over other 
knowers and other ways of knowing.   This takes shape in such activities as 
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demystification and denaturalization. On this view, the truth is already there, dwelling 
deep in a text or context, waiting to be sniffed out and revealed by the critic.  
For the reparative knower, truth is something to be made, not something to be 
exposed. The making of truth requires a kind of transformative work on the part of the 
subject. Because the subject is not yet ready, not yet prepared to receive (i.e., to create) 
truth, she must undergo a transformation. It is as though in transforming herself through 
reparation, the subject also thereby participates in the creation of truth. Truth here does 
not wait for the illuminating tools of a suspicious critic, but rather requires the creative 
tactics of the reparative critic.  
 Knowledge is thus taken as a matter of performativity or action. That knowledge 
does something – to both its subjects and its objects – is not a new insight, but it orients 
the critic to consider asking a different range of questions than whether a particular piece 
of knowledge is true, or how one can know it is true. The reparative critic asks other 
epistemic questions like “What does knowledge do?” or “How is knowledge 
performative?” or “How do knowledge practices differ on the bases of their 
performativity?”95 On this view, knowledge practices, like those of paranoid reading and 
reparative reading, differ according to what they do and how they act on both critics and 
texts.  
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2.2.4 Morality of Reparation  
 Heather Love notes that the concept of reparative reading is “primarily an ethical 
category for Sedgwick.”96 Indeed, Sedgwick repeatedly invokes the ethical stakes at work 
in the difference between paranoid reading and reparative reading as viable critical 
practices. These stakes have to do with an understanding of reparation as inaugurating 
ethical possibility that forms through the feelings of love, remorse, empathy, and concern 
for others.97 In Sedgwick’s words, ethical possibility emerges with the subject’s “guilty, 
empathetic view of the other as at once good, damaged, integral, and requiring and 
eliciting love and care.”98 Yet, this concern for the other is coextensive with the subject’s 
fragile concern to provide herself with pleasure and nourishment in an otherwise 
precarious environment.99 The ethical stakes between paranoid reading and reparative 
reading have also to do with their differences in grappling with moral ambiguity. Recall 
that the subject in the paranoid position splits objects into ‘good’ or loving parts and 
‘bad’ or harmful parts. This splitting disallows the subject from seeing the simultaneous 
existence of love and aggression in the self-same object and it also creates a schism 
within the subject herself. The paranoid subject cannot tolerate moral ambiguity or 
ambivalence. This arrives only with the integration of the ‘good’ (i.e., loving) and ‘bad’ 
(i.e., aggressive) part-objects achieved with the reparative position.  
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2.2.5 Agency of Reparation 
 This avowal of moral ambivalence is accompanied by a more realistic 
understanding of agency than the one at work in the paranoid position. With the splitting 
of the object into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ parts, the paranoid subject feels herself to be either 
powerless or omnipotent in the face of the ‘bad’ part-object. With the achievement of the 
reparative position, the subject realizes what Sedgwick calls the “middle ranges of 
agency,” or the idea that one can be relatively empowered or disempowered without 
destroying someone else or being destroyed.100 This is a relational conception of agency 
that captures the complexities, dynamic fluctuations, negotiations, and differentials of 
power. The subject in the reparative position thus accepts a more complicated view of 
agency than the all-or-nothing depiction associated with the paranoid position.  
 
3. Paranoid Critique and Reparative Critique  
Sedgwick offers a helpful vocabulary for clarifying the differential practices of 
what I call “paranoid critique” and “reparative critique.” In addition to this vocabulary, 
she enacts a posture of relating to paranoid critical practices that I find illuminating for 
the affective posture that a reparatively positioned critic adopts toward paranoid critique. 
In other words, I find sustenance in Sedgwick’s work not only for the concepts offered 
therein, but also for the moods, ethos, styles, and orientations it performs.101 By 
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understanding paranoia and reparation as differential positions or practices rather than as 
theoretical ideologies, diagnostic personality types, or as normatively ordered stages, 
Sedgwick is able to see how a single thinker (including herself) often engages in both 
styles of criticism (and in other styles besides these). Sedgwick thus presents paranoia 
and reparation as flexible and heterogeneous relational stances in order to hold both open 
as possibilities for critical practice.102 She emphasizes their practical differences in the 
hopes of “doing justice to the powerful reparative practices that…infuse self-avowedly 
paranoid critical projects, as well as in the paranoid exigencies that are often necessary 
for nonparanoid knowing and utterance.”103  
In a similar vein, I offer reparative critique not as a substitute for paranoid 
critique, which would itself be a paranoid gesture, but to expand the field of possible 
critical practices in an additive gesture that Sedgwick aligns with a reparative impulse.104 
Like Sedgwick, my concern is not with wholly dismissing paranoid critique, but with 
interrupting its self-evident imperative force as the only viable practice of critique so as to 
offer alternative methods and moods for engaging critique. That is, I take issue with the 
near equivalence of critique and paranoid inquiry such that “to theorize out of anything 
but a paranoid critical stance has come to seem naïve, pious, or complaisant.”105 The 
concept of reparative critique allows one to see that not only is it possible to practice 
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critique non-suspiciously, but that there may be some incentive to do so in light of the 
problematic features of paranoia already discussed.  
I translate Sedgwick’s concepts of paranoid reading and reparative reading into 
distinct practices of philosophical critique. This work of translation, however, presents 
some difficulties. One might object that methods of reading are not the same as practices 
of critique and therefore the two cannot profitably be compared. While I agree that the 
two do not wholly consist in the same activity, in my estimation, the practice of critique 
includes reading as one of its activities. The critic cannot do her work without engaging 
some strategy of reading and interpretation in her dealing with texts, cultures, archives, or 
other media objects. While the practices of critique and reading are not wholly identical, 
they also are not thereby incompatible insofar as the one contributes to the work of the 
latter.106 Furthermore, it is clear from Sedgwick’s essay that the strategies of paranoid 
reading and reparative reading do not only refer to methods of interpretation, but extend 
to styles of argumentation and writing, ethical modes of relating, and trends of critical 
theorizing. That is, while Sedgwick is especially concerned with paranoid styles of 
reading in queer theory, she nonetheless argues that critical habits of suspicion and 
paranoia have become central to, if not nearly synonymous with, criticism itself.107 While 
Sedgwick’s essay is clearly motivated by tendencies of critical practice within her 
disciplines of queer theory and literary theory, she sees these trends encompassing a wide 
range of critical theoretical work. On this view, the concepts of paranoid reading and 
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reparative reading already refer to alternative kinds of critical theoretical inquiry.108 
Reparative reading would here constitute a practice of reparative critique. Yet, one might 
argue that even if Sedgwick takes these methods of reading to be synonymous with types 
of critical inquiry, she does not map them specifically to varieties of philosophical 
critique. There may thus be a slippage between what Sedgwick means by “critical 
theoretical inquiry” and what I mean by “critique.” I take this slippage to be a welcome, 
if inevitable, feature of undertaking translation work. As Latour points out, there can be 
no points of passage without lines of detour, no continuity without contamination, and no 
association without transformation.109  
My concepts of paranoid critique and reparative critique drift from those of 
paranoid reading and reparative reading in two ways. First, I do not link paranoid critique 
and reparative critique to a theory of negative and positive affects for reasons rehearsed 
earlier. Second, I understand these practices as variations of a conception of critique that 
comes from Kant. For Kant, critique is an ethos and style of philosophical inquiry that 
brings together the features of reflexivity, a limit-attitude, and suspicion. Unlike Kant, 
however, I do not take suspicion to be the affect that necessarily informs the work of 
critique. Suspicion inflects the variety of critical practice I call paranoid critique. This is a 
critical exercise that habituates critics to the activities of denouncement and 
demystification. These activities crystallize in the critic’s anticipation and exposure of 
hidden truths that she takes to be noxious, violent, shameful, evil, or worthy of 
condemnation. The danger for the paranoid critic is to be caught off guard by truths she 
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did not anticipate. Paranoid critique potentially suffers from the problems identified by 
Sedgwick in the method of paranoid reading. I take these problems to surface especially 
in those features of critique’s reflexivity and its limit-attitude. In terms of its reflexivity, 
paranoid critique engages the critic in a vigilant, anticipatory, and antagonistic relation to 
herself. This antagonism manifests in the paranoid critic’s posture toward the constitutive 
limits of herself and others. She sets herself against these limits, treating them with 
aspersion and contempt, while attempting to forestall their expected appearance in other 
domains. The paranoid critic’s obsession with anticipating such limits blinds her from the 
possibility of transgressing or transforming them. Rather than treat these limits as 
transformable contingencies, the paranoid critic takes them as inevitable obstacles that 
can be exposed and expected but can never be overcome.  
Reparative critique is a type of critical practice that disposes critics to the 
activities of mending and assembling. The term ‘reparative’ is used to capture the 
creative and restorative work of critique. That is, critique is understood here as not simply 
a diagnostic tool, but as a tool that transforms, mends, reworks, and provides sustenance. 
This practice is invested with a range of affects that include love, mourning, hope, 
remorse, joy, care, and curiosity. Reparative affects inflect the features of critique 
differently than do suspicion or paranoia. Reflexivity becomes a matter of establishing a 
mode of self-relation that links with what Foucault calls “the care of the self.” This is a 
reflexive practice concerned with the difficult and delicate work of providing the self 
with pleasure and nourishment in an otherwise precarious environment. Reparative 
reflexivity differs from the paranoid version in that the subject of critique relates to 
herself not as an enemy, but as someone worthy of care, concern, and patient attention. 
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This entails an honest consideration of one’s limits, losses, and faults, as well as an 
openness to the possibility of transforming these limits and mending some of the harms. 
The reparative critic regards limits as those ambiguous things that are both constraining 
and alterable. Limits are constraining in that they discipline action in particular ways, but 
they are also alterable in that these limits are capable of being transgressed and changed. 
The limit-attitude of reparative critique is thus more of the positive variety that Foucault 
discusses in “What is Enlightenment?”. For Foucault, the limit-attitude consists in 
situating ourselves at those constitutive boundaries so as to test their fragility and 
transformability. The critic’s task is neither one of renouncing or vindicating the limits of 
ourselves, but of tracing their points of fracture and instability so as to experiment with 
the possibility of moving beyond them.  
 
4. Varieties of Reparative Critique 
 To further develop and support reparative critique as a viable critical practice, I 
turn in the following chapters to the work of William James and Michel Foucault. These 
two figures, I argue, offer varieties of reparative critique that are inflected by a range of 
different affects. I take them as exemplary for the way they reparatively engage the labor 
of critique. Each understands critique to be something other than a paranoid philosophical 
exercise that either denounces or demystifies some social practice. Rather, they take 
critique to be a reparative philosophical exercise that brings together the activities of 
inquiring, assembling, and transforming. Each differently nuances the practice of 
reparative critique through the affects they bring to bear to critical work, through their 
diverse styles of philosophical inquiry, and through the specific objects that capture their 
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critical attention. In spite of these differences, the varieties of reparative critique offered 
by James and Foucault resonate along three conceptual lines – action, affectivity, and 
transformation. In the chapters that follow, I use reparative critique as an interpretive lens 
for understanding the pragmatism of James and the genealogy of Foucault. By re-reading 
their work through the lens of reparative critique, I try to frustrate familiar accounts that 
either deny they have a conception of critique (in the case of James) or that interpret their 
critical activity exclusively through a lens of paranoid critique (in the case of Foucault).  
 By selecting the work of James and Foucault as sites for developing and 
supporting reparative critique, my argument is not that the work of other scholars could 
not be productively engaged for the same purpose. I do not believe that these specific 
figures have exclusive claim to the practice of reparative critique. For instance, one might 
explore other versions of reparative critique in the work of French theorists like Roland 
Barthes and Gilles Deleuze, of American ‘Continental’ theorists such as Judith Butler, of 
pragmatist philosophers like John Dewey and Cornel West, and of literary public 
intellectuals including James Baldwin and Toni Morrison. I also do not claim that one 
cannot find paranoid elements in the critical work of James and Foucault. These are 
figures whose work is fueled by a concern with the stagnant and paralyzing effects of 
certain judgments, practices, beliefs, and theories on our thought and action. They call 
attention to and question the authoritative posturing of critics and philosophers who make 
judgments and prescriptions about specific social, ethical, and political problems. Finally, 
they are thinkers who take critical work to be a question of making, doing, and 
transforming. That is, they bring a reparative attitude to the ongoing work of critique.  
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5. Chapter Outline 
 
 In what follows, I develop and refine the practice of reparative critique in two 
parts. In Part One (consisting of Chapters Two and Three), I clarify varieties of reparative 
critique in the history of philosophy through the work of Foucault and James, 
respectively. I then show how reparative critique can be put to work for contemporary 
political philosophy in Part Two (consisting of Chapters Four, Five, and Six). These two 
parts are connected in the following way – the figures engaged with in Part One supply 
precedents for the enactment of reparative critique in Part Two as a method for 
contemporary political critique. That is, I draw on the models of reparative critique 
provided by Foucault and James to show how reparative critique can be deployed for 
inquiring into problems within current political theory and practice.  
 Part One begins with Chapter Two on Foucault’s method of genealogical critique. 
In this chapter, I draw on the concept of reparative critique to clarify the status of 
normativity in Foucault’s genealogical method. Unlike Nancy Fraser and Jürgen 
Habermas, I argue that genealogical critique is not a normatively ambitious exercise 
insofar as it does not aim to supply normative judgments about or prescriptions for its 
objects of critique. Rather, I contend that it is a normatively concerned exercise in the 
sense that it aims to mark out possibilities for transforming those practices that constitute 
problems for our present selves. To clarify this element of concern guiding genealogy, I 
attend to Foucault’s writings on care as an affective attitude guiding his practice of 
reparative critique. 
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 In the subsequent chapter on James (Chapter Three), I offer a rereading of 
James’s philosophical pragmatism through the lens of reparative critique. I argue that 
James practices critique as a reparative exercise that can be understood through his 
meliorism, which is the name James gives to a hopeful attitude about the possibility of 
improving our practices and selves. To elucidate James’s practice of reparative critique, I 
highlight a central feature of his meliorism that troubles the charge voiced by Cornel 
West and others that he is an uncommitted and therefore acritical thinker. James develops 
a reparative account of agency which figures in his meliorism as a response to the 
problematics of action. To account for this type of agency and the reparative commitment 
it entails, I turn to James’s psychological and ethical work from the 1880s and 1890s.  
 Following this, Part Two begins with Chapter Four, in which I take up debates 
over the status of ideal theory in contemporary political philosophy. Using the frame of 
these debates, I argue that a reparative political critique must be realist rather than 
idealizing in orientation. It must be realist for two reasons. First, insofar as ideal theory 
bears affinities with paranoid critique in terms of their epistemic aims of universalism 
and certainty, reparative political critique must incline itself away from ideal theory. 
Second, reparative political critique must be realist insofar as it offers a fact-sensitive 
approach that attends to problems of power that haunt a particular present. The realist 
orientation of reparative political critique offers a better alternative, I argue, to the 
paranoid tendencies at work in both John Rawls’s ideal theory as well as Raymond 
Geuss’s political realism.  
 Chapters Five and Six can be understood as putting the realist method of 
reparative critique to work on contemporary ethical and political problems arising from a 
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digital present. In Chapter Five, I consider the problem of racial bias and discrimination 
posed by the exercise of power in predictive policing algorithms. Focusing on person-
based algorithms like the Chicago Police Department’s Strategic Subject List (SSL), I 
argue that predictive policing exercises power through a paranoid style that constitutes a 
form of what I call “temporal governmentality.” This concept refers to a way of 
organizing power through specific temporal relations between the past, present, and 
future. Analyzing the SSL through the lens of temporal governmentality, I argue that the 
racialized time of predictive policing works to forge a double closure of the past and the 
future through a paranoid logic that aims to preempt future possibilities of criminal 
conduct by drawing on a past codified in the form of historical crime data. 
 After clarifying the power exercised by predictive policing algorithms, Chapter 
Six deploys reparative critique to outline a set of ethical strategies for transforming the 
practice of predictive policing. That is, whereas Chapter Five utilizes reparative critique 
to make sense of problems in predictive policing, Chapter Six takes up the task of 
reparatively transforming these problems. Drawing on James’s conduct-centric approach 
to ethics and Foucault’s account of ethics as counter-conduct, I develop an ethical 
framework for responding to the power at work in predictive policing systems. This 
framework pushes beyond the ideal of transparency that guides much work on the ethics 
of algorithms. Unlike the transparency ideal, the ethical strategies I defend consist in a set 
of four techniques of counter-conduct that resist predictive policing’s operation of power. 
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PART I 
CHAPTER II 
CARE AND REPARATIVE TRANSFORMATION  
IN FOUCAULDIAN GENEALOGY 
 
Introduction 
In an anonymous interview from 1980, Michel Foucault described his critical 
project in the following way: “I can’t help but dream about a kind of criticism that would 
try not to judge but to bring an oeuvre, a book, a sentence, an idea to life; it would light 
fires, watch the grass grow, listen to the wind, and catch the sea foam in the breeze and 
scatter it. It would multiply not judgment but signs of existence.”110 The fact that 
Foucault insisted on remaining anonymous in this interview should not be lost on the 
reader. Indeed, Foucault’s gesture problematizes the authority attributed to the name of 
an author or intellectual. This problematizing posture toward the author is a theme of 
Foucault’s work from the late 1960s and early 1970s. Foucault begins a lecture from 
February 1969, later published as “What is an Author?,” with the following line from 
Samuel Beckett: “‘What does it matter who is speaking,’ someone said, ‘what does it 
matter who is speaking.’”111 Foucault then elaborates the ethical rule of indifference that 
immanently guides the practice of writing and that alludes to the disappearance or death 
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of the author.112 He uses anonymity in his 1980 interview as a form of ethical address to 
the “potential reader.”113 He uses anonymity not to pass judgment, but to give the reader 
the agency to assess what is said on her own, to be “more inclined to find out why I say 
what you read.”114 The anonymous critic deploys anonymity in order to allow others to 
judge for themselves: “just allow yourself to say, quite simply, it’s true, it’s false. I like it 
or I don’t like it. Period.”115 
Foucault’s anonymous interview offers a fecund site for thinking through 
genealogy as a form of critique without judgment. I use the term ‘reparative critique’ to 
refer to genealogy as a style of critique disinvested from judgment. Put positively, 
reparative critique is a critical practice that attends to the transformability of those 
historical limits that constrain our present ways of thinking, feeling, relating, and acting. I 
draw on the concept of reparative critique here to clarify the status of normativity in 
Foucault’s genealogical method. As I will argue, genealogical critique is not a 
normatively ambitious exercise insofar as it does not aim to supply normative judgments 
about its objects of critique, nor does it aim to provide normative prescriptions or 
solutions to the problems it brings into focus. It is, however, a normatively concerned 
exercise in the sense that it aims to mark out possibilities for transforming those practices 
that constitute problems for our present selves. We can provisionally think of this 
distinction in terms of the familiar difference between projects in normative ethics and a 
metaethical orientation that is not skeptical toward normativity, but does not in the first 
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place attempt to develop normative rules. This distinction between a normatively 
ambitious project and a normatively concerned project throws into relief the relation 
between genealogical critique and normativity. The difference can be grasped as that 
between a mode of critique that aims to judge and one that aims to “take care.”116 Care 
marks the affective ethos or attitude of Foucault’s practice of reparative critique. This 
attitude of care or concern is one that Foucault continually invokes in his writings on 
ethics and critique from the late 1970s and early 1980s. ‘Care’, I argue, is Foucault’s 
affective style of, in Roland Barthes’s words, “being present to the struggles of his 
time.”117  
This argument proceeds in five steps. In section one, I sketch an overview of the 
debate concerning the status of normativity in Foucault’s method of genealogical critique. 
Here I offer my concept of reparative critique to indicate the sense in which genealogy is 
not normatively ambitious, but is normatively concerned in that it describes the historical 
formation of present practices with an eye toward opening up a space for their possible 
transformation. I then show in section two how Foucault inherits a distinction between 
critique and judgment from two of his most influential predecessors, Kant and Nietzsche. 
I defend the distinction between critique and judgment as useful for clarifying the lack of 
normative ambition of genealogy insofar as it refuses to impose normative prescriptions 
about what to do. This work of contextualizing genealogy as a non-judgmental form of 
critique will help us see what is unique about Foucauldian genealogy as a practice of 
problematization. In section three, I provide an account of problematization as an activity 
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and object of critical inquiry so as to specify, more positively, what genealogy does as a 
form of critique without judgment. I clarify two things about problematization as an 
object and activity of critique. Problematization is a critical practice that creates, among 
other things, problems as possible openings for the present work of transformation. 
Problems are not objects for normative judgment, but objects of normative concern. They 
call not for judgment, but for care. This leads me to clarify the relation between the 
ethical and critical uses of care in Foucault’s late writings in section four. Care 
importantly calls our attention to the work of transformation that Foucault’s practice of 
reparative critique endeavors to perform. Finally, in the conclusion, I specify how the 
normative concern embodied in Foucault’s practice of care functions as a response to the 
problem of normativity in Foucauldian critique. 
 
1. The Normative Status of Genealogical Critique 
 The most influential criticisms of Foucault’s genealogical method can be found in 
the work of Nancy Fraser and Jürgen Habermas.118 Their criticisms aim to show the 
normative confusions or, to use Habermas’s phrase, the “cryptonormativism” at work in 
Foucault’s genealogies. According to Fraser, Foucault uses the empirical insights 
supplied by genealogy to draw normative conclusions about the forms of “domination” 
and “subjugation” that result from the capillary exercise of modern power.119 These 
normative conclusions, however, amount to normative confusions insofar as Foucault 
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vacillates between two incompatible positions. Fraser argues that on the one hand, 
Foucault “adopts a concept of power that permits him no condemnation of any 
objectionable features of modern societies.”120 On the other hand, Foucault’s rhetoric 
“betrays the conviction that modern societies are utterly without redeeming features.”121 
Thus, for Fraser, Foucault derives negative conclusions about the present from his 
historical work at the same time as he deploys a concept of power that disallows 
denunciation.  
 In a somewhat different register, Habermas argues that Foucault’s genealogical 
method suffers from “cryptonormativism” in that it unconsciously ports certain norms in 
the conclusions it arrives at through empirico-historical inquiry.122 Habermas argues, 
“Foucault understands himself as a dissident who offers resistance to modern thought and 
humanistically disguised disciplinary power.”123 On Habermas’s read, Foucault aims to 
judge disciplinary power as something bad, unjust, or pernicious. For Habermas, 
genealogy is normatively ambitious insofar as it is aims to subvert modern forms of 
power.  
 Fraser and Habermas are not alone in their criticisms of the normative ambiguity 
of genealogy. Michael Walzer and Charles Taylor forward similar arguments against 
genealogy. In his essay, “The Politics of Michel Foucault,” Walzer accuses Foucault of 
nihilism and moral anarchism.124 He claims that Foucault has anarchistic political 
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commitments in that he seeks the dismantling or “abolition” of certain regimes of 
power.125 Furthermore, he argues that since Foucault regards morality and politics as 
reciprocally connected, Foucault’s anarchism amounts to a form of nihilism in that he 
aims to abolish “both moral and scientific categories.”126 This nihilism leaves Foucault 
without any normative resources to contest the legitimacy of power or to discriminate 
between forms of power that are better or worse than others. Taylor accuses Foucault of 
holding a contradictory position that leaves him normatively bankrupt insofar as Foucault 
detaches power from truth and liberation. He contends that Foucault contradicts himself 
in passages where he denies the possibility of liberation from regimes of power and 
where he seems to allow for the possibility of a liberation that is “founded on a 
puncturing of illusions.”127 Taylor calls this Foucault’s “Nietzschean refusal of ‘truth’ 
and ‘liberation’” that leads him to a relativistic understanding of historical changes in 
power relations.128 He argues that Foucault, by detaching power from truth and freedom, 
gives up the normative criteria – that is, the measure of comparability – that allows one to 
judge the historical changes of power.  
  Two recent strategies for defending Foucault against the arguments of Fraser, 
Habermas, and others can be gleaned from the work of Amy Allen and Colin Koopman. 
Allen and Koopman clarify the normative status of genealogy and both attempt to show 
the compatibility of genealogy with the more normatively robust work of Habermas. In 
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The Politics of Our Selves, Allen argues with Fraser that Foucault indeed commits a 
genetic fallacy, but she dissents from Fraser’s contention that this genetic reasoning is 
unequivocally fallacious.129 Allen deploys the insights from Foucault’s historicist 
poststructualism and Habermas’s normative critical theory to forward a contextualist 
form of normativity. This “principled form of contextualism” highlights the dual need to 
“posit context-transcending ideals and to continually unmask their status as illusions 
rooted in interest and power-laden contexts.”130 Koopman argues against Fraser that 
Foucault does not commit a genetic fallacy, but agrees with Fraser (and disagrees with 
Allen) that genetic reasoning is indeed fallacious.131 Koopman’s non-normative reading 
of Foucault in Genealogy as Critique motivates his turn to Habermasian critical theory 
and Deweyan pragmatism for lending the normative resources to critical theory that are 
found wanting in Foucauldian genealogy.  
 My strategy of defending Foucault against the criticisms of Fraser, Habermas, and 
others differs from those deployed by Allen and Koopman in two ways. First, contra 
Allen, I am not interested in showing how Foucauldian genealogy is itself normatively 
ambitious and thus consistent with forms of normative theory like Habermasian 
communicative ethics. Second, unlike Koopman, I worry that a partitioning of the tasks 
of diagnosis and normative reconstruction to genealogy and pragmatist critical theory, 
respectively, potentially obfuscates the sense in which genealogy is itself a transformative 
kind of work. Seeing genealogy as contributing the materials to normative theorists for 
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reconstruction potentially makes genealogy a mere instrument for normative theory. 
Might genealogy be not just preparatory for the ambitious normative work to come later? 
Might it itself perform a type of political and ethical work that, while not normatively 
ambitious, is normatively concerned with problematizing present limitations on actions 
and creating possibilities for transforming these limits?  
I follow Verena Erlenbusch-Anderson in distinguishing between a normatively 
ambitious project and what she describes as the “normatively oriented” work of 
genealogy.132 In Genealogies of Terrorism, Erlenbusch-Anderson suggests that 
Foucault’s method is normatively oriented insofar as it “describes practices that are 
intolerable... with the aim of making transformation possible.”133 Building on this work, I 
conceptualize genealogical critique as normatively concerned, but not normatively 
ambitious. In highlighting the element of concern at work in genealogy, I aim to 
emphasize something that is missing in Erlenbusch-Anderson’s account – namely, the 
affective dimensions of genealogy as a method of critique.134 Genealogy is normatively 
concerned in that it attends to problems as sites of normative ambiguity rather than as 
normatively clear-cut cases. Whereas the latter refer to wrongs, harms, or injustices that 
stand in need of the normatively ambitious work of judgment, the former call for the 
work of critique, informed by an affect of care, to attend to the features contributing to 
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their ambiguous status. For example, we can distinguish between normatively clear-cut 
cases such as a parent’s violent abuse of a child and more normatively ambiguous cases 
such as the gentle chiding a parent gives to stop a child from drawing on walls.135 
Genealogy addresses the second practice as potentially problematic without yet being 
harmful or unjust. Hence, while Fraser and Habermas criticize Foucault for using 
genealogy to furtively denounce normatively clear-cut cases of domination and injustice, 
I suggest that genealogy attends to normatively ambiguous practices and experiments 
with their possible transformation. This distinction helps clarify the normative status of 
genealogy as a mode of critique that combines historical analysis and experimental 
transformation.136 Understanding genealogy as a practice of reparative critique draws our 
attention to the transformative work prepared and performed by this method of inquiry.  
I interpret genealogy as a practice of reparative critique in order to highlight what 
Foucault calls his “optimism.”137 The “reparative” refers to a set of strategies whereby 
subjects salvage possibilities or “extract sustenance” from the objects of a culture.138 As I 
argued in Chapter One, unlike the overly anxious, self-defeating, and anticipatory affects 
guiding the practice of paranoid critique, reparative critique is aligned with an affect of 
hope, which, as Sedgwick notes, is “among the energies by which the reparatively 
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positioned reader tries to organize the fragments and part-objects she encounters or 
creates.”139 
If we understand a reparative attitude as one that is identified by an openness to 
change and contingency, then we might understand genealogy as invested with such an 
attitude. This attitude is reflected in Foucault’s observations of the optimism that his 
research rests on. He comments, “There is an optimism that consists in saying, ‘In any 
case, it couldn’t be any better.’ My optimism would consist rather is saying, ‘So many 
things can be changed, being as fragile as they are, tied more to contingencies than to 
necessities, more to what is arbitrary than to what is rationally established, more to 
complex but transitory historical contingencies than to inevitable anthropological 
constants.’”140 Elsewhere Foucault links his optimism with his refusal to offer 
prescriptions for actions to be carried out by those enmeshed in power relations. He 
notes, “If I don’t say what needs to be done, it isn’t because I believe there is nothing to 
be done. On the contrary, I think there are a thousand things that can be done, invented, 
contrived by those who, recognizing the relations of power in which they are involved, 
have decided to resist them or escape them. From that viewpoint, all my research rests on 
a postulate of absolute optimism. I don’t construct my analyses in order to say, ‘This is 
the way things are, you are trapped.’ I say these things only insofar as I believe it enables 
us to transform them.”141 Foucault’s optimism, like the fracturing affect of hope that 
Sedgwick associates with reparative reading, affirms the possibility for transforming the 
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present. Foucault’s reparative posture, embodied in his genealogical method of critique, 
thus holds open transformation as a possibility. 
 To defend Foucault from the criticisms of Fraser and Habermas, it is necessary to 
demonstrate that Foucault did not endeavor to draw normative judgments about the 
present from his histories of the present. Here I rely on a distinction between critique and 
judgment that was central to Foucault’s conception of genealogy as a method of critique. 
This difference between critique and judgment that comes to the fore in Foucault’s 
genealogical method underscores the sense in which genealogy is not normatively 
ambitious. Genealogy is not normatively ambitious because it does not aim to judge its 
objects of critique, nor does it aim to provide normative prescriptions for resolving the 
problems it clarifies.  
While the next few sections develop and defend the distance between 
genealogical critique and normative judgment more thoroughly, as a first pass, consider 
Foucault’s unambiguous response to an interviewer’s question concerning disciplinary 
power. His interviewer asks whether Foucault considers it bad or “repressive” to 
discipline children to prevent them from drawing on walls. Foucault replies, “There’s no 
reason why this manner of guiding the behavior of others should not ultimately have 
results that are positive, valuable, interesting, and so on. If I had a kid, I assure you he 
would not write on the walls – or if he did, it would be against my will. The idea!”142 
Foucault’s view here and elsewhere is not that the exercise of power is bad, unjust, or 
wrong, but that it is problematic, dangerous, or fraught. Problems or dangers are not quite 
those things that stand in need of judgment. They are those things that call for inquiry in 
                                                        
142 Op. cite n.135.   
 59 
the form of critique and curiosity in the form of care. Before turning to the work of 
problematization and care in Foucault’s work, I first offer a historical framing for these 
ideas in order to highlight the difference between critique and judgment.   
 
2. Critique without Judgment, or What Genealogy is Not 
 To understand Foucault’s conception of critique without judgment, it helps to 
identify what specifically Foucault inherits from two of his (arguably) most influential 
philosophical predecessors. I disentangle two threads that Foucault inherits from Kant 
and Nietzsche as they concern the distinction between critique and judgment. These 
threads, however, do not constitute lines of fidelity on Foucault’s part; they are detours or 
vectors of displacement.143 Foucault transforms and reassembles the threads to create his 
own version of genealogical critique as a practice of problematization.144  
First, from Kant, Foucault inherits critique as a form of philosophical inquiry into 
conditions of possibility that addresses a historical question concerning our present 
subjectivity. Kant distinguishes critique from criticism. Critique is a specific kind of 
inquiry; criticism is an evaluative and interpretive practice. Second, from Nietzsche, 
Foucault acquires genealogy as a historical and creative style of critique that also 
addresses itself to the present. Nietzsche contrasts the activity and creativity of critique 
with the reactive pathos and normative aspirations of judgment.145  
                                                        
143 See Latour, “Technical Mediation.”  
 
144 See Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 10-13 and Koopman, Genealogy as Critique.  
 
145 Though Kant and Nietzsche both posit the possibility of distinguishing critique from judgment, both 
occasionally slip into thinking of critique in terms of judgment. One can see this in the way Kant refers to 
his critical investigation of pure reason in the first Critique as a “tribunal of reason.” See Kant, Critique of 
Pure Reason, Preface, Axii. Nietzsche substitutes a “pathos of difference” for Kant’s principled 
indifference in his genealogical version of critique. Nietzsche’s metaphor for philosophical critique is not 
 60 
Many scholars emphasize the importance of Kant for understanding Foucault’s 
critical-historical methodologies of archaeology and genealogy.146 In several interviews 
and essays, Foucault situates his own work in relationship to Kant. Essays and interviews 
from the early 1980s like “What is Enlightenment?,” “What is Critique?,” and “The 
Subject and Power” speak directly to Kant’s importance in asking a particular kind of 
historical question that links ourselves with the present. In an essay from 1984 
celebrating the 200th anniversary of a little-known text written by Kant in 1784, Foucault 
takes up the same question addressed by Kant in a German periodical: What is 
Enlightenment? (Was ist Aufklärung?). He describes Kant’s question – “What is 
Enlightenment?” – as posing a novel philosophical task, a form of inquiry that asks after 
who we are in a precise moment of history.147 This question asks, “What is our own 
actuality, what is happening around us, what is our present?”148 It signals something 
novel insofar as it invites Kant to reflect on his present as “difference in history.”149 
Foucault connects Kant’s historical question with the mode of philosophizing Kant 
engages in his three Critiques. He writes, “Kant, in fact, describes Enlightenment as the 
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moment when humanity is going to put its own reason to use without subjecting itself to 
any authority; now it is precisely at this moment that the critique is necessary, since its 
role is that of defining the conditions under which the use of reason is legitimate in order 
to determine what can be known [connaître], what must be done, and what may be 
hoped.”150 Foucault thus takes “What is Enlightenment?” as the text that brings together 
critique and history, which outlines the attitude or ethos of modernity.151 Foucault inherits 
two things from Kant – a historical question and critique as a philosophical task for 
addressing the question. From Kant he takes a conception of critique dissociated from 
criticism or negative judgment.  
 Kant defines his critique in The Critique of Pure Reason as an “estimation” of the 
“sources and limits” of reason.152 Kant’s aim in the first Critique is to provide an 
explanation of the conditions of possibility of certain epistemic forms of judgment, what 
Kant calls ‘synthetic a priori judgments.’ “How,” he asks, “are synthetic a priori 
judgments possible?”153 Unlike analytic a priori judgments, synthetic judgments refer to 
those propositions whose predicate-concept is not contained within the subject-
concept.154 Kant’s inquiry amounts to a form of transcendental critique insofar as it is an 
investigation of an a priori mode of knowledge that treats the conditions of possible 
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knowledge as necessary and universal.155 Though for Kant critique takes the form of 
judgment,156 judgment is neither taken as a type of approval or denunciation, but is 
undertaken as a form of rational inquiry.157 Like a “tribunal,” critique assumes the form 
of an impartial or indifferent judgment.158 In the first Critique, Kant writes that by 
critique, he does not mean “a criticism of books and systems,” but a “critical inquiry into 
the faculty of reason.”159 Kant here distinguishes between critique and criticism. The 
former is a rational inquiry into limit conditions. The latter is a practice of evaluating, 
interpreting, and judging texts, works of art, or other objects. Kant aims to reach a 
“decision about the possibility or impossibility of a metaphysics in general, and the 
determination of its sources, as well as its extent and boundaries, all, however, from 
principles.”160 Kant’s critique thus does not aim to negatively or positively judge the 
objects of his inquiry in the sense of either condemning or praising them. More precisely, 
his critique represents a principled inquiry or rational examination of necessary and 
universal limits. 
Nietzsche takes up the Kantian project of critique in his 1887 On the Genealogy 
of Morality. There Nietzsche writes, “[W]e need a critique of moral values, the values of 
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these values themselves must first be called in question – and for that there is needed a 
knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which they grew, under which they 
evolved and changed.”161 By examining the depth conditions of moral values in terms of 
the will to power and will to truth, Nietzsche continues Kant’s critical project as an 
investigation of conditions of possibility. Yet, Nietzsche also transforms critical 
philosophy from a transcendental form of inquiry to a historical one through his method 
of genealogy. In his unorthodox reading of Nietzsche from 1962, Gilles Deleuze stresses 
Nietzsche’s inheritance and alteration of Kant’s critical philosophy.162 I use Deleuze’s 
interpretation to foreground Nietzsche’s importance for Foucault’s conception of critique. 
Deleuze’s book on Nietzsche not only had a significant impact on French thought in the 
early 1960s,163 it also serves as a helpful indication of the insights Foucault found in 
Nietzschean genealogy as a model of historical critique.164 Deleuze’s Kantian reading of 
Nietzsche makes explicit Foucault’s own implicit reading of Nietzsche as inheriting (and 
transforming) Kantian critical philosophy.165 
Deleuze reads Nietzschean genealogical critique as a creative, active, affirmative, 
and historical endeavor that is focused around the problem of values – that is, in terms of 
the “value of values,” the “evaluation from which their value arises,” and the “problem of 
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their creation.”166 Critique takes evaluation, the differential element of values which is 
not itself a value but a “way of being” or “mode of existence,” as its object of inquiry.167 
Yet, critique is also an expression of evaluation, an active way of being, contrasted with 
reaction, revenge, and ressentiment. Deleuze’s reading importantly highlights Nietzsche’s 
affirmative and creative conception of critique. This interpretation contrasts with those 
who read Nietzschean genealogical critique as primarily subversive or denunciatory.168 
Deleuze argues that Nietzsche’s affirmative version of critique overcomes negation 
through the affirmation of difference.169 Nietzsche’s genealogical critique thus divests 
itself of the negative and reactive and expresses instead affirmative differences or active 
modes of existence. On this view, critique is not that which negatively judges but that 
which affirms, creates, and historically evaluates according to immanent modes of 
existence.170 
Deleuze’s Nietzschean distinction between judging and evaluating comes to the 
fore in his 1993 essay, “To Have Done with Judgment.” I mention this essay because it 
highlights a differentiation that Foucault suggests in his anonymous 1980 interview with 
which I opened this chapter. Published as “The Masked Philosopher,” Foucault there 
draws a distinction between a form of criticism that judges and one that creates. He 
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muses, “I can’t help but dream about a kind of criticism that would try not to judge but to 
bring an oeuvre, a book, a sentence, an idea to life… It would multiply not judgment but 
signs of existence.”171 Likewise, Deleuze differentiates the act of judgment from the 
creation of “modes of existence.” “Judgment,” he urges, “prevents the emergence of any 
new mode of existence. For the latter creates itself through its own forces, that is, through 
the forces it is able to harness, and is valid in and of itself inasmuch as it brings the new 
combination into existence. Herein, perhaps, lies the secret: to bring into existence and 
not to judge.”172 On this view, judgment is problematic because it presupposes fixed, 
universal, transcendent values or criteria (e.g. “good” and “evil”) that allow one to assess 
the morality of action.173 Judgment implies normative assessment. It adjudicates, 
appraises, approves or condemns; it does not create. Deleuze thus brings into view a 
Nietzschean insight about critique that Foucault adopts in his own version of genealogy, 
which constitutes a creative form of critique without judgment.  
Foucault gleans these distinctions between critique and judgment from Kant and 
Nietzsche and transforms their insights in his own genealogical method. For example, 
elucidating the critical task of Discipline and Punish in an interview from 1983, later 
published in 1984 as “What is Called Punishing,” Foucault explains that he “didn’t aim to 
do a work of criticism [oeuvre de critique], at least not directly, if what is meant by 
criticism in this case is denunciation of the negative aspects of the current penal 
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system.”174 Foucault here distances his work from a form of criticism that denounces the 
negative parts of a practice, institution, or political system. Rather, he clarifies his task of 
critique as one that addresses the problem of uncovering the “system of thought” or 
“form of rationality” that conditions, supports, and sustains a heterogeneous set of 
practices.175 His critique of the prison form is a Kantian-Nietzschean inquiry into 
imprisonment’s historical conditions of possibility. 
Later in the interview, Foucault distances himself from “prophetic intellectuals” 
who proffer normative advice about what people “ought to do ahead of time.”176 Such 
intellectuals prescribe “conceptual frameworks for them” in an authoritative posturing 
that expresses a form of power exercised on practitioners.177 From the prescriptive 
discourse of prophetic intellectuals, Foucault contrasts the problematizing discourse of 
“specific intellectuals” who “try and isolate in their power of constraint, but also in the 
contingency of their historical formations, the systems of thought that have become 
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familiar to us, that appear self-evident and are integral with our perception, our attitudes, 
our behaviors.”178 The critic engaging in the work of critique is thus not one who lays 
down prescriptions, prophecies or programs for behavior. She does not have such 
normative ambitions. The critic “challenges.”179 She challenges by conducting historical 
inquiry into the contingency and conditionality of familiar systems of thought so as to 
defamiliarize, problematize, or make them strange. The aim of critical analysis is “to 
permit at the same time refusal, and curiosity, and innovation.”180 
 Critique does not assess; it does not take the positional stance of either “for” or 
“against.” Critique does not negate. It does not prophesize or prescribe. Critique does not 
judge. What then does critique do? Critique inquires, problematizes, and creates.  
 
3. Critique as Problematization, or What Genealogy Does 
Toward the end of his short life, Foucault came to describe his work as exercises 
of “problematization.”181 By considering problematization as an activity of critique, we 
can begin to specify the relation between critique and normativity. Critique poses 
problems or questions to practice where normative theory would advance judgments, 
prescriptions, and solutions. Problematization is not a normatively ambitious exercise in 
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the sense that it does not aim at providing normative judgments, prescriptions or solutions 
to problems. But it is a normatively concerned exercise in the sense that it aims to mark 
out possibilities for transforming those practices that constitute problems for our present 
selves. Concern affectively inflects the normative orientation of critique as 
problematization.182 Foucault regards problems not as objects for judgment, but as 
objects of concern. Problematization does not impose answers or solutions; it poses 
problems and creates concepts. 
As Rabinow and Koopman have shown, problematization has a double 
meaning.183 It refers at once to Foucault’s historical objects of analysis and the activity of 
his critical inquiries. The former instance might be called, following Koopman, “nominal 
problematizations,” while the latter instance refer to “active problematizations.”184 To 
highlight this difference, consider the nominal dimension at work in Foucault’s 
description of sexual problematization from the second volume of The History of 
Sexuality. There Foucault considers the historical “forms in which sexual behavior was 
problematized, becoming an object of concern, an element for reflection, and a material 
for stylization.”185 In this work, moral problematizations of pleasure constitute the object 
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of Foucault’s critico-historical analysis. Here the past problematizations of historical 
actors become material for Foucault’s own problematizing activity. As an activity, task or 
work, problematization is both a form of description that aims to clarify past 
problematizations that condition the history of present practices, as well as a critical 
attitude that amplifies our interest or concern in the problematizations that “pose 
problems for politics.”186 Koopman refers to these as the “clarifying” and “intensifying” 
functions of the activity of problematization.187  
This section aims to explicate two things about problematization as both an object 
of inquiry and as an activity of critique. First, as an object, problematization is a fraught 
or dangerous complex of practices. Second, as an activity with a clarifying and an 
intensifying function, problematization is a critical practice that creates concepts for the 
clarification of problems and that creates problems as intensifying openings for the work 
of transformation. The dangerousness of problematizations and the clarifying work of the 
concepts produced by problematization are staples of Foucault scholarship.188 Without 
disputing these elements of his work, I want to focus on a less-noticed aspect of 
problematization, namely the sense in which problems invite transformation.  
Foucault famously remarked, in an interview with Rabinow and Dreyfus 
conducted at Berkeley in April 1983, that the point of his genealogies of problems is “not 
that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as 
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bad.”189 The differentiation Foucault makes in this statement foregrounds an important 
dimension of problematization as the object of his historical inquiries. Problems are not 
“bad” things. To clarify this, consider something like disciplinary power. The operation 
of disciplinary power functions to normalize bodies through techniques like panoptic 
surveillance, meticulous training, the examination, time schedules, and hierarchical 
observation.190 Is discipline something bad? On the one hand discipline provides us with 
possibilities for organizing our action in an efficient and self-regulating fashion. This 
efficiency allows the runner to train her body to pick up her pace by attending to the 
minute movements of her legs and arms, her gait, her breathing, her body’s energy and 
stamina, her mental focus, and to make adjustments accordingly. This improvement of 
her body’s possibilities requires a particular knowledge of itself in relation to a norm. 
What, for instance, is the average pace for other runners in her age group? What is the 
fastest time for her age group and what must her pace be to exceed this time? Is the 
runner’s disciplinary practice a bad thing? This is uncertain. Surely the runner appreciates 
her body’s response to discipline. Perhaps this discipline qualifies her for Boston. 
Perhaps it improves her well-being. At the same time, this seemingly innocent example 
might point to the limitations and toxic effects of disciplinary power. The runner might 
push her body too far in disciplining it. She might regard running less as an enjoyable 
exercise and more as a stressful activity. Her constant comparison to the norm of other 
runners might leave her in a constant state of dissatisfaction, frustration, and inadequacy. 
Given that both of these are possibilities, the runner’s discipline is thus not quite a bad 
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thing as it is dangerous. It is dangerous because it hovers in that opaque zone that both 
provides possibilities and opportunities for action as well as limitations and perils for 
conduct.  
The disciplinary problematization exemplified above is precarious or dangerous. 
It is not clear whether this practice constitutes a good or a bad thing that would call to be 
either embraced or dismissed. This normative ambiguity highlights the sense in which 
Foucault understood his genealogies as concerned with problems rather than with 
wrongs, moral harms, ideologies, or other “bad” things. Unlike wrongs, problems do not 
readily admit of normative evaluation. Problems do not quite constitute those things that 
need to be subverted, denounced, castigated, made right, or solved. Rather, problems are 
objects of concern. Todd May argues that these problems or problematizations point out 
the way some of our practices are “fraught.”191 May urges, “Instead of prohibitions there 
are dangers. Instead of obligations there are opportunities. Instead of allowances there are 
multiple ways these dangers and opportunities can be navigated.”192 Fraught or dangerous 
practices are urgencies that call for the reflectiveness of thought and the struggle of 
action. A problem’s resistance to normative evaluation stems in part from its complex 
entanglement of dangers and opportunities of action. Foucault describes problems as 
“tangled things” that “cannot easily be resolved.”193 Problems are thus those complexes 
that cannot be easily or readily resolved or fixed. They require rather a different activity 
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on the part of historical actors and contemporary critics – the activity of posing questions, 
or problematization.  
This posing of questions can take multiple forms, two of which can be seen in the 
conceptual and practical work of Foucault: problematization constitutes an activity of 
thought and an experimentation of conduct. Foucault relates these dual activities to the 
labor of critique. The clarifying function of critique takes the form of a “historical 
investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize 
ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying.”194 The experimental 
function of critique takes the form of “the undefined work of freedom,” that is, “work 
carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings.”195 Critique as the activity of 
problematization is a single practice with two functions. In order to understand the two 
functions of this single practice, we might consider what each function differently 
creates. First, the clarifying function of critique creates concepts. Second, the 
experimental function of critique creates possible openings for the work of freedom. I 
briefly explicate the first conceptual dimension before turning to the second experimental 
dimension as the more important for positioning genealogy as reparative rather than 
fundamentally normative. 
First, critical problematization is an inquiry that clarifies the historical conditions 
of certain present practices by showing how these practices have historically emerged and 
how they have come to cohere through certain power/knowledge complexes like 
sovereignty, discipline or biopower. These power/knowledge ensembles help make sense 
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of the historical tangle that tethers and ballasts our present practices. Historical inquiry 
supplies Foucault with a material for clarifying the fraught and intractable practices that 
serve as objects of concern for our present. Foucault clarifies history through the creation 
of concepts. As noted by Arnold Davidson, Tuomo Tiisala, Koopman and Matza, 
signature Foucauldian concepts like “sovereign power,” “disciplinary power,” and 
“biopower” are the fruits of Foucault’s historical inquiries.196 These concepts are 
important for bringing clarity to how our present practices are historically conditioned by 
specific power relations. More significant than merely showing that our practices are 
historically contingent, following Koopman, concepts offer grips for clarifying “the 
history of how some practice was contingently constructed.”197 This is to say that 
Foucault’s critical concepts serve both a denaturalizing function and an elucidating 
function. They denaturalize by pointing out that our practices are contingent in addition 
to explicating how our practices have been contingently composed. Concepts are thus 
useful for the purposes of defamiliarization and elucidation. It is the second of these that 
is especially important for the work of transformation because to undertake the remaking 
of those intractable practices, it is necessary that we understand how they have been 
historically made.198  
Concepts, however, are not the only yield of Foucauldian problematization. While 
important because they indicate certain materials needed for the work of transformation, 
concepts alone are not sufficient for this work. Equally important, but less discussed in 
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the scholarship, is the sense in which problems invite transformation. Consider 
Foucault’s insistence that “If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to 
do.”199 Foucault wants to impart us with something else aside from concepts as tools for 
transformation. He aims to leave us with problems as possible openings for the work of 
experimentation. I mean ‘opening’ in the double sense of a beginning and a gap. A 
beginning refers to an opening in the form of time, while a gap refers to an opening in the 
form of space. Problems indicate beginnings and gaps for a further kind of work, a work 
that Foucault refers to as “experimental.” 200 This “work done at the limits of ourselves 
must, on the one hand, open up a realm of historical inquiry and, on the other put itself to 
the test of reality, of contemporary reality, both to grasp the points where change is 
possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this change should take.”201 
Critique produces problems at once as historical limits constraining our present practices 
and as experimental possibilities for going beyond these limits.  
Firstly, historical critique is productive of problems as possible beginnings for the 
work of experimentation. In “What is Enlightenment?,” Foucault writes that we are 
“always in the position of beginning again” insofar as the knowledge of our historical 
limits and the possibility of moving beyond them is “limited and determined.”202 These 
limited or partial possibilities do not mean that transformation is closed off from us; on 
the contrary, they point to openings for experimentation such as that engaged by Foucault 
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in his work with the Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons (GIP) in the early 1970s. 
Foucault describes the experimental work of the GIP as one of problematization. “The 
GIP,” he writes, “was a ‘problematizing’ venture, an effort to make problematic, to call 
into question, presumptions, practices, rules, institutions, and habits that had lain 
undisturbed for many decades.”203 Like Foucault’s own critical histories, the GIP poses 
problems, questions, or difficulties. Rather than offer theoretical proposals for the 
improvement of the prison, the GIP offered a series of questions to open a space for the 
prison’s possible transformation.  
Secondly, historical critique is productive of problems as possible gaps that open 
up space for what Foucault calls the “work of thought.”204 He refers to thought as 
something that allows a subject to forge a space – a gap, opening, or distance – between 
herself and her ways of acting or reacting. Thought is what allows one to “question” a 
way of acting “as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals.”205 It is through thought 
that subjects reflect on an action as a problem. For a set of actions to enter the space of 
thought, “it is necessary for a certain number of factors to have made it uncertain, to have 
made it lose its familiarity, or to have provoked a certain number of difficulties around 
it.”206 While these factors result from social and political struggles, their function is to 
incite or instigate thought. Just as problems are generative for thought, thought is 
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generative for problems as it offers an opening – in the sense of a gap or space – for the 
creation and articulation of problems.  
As I have been arguing, the activity of problematization is not just productive of 
concepts that clarify problems; it is productive of problems themselves. Problems call for 
experimentations in thought and practice rather than prescriptions by theory. Problems 
invite the “patient labor” of inquiry.207 They mark not places of rest, but beginnings. 
They do not bear the closed form of solutions, but the open form of thought. Less 
proposals for the carrying out of certain actions than “problems posed to politics,” 
problematizations create openings for further work in the order of thought and practice. 
Foucault thus maintains that the aim of genealogy as a form of critique is “to pose 
problems, to make them active, to display them in such a complexity that they can silence 
the prophets and lawgivers, all those who speak for others or to others.”208 As I argue in 
the following section, problems call for “care,” not judgment.209 
 
4. The Affective Style of Critique, or Genealogy as a Practice of Care  
Late in his life, Foucault increasingly deployed the language of care to describe a 
kind of ethical self-relation and a philosophical attitude of critique. While the former use 
has been well-noted in the secondary scholarship on Foucault, the latter use has been 
                                                        
207 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment,” in EW1, 319.  
 
208 Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault,” in EW3, 288.  
 
209 Ibid. Italics added.  
 
 77 
underemphasized.210 For instance, Foucault’s writings on care have been neglected by the 
commentators discussed above in their writings on critique and normativity.211  
Rather than see the ethical and critical invocations of care as completely separate 
from one another, I follow Judith Butler and others in emphasizing the connection 
between Foucault’s work on ethics and his rethinking of critique, both of which occurred 
from 1978 to 1984.212 The immanent connection between the ethical and critical uses of 
care in Foucault’s late writings can be witnessed not only in the way he describes the 
critical function of philosophy as derived from Socrates’s injunction to “take care of 
yourself,”213 but also in the way he refers to critique in terms of virtue,214 attitude,215 and 
ethos.216 Together these uses of care indicate the sense in which genealogy is normatively 
concerned but not normatively ambitious.  
Foucault’s attention to care (le soin) and concern (le souci) in his ethical and 
critical writings brings to the fore his affective style of reparative critique. Reparative 
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critique is the name I have given to Foucault’s style of attending to the historical limits 
and the experimental possibilities of his present. Care marks the affective ethos or 
attitude of Foucault’s practice of reparative critique. As I argue here, care serves two 
functions in Foucault’s work. First, it functions as the ethical mode of self-transformation 
that is folded into Foucault’s strategy of critique. Second, it functions as the affectivity 
that guides curiosity as a virtue of his critical practice.  
The use of care as an attitude of critique can be seen in such essays as “What is 
Enlightenment?”. There Foucault describes the “practical coherence” of diverse critical 
inquiries as “the care [le soin] brought to the process of putting historico-critical 
reflection to the test of concrete practices.”217 Here Foucault uses “care” to specify the 
mode of attention needed for the experimental work of testing the historical limits of our 
present selves. In this context, care functions as the practical attitude guiding the work 
“carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings.”218 This invocation of care 
suggests the ethical activity of “care of the self” (souci de soi) that Foucault explored in 
the early 1980s in a series of course lectures, essays, interviews, and in the third volume 
of The History of Sexuality.219  
In his 1981-1982 course lectures at the College de France, published as The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault takes up the question of the historical relations 
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between the “subject” and “truth.”220 He begins the course by distinguishing between two 
ancient Greek injunctions – the famous Delphic prescription to “know yourself” (gnothi 
seauton) and the more obscure injunction to “take care of yourself” (epimeleia 
heautou).221 According to Foucault, from the 5th Century BCE to the 5th Century CE, the 
former precept to “know yourself” was subordinated to the latter one to “take care of 
yourself.”222 Socrates thus appears as the person “whose essential, fundamental, and 
original function, job, and position is to encourage others to attend to themselves, take 
care of themselves, and not neglect themselves.”223 Foucault then traces a historical shift 
in this truth-subjectivity relation which transformed from an Ancient Greek privileging of 
self-care over self-knowledge to a privileging of self-knowledge over self-care in the 
modern or “Cartesian moment.”224 He asks after this neglect of the care of the self by 
Western philosophy in the retelling of its own history: “How did it come about that we 
accorded so much privilege, value, and intensity to the ‘know yourself’ and omitted, or at 
least, left in the shadow, this notion of care of the self?”225  
In specifying the “Cartesian moment” as the event that championed self-
knowledge to the detriment of self-care, Foucault introduces another distinction, this time 
between “philosophy” and “spirituality.” Philosophy is “the form of thought that asks 
                                                        
220 Foucault, Hermeneutics, 2.  
 
221 Ibid., 3-4.  
 
222 Ibid., 4-5.  
 
223 Ibid., 5. 
  
224 Ibid., 14.  
 
225 Ibid., 12.  
 
 80 
what it is that enables the subject to have access to the truth and which attempts to 
determine the conditions and limits of the subject’s access to the truth.”226 Spirituality, in 
contrast, is “the search, practice, and experience through which the subject carries out the 
necessary transformations on himself in order to have access to the truth.”227 As 
Davidson notes, this distinction highlights a difference between a formal and analytical 
inquiry into the conditions that limit our access to true knowledge – what Foucault calls a 
“philosophical analytics of truth in general” – and an historical inquiry into how we have 
constituted ourselves as subjects of truth and how we might undertake the necessary work 
of transforming ourselves so that we have access to truth– what Foucault describes as a 
“historical ontology of ourselves.”228  
The two styles of inquiry – philosophy and spirituality – differ according to the 
subject’s relation to truth. In the first, the subject is given access to truth through the 
condition of “knowledge [connaissance] alone.”229 Here the subject has access to truth 
solely through her acts of knowing and is capable of truth without having to alter or 
change herself as a subject. In the second spiritual form of inquiry, the subject is not 
capable of having access to truth such as she is and thus must undergo a transformation or 
conversion to have access to truth.230  
                                                        
226 Ibid., 15.  
 
227 Ibid.  
 
228 See Davidson’s Introduction in Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, xxiii. See also Foucault, “What is 
Enlightenment,” in EW1, 315.  
 
229 Foucault, Hermeneutics, 17.  
 
230 According to Foucault, the subject’s transformation can take a variety of forms, though he names two: 
love (eros) and work (ascesis). Love names the dual-movement whereby the subject is removed from her 
“current status and condition” and whereby the truth comes to the subject and “enlightens” her. Work 
names a kind of “elaboration of the self by the self… for which one takes responsibility” through a long, 
painful, and arduous labor. This transformation of the subject through love or work has “rebound effects” 
 81 
What Foucault calls spirituality maps onto the “care of the self.” It “designates 
precisely the set of conditions of spirituality, the set of transformations of the self, that 
are the necessary conditions for having access to the truth.”231 Foucault describes ancient 
ascetic practices of self-care that consist in a reflexive mode of self-relation whereby one 
“attempts to develop and transform oneself.”232 A form of ethical conduct, the care of the 
self should not be interpreted in terms of self-absorption, selfishness, or egoism – what 
Foucault calls the “Californian cult of the self.”233 Care of the self rather describes a kind 
of activity or work that entails the self’s reflexive attention to itself.234 Care marks that 
activity whereby the self relates to itself as an ethical agent. Foucault stresses that the 
Greek epimeleia heautou (“care of the self”) designates three things: 1) an ethos or a 
general way of relating to “the self, others, and the world”; 2) a “certain form of 
attention” toward “what we think and what takes place in our thought”; and 3) a set of 
actions or practices “exercised on the self by the self, actions by which one takes 
responsibility for oneself and by which one changes, purifies, transforms, and 
transfigures oneself.”235 The care of the self is thus an ethos or way of being, an attitude 
or mode of attention, and an ascesis or a set of exercises that are undertaken in a 
continuous, persistent, and habitual fashion.236  
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Interestingly, Foucault’s three-fold description of the care of the self – as an 
ethos, an attitude, and a form of work or activity – matches his account of critique in 
“What is Enlightenment?” There Foucault depicts critique as an “ethos,” an “attitude,” 
and a “work.”237 Here he uses attitude and ethos synonymously to designate “a mode of 
relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a 
way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same 
time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task.”238 By construing critique 
as an attitude or ethos, Foucault understands critique as simultaneously a way of relating 
to the present, a way of thinking and feeling, and a way of acting and behaving that 
signals a relation of belonging and a task. He describes the task or exercise critique 
engages as the “work done at the limits of ourselves” that is at once a “historical analysis 
of the limits imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond 
them.”239 Foucault again distances his conception of critique from that style of inquiry 
associated with the Cartesian moment where self-care is forgotten, committed to the 
shadows by the philosopher’s privileging of self-knowledge. He explains, “It is true that 
we have to give up hope of ever acceding to a point of view that could give us access to 
any complete and definitive knowledge [connaissance] of what may constitute our 
historical limits.”240 That is, critique’s relation to truth and subjectivity will not take a 
philosophical form whereby the truth is essentially guaranteed to the subject by 
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knowledge alone.241 Rather, critique’s relation to subjectivity and truth will take a 
spiritual form whereby the subject undergoes the slow and painful work of self-
transformation in order to be capable of the truth.242 In Foucault’s hands, critique thus 
attends to, re-enlivens, and enacts a practice left to the shadows by the Cartesian moment. 
This is precisely the practice of the “care of the self” (souci de soi).  
As Judith Butler has pointed out, Foucault’s late work on ethics throws into sharp 
relief his intensified interest in critique between 1978 and 1984.243 Butler argues that by 
conceptualizing critique as an ethical practice, Foucault signals the ethical mode in which 
he pursues the question of critique. Critique can be understood as an ethical practice 
insofar as it exposes the limits of “established and ordering ways of knowing” and 
explores “what might be changed” through techniques of self-transformation.244 Butler 
indicates the point of connection between Foucault’s ethics and his politics through the 
work of critique, which “becomes the practice by which the self forms itself in 
desubjugation.”245 Here Butler builds on Foucault’s description of critique as the “art of 
voluntary insubordination” that would “insure the desubjugation of the subject in the 
context of… the politics of truth.”246 For Butler, critique not only entails a subject’s 
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desubjugation or undoing through the work of self-transformation; critique is itself a 
practice of self-transformation that engages the subject in a process of desubjugation.  
By understanding critique as an ethical practice, Butler draws our attention to the 
way in which Foucault stylized critique as an activity of the care of the self. Critique 
constitutes a practice of “working on” or “being concerned with” the self.247 It is not just 
that Foucault’s method of historical critique prepares the way for the transformation of 
the subject; rather, Foucault envisions his critical work as performing a certain 
transformative labor. In the Introduction to the second volume of The History of 
Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure, Foucault describes philosophical activity as the critical 
work that “thought brings to bear on itself” as it endeavors to “know how and to what 
extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already 
known.”248 Philosophical critique is here taken as the reflexive activity (ascesis) of 
thought that explores what might be transformed through “the practice of a knowledge 
that is foreign to it.”249 Philosophical critique both marks out “transformable 
singularities” and undertakes a practice of transformation through the “working of 
thought upon itself.”250 Critical activity is here thought of as a mode of reflexive self-
care.  
This conception of critique as a reflexive exercise of self-care can be seen in 
Foucault’s repeated remarks that he expects his work to transform him in some 
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fashion.251 In an interview from 1982, Foucault describes the problem of his work as 
“[his] own transformation.”252 When others comment on the frequent changes of his 
research, he responds, “Well, do you think I have worked like that all those years to say 
the same thing and not to be changed?”253 Foucault refers to himself as an 
“experimenter,” who is always “on the move” in relation to the things that interest him 
and in relation to what he has already thought.254 He describes critical inquiry and the 
practice of writing as processes of “straying afield” of himself,255 as leading him to 
“unforeseen places” and dispersing him toward “a strange and new relation with 
himself.”256 Foucault notes that his historical texts like History of Madness and Discipline 
and Punish were not written to please professional historians, but “to construct 
[himself],” and to “invite others to share an experience of what we are” such that we 
might transform our relationships with ourselves, with others, and with specific problems 
like madness or punishment.257 He refers to his texts as “experience books”258 that do not 
so much convey knowledge or facts as they produce an experience that transforms the 
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subject (i.e., Foucault himself) and the readers of his work (i.e., us). Foucault’s texts thus 
endeavor to transform himself and others. When social workers and correctional officers 
complained that Discipline and Punish had a “paralyzing” effect on them, Foucault 
responds that “this very reaction proves that the work was successful, that it functioned as 
[he] intended.”259 That is, these readers were transformed by an experience produced by 
Discipline and Punish that complicated their relationship to the prisoners with whom they 
worked.  
Speaking to the autobiographical aspect of his work, Foucault comments that 
every book he has written was partly inspired by some direct personal experience. He 
notes:  
I’ve had a complex personal relationship with madness and with the psychiatric 
institution. I’ve also had a certain relationship with illness and death. I wrote 
about the birth of the clinic and the introduction of death into medical knowledge 
at a time when those things had a certain importance for me. The same is true of 
prison and sexuality, for different reasons.260 
 
Stimulated by his own relationships with particular practices and discourses, Foucault’s 
books are to be understood as “fragment[s] of autobiography” that aim for nothing less 
than Foucault’s own self-transformation.261 This autobiographical dimension of his work, 
however, exceeds the purely personal. This is due to the fact that his critical histories 
relate to collective points of concern for contemporary subjects, and are often the result 
of some collective practice such as the one engaged by Foucault with the GIP. Thus, 
Foucault emphasizes that he only began to write Discipline and Punish after he 
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participated for a number of years in working groups like the GIP that were “thinking 
about and struggling against penal institutions.”262 Not only does he insist that his work is 
partly incited by certain collective practices, he maintains that his work can have (and 
indeed has had) transformative effects.263  
As an ethical practice of self-care that works toward the subject’s transformation 
and the transformation of our relations with others, critique is guided by an affect of care 
that Foucault often calls “curiosity.”264 Care is understood as an attitude that inflects 
one’s relation not so much to oneself as to “what exists and what might exist.”265 
Following Lynne Huffer, we might think of care here as an affect orienting Foucault’s 
relation to alterity – to those others forgotten by history that Foucault encounters in the 
archives, to those others who question and resist the dangers of power in his present, to 
those future others who might take upon themselves the work of transformative critique, 
but also to what could be other.266  
Foucault uses “care” to specify what he means by curiosity as the “desire to 
know” (savoir) in the following passage from “The Masked Philosopher”:  
Curiosity…evokes ‘care’; it evokes the care one takes of what exists and what 
might exist; a sharpened sense of reality, but one that is never immobilized before 
it; a readiness to find what surrounds us strange and odd; a certain determination 
to throw off familiar ways of thought and to look at the same things in a different 
                                                        
262 Foucault, “An Interview with Michel Foucault,” in EW3, 245.  
 
263 Foucault speaks to the “effect” his History of Madness had on “the perception of madness” and to the 
effect that his Discipline and Punish had on prisoners who participated in prison revolts after reading this 
book. See Foucault, “Truth is in the Future,” in Foucault Live, 301.  
 
264 Foucault, “The Masked Philosopher,” in EW1, 325.  
 
265 Ibid.  
 
266 Huffer, Mad for Foucault, 275.  
 
 88 
way; a passion for seizing what is happening now and what is disappearing; a lack 
of respect for the traditional hierarchies of what is important and fundamental.267  
 
Foucault presents “curiosity-as-care”268 as an attitude that guides philosophical inquiry. 
Curiosity, a word etymologically related to care, expresses a diligent posture of interest 
toward some object of concern.269 Care evokes the passion of curiosity as an ethos of 
critique.270 It suggests a “passion” for grasping “what is happening now and what is 
disappearing.”271 Care specifies a certain affective attentiveness the critic bears toward 
her object of concern.  
Unlike the use of care in feminist ethics as a concept for normative theory, 
Foucault deploys care as an affective style of critical practice.272 This care is not so much 
a “protectionist attitude” as it is an attentive or “mindful” attitude.273 This attitude of care 
expresses itself in the patient labor of Foucault’s historical inquiries inasmuch as this 
work requires a diligence in wading through archives and an attentiveness in assembling 
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fragments of history. One can see this care at work in Foucault’s 1977 introductory essay 
to his uncompleted Parallel Lives series, “Lives of Infamous Men.”274 Foucault speaks 
poignantly of the “resonance” he still feels in his encounter with “these lowly lives 
reduced to ashes.”275 Without naming this resonance, Foucault describes his decision to 
compile a collection of these “poem-lives” not in a book of history like his earlier History 
of Madness, but in an “anthology of existences.”276 This decision is guided by an express 
concern for preserving the intensity of these obscure lives and the shock their poems 
induce.277 Thus, Foucault shows a tenderness toward these forgotten lives in assembling 
the traces of their exchange with power “in the form of a few remains” so as to maintain 
their intensity and strangeness.278 These are lives that struggled with power. They are 
those who, in the 16th and 17th centuries, were brought into contact with power through 
petitions made to the king by their families, asking that they be committed to internment. 
Or they are those who, like Herculine Barbin or “Alexina,” an intersex adolescent living 
in France in the 1860s, were subjected to the normalizing tactics of disciplinary power 
through the medico-moral gaze of doctors and clinicians.279 Careful not to subject these 
lives to the same rituals of power that subjugated them while they were living, Foucault 
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relates to them through the intensity and complexity of an affect of care. Thus, the 
interest or curiosity Foucault bears toward these nearly disappeared lives is not the 
curiosity that “seeks to assimilate what it is proper for one to know,” but the curiosity that 
“takes care of what exists and what might exist.”280  
 
Conclusion 
Like Baudelaire’s “extreme attention” to the volatility of the present, an attitude 
of care reflects Foucault’s style of being attentive to the struggles of his present.281 As 
Foucault recognized, such struggles do not need the prophecies or prescriptions of 
normative theorists; they need the care of engaged inquirers who sustain the dual labors 
of critique – the historical clarification of problems and the experimental work of 
transformation. Care expresses just that attitude whereby “the critique of what we are is 
at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits imposed on us and an 
experiment with the possibility of going beyond them [de leur franchissement 
possible].”282 Care is the affect guiding Foucault’s practice of reparative critique. 
 The practice of care guiding Foucauldian critique constitutes a reparative position, 
not a normative one. If the “normative” designates a set of criteria through which to 
determine what one ought or ought not to do, the “reparative” refers to a set of strategies 
for attending to the transformative openings of practices that comprise problems for our 
present selves. The normative involves the work of judgment in its determination of right 
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and wrong, good and bad, permissible and impermissible. If, however, genealogical 
critique is “not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are,”283 then it does not 
assume the normative labor of passing judgment. Rather, genealogical critique poses 
problems that call for care. Care orients the critic toward the transformability of 
problems. As Foucault notes, genealogy “does not consist in a simple characterization of 
what we are,” but follows lines of fragility in the present so as to open up “the space of 
freedom understood as a space of concrete freedom, that is, of possible 
transformation.”284 I have described this as a normatively concerned exercise rather than 
a normatively ambitious one to clarify the intimacy between critique and transformation 
in genealogy.  
A reparative position is normatively concerned without thereby being normative 
insofar as it involves the possible transformation of practices without commanding what 
ought to be done. Hence, the critic does not bear a programmatic role in relation to 
transformation. Their role is “to see how far the liberation of thought can make those 
transformations urgent enough for people to want to carry them out and difficult enough 
to carry out for them to be profoundly rooted in reality.”285 Foucault takes on the 
reparative role of pointing out that things may be changed, inciting the urgency of 
entertaining, in Sedgwick’s words, “such profoundly painful, profoundly relieving, 
ethically crucial possibilities” as that the future may be different from the present and that 
the past could have been otherwise.286  
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This normatively concerned critical practice is embodied in the care Foucault 
takes in the labor of assembling together the fragments of history, re-membering those 
nearly forgotten lives that are “as though they hadn’t been.”287 It is also the care Foucault 
takes in not imposing prophecies or prescriptions for the actions to be carried out in 
ongoing political struggle. This care is reparative in that it sustains an encounter with the 
limits of ourselves by glimpsing and testing the “lineaments of other possibilities.”288 It is 
care that brings sustenance to the slow and painful work that we carry out upon ourselves 
“as free beings,” a work Foucault identifies as that of critique.289 Care thus provides 
sustenance to the exercise of critique.  
One sustaining effect Foucault intends his practice of critique to have is that of 
inducing hesitation on the part of those who work in certain institutional settings like 
prisons. He comments, “My project is precisely to bring it about that they ‘no longer 
know what to do,’ so that the acts, gestures, discourses that up until then had seemed to 
go without saying become problematic, difficult, dangerous.”290 Social workers, for 
instance, might feel themselves stuttering with uncertainty in their actions toward 
prisoners as they encounter the problems of disciplinary power.291 Foucault takes care in 
not telling these social workers what to do because in part he hopes to stimulate their 
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hesitation and uncertainty in knowing what to do. Critique need not be a tool for arriving 
at normative prescriptions; it “should be an instrument for those who fight, those who 
resist and refuse what is.”292 Without fully developing this aspect of genealogical 
critique, Foucault can be understood as gesturing toward a kind of agency that is open to 
hesitation and doubt. As I argue in the following chapter, one can turn to the work of 
William James as supplying a conception of reparative agency that trembles with 
hesitation without thereby succumbing to the immobility of indecision.  
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CHAPTER III 
MELIORISM AND REPARATIVE AGENCY 
IN JAMESIAN PRAGMATISM 
 
Introduction  
 
In the preface to the 1897 publication of his monograph, The Will to Believe and 
Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, William James writes that “what mankind at large 
most lacks is criticism and caution, not faith.”293 This statement interestingly appears in a 
passage where James is defending his infamous essay on “The Will to Believe” from 
readers that take him as naively advocating an uncritical form of faith. In many respects, 
James’s recognition of the interpretation of his ideas as uncritical in this preface 
anticipates a dominant theme in secondary scholarship that presents him as profoundly 
acritical. Figures as diverse as Bertrand Russell, George Santayana, and Reinhold 
Niebuhr have cast James as problematically acritical, particularly in his championing of 
the “will to believe.”294  
Perhaps the most famous such claim is Cornel West’s depiction of James’s 
philosophical perspective as one of “political impotence.”295 For West, James is deeply 
acritical just insofar as he lacks political commitment. As West argues in The American 
Evasion of Philosophy, James’s critical quietism amounts to an over-attention to the 
“personal and existential” while neglecting the social conditions of political and 
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economic crises.296 West follows critics like Lewis Mumford who characterize Jamesian 
pragmatism as a political “anesthetic” or form of “acquiescence” that endorses a “desire 
for a comfortable resting place.”297 Connecting critique with conviction, these readers 
suggest that James effectively replaces critique with compliance. Hence, against the 
interpretation of James’s pragmatism as problematically Promethean in its celebration of 
a strenuous and boundless agency, James would seem to be ineffective for work requiring 
confidence and commitment.298  
Recent scholarship by Sarin Marchetti (2015) and Alexander Livingston (2016) 
has begun to frustrate the familiar dismissal of James as an uncommitted and therefore 
uncritical philosopher. Each offers a reworking of James’s ethical and political thought 
by focusing on his specific engagement with the work of critique.  
Livingston’s Damn Great Empires! William James and the Politics of 
Pragmatism is the latest in a series of scholarly attempts to counter West’s interpretation 
and reconsider James’s political thought.299 Taking up his Nachlass writings on empire, 
Livingston describes James’s critical practice as one of “subversive repetition.”300 This 
refers to the way James’s critique of empire subversively interrupts and reworks 
dominant myths about imperialism and American exceptionalism. Through subversive 
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300 See Livingston, Damn Great Empires, 16, 103. See also Livingston, “Pragmatism,” 215.  
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repetition, James takes up the political language of imperialism prevalent in his historical 
and social milieu in order to refashion it in an anti-imperialist style.301 Livingston thus 
attributes to James a kind of Butlerian conception of critique as an exercise in subversive 
repetition that performatively disrupts entrenched political and social categories.302  
Marchetti’s Ethics and Philosophical Critique in William James also aims to 
revise interpretations of James as an acritical thinker by attending to his work in ethical 
philosophy. Marchetti goes so far as to argue that James’s revolution in moral thought 
proceeds from “a radical rethinking of what philosophical critique as a whole might be 
and do.”303 As evinced by the title of his text, critique plays a central, if under-discussed, 
role in Marchetti’s reinterpretation of James’s ethics.304 He describes philosophical 
critique as consisting in a type of reflexive practice: “The point of philosophical critique 
is to survey and question our ordinary moral vocabulary expressive of our moral life, as 
well as the philosophical one parasitic on it and generated from such reflective 
activities.”305 Critique’s reflexive activity captures what Marchetti calls the exercise of 
“swinging back and forth from the ordinary to the reflective dimension of experience.”306 
                                                        
301 See Livingston, Damn Great Empires, 16-18.  
 
302 See Judith Butler’s account of subversive repetition in Butler, Gender Trouble, 175-193.  
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Marchetti’s and Livingston’s construal of James’s thought in terms of critique 
highlights a growing scholarly attention to the critical aspect of his work.307 Yet, these 
scholars offer different articulations of the function of Jamesian critique. While Marchetti 
highlights the reflexive feature of James’s critical practice, Livingston focuses on its 
subversive function. These interpretations present challenges for scholars attempting to 
specify James’s unique contribution to the work of critique. On Marchetti’s reading, it is 
difficult to see precisely what is so novel or radical about James’s critical practice insofar 
as its reflexive function was already established by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of 
Pure Reason.308 It is also not readily apparent whether James’s deployment of subversive 
repetition in his writings on psychology, religion, and philosophy constitutes his 
distinctive critical practice.  
This chapter clarifies James’s unique critical exercise by rereading his 
philosophical pragmatism and meliorism through the lens of reparative critique.309 I 
argue that James practices critique as a reparative exercise that can be understood in 
terms of his meliorism, which is the name James gives to a hope in the possibility of 
improving our practices and selves. That is, meliorism constitutes his specific practice of 
                                                        
307 Jeffrey S. Edmonds depicts James’s strategy of critique as concerning the problematization and 
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reparative critique. Reparative critique refers to a style of critical work that aims to 
salvage possibilities in spite of the limits that constrain us. Unlike negative forms of 
critique whose primary activity is one of denouncing or condemning the objects of a 
culture, the reparative critic engages critique as a transformative tool for mending and 
reworking that which is limiting or constraining. On my view, James does not explicitly 
revolutionize critique so much as he silently practices an alternative version distant from 
the negative variety that has “run out of steam” in Bruno Latour’s words.310 While not 
entirely identical with Kant’s conception of critique as an inquiry into the conditions of 
possibility,311 James’s reparative version addresses the constitutive limits of human 
practice while attending to the possibilities of testing such limits. Hence, for James, 
critique consists in an inquiry into the possibilities of conditions.  
To elucidate James’s practice of reparative critique, I highlight a central feature of 
his meliorism that troubles the charge voiced by West and others that he is uncommitted 
and therefore acritical. I suggest that James develops a reparative account of agency 
which figures in his meliorism as a response to the problematics of action. Reparative 
agency concerns the possibility of acting in the midst of constraints that frustrate or 
otherwise inhibit action. This concept maps onto what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick calls the 
“middle ranges of agency” – the idea that one can be relatively empowered or 
disempowered without thereby destroying or being destroyed by another.312 Reparative 
agency entails a conception of commitment that escapes the totalizing dilemma of 
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complete conviction or absolute impotence. If one can be relatively empowered or 
disempowered (and thus neither wholly omnipotent nor wholly powerless), then one can 
also be committed and yet doubtful (and hence neither totally committed nor totally 
uncommitted). This type of reparative commitment underscores the simultaneous 
presence of uncertainty and faith in James’s meliorism.313 We thus ought to read James as 
investing reparative agency with an affect of hesitant hope. 
I flesh out the concept of reparative agency by reinterpreting three key works 
where James develops his meliorism. My strategy for rereading these texts through the 
lens of reparative critique requires attending to what William J. Gavin calls the “latent 
content” of James’s thought insofar as James does not explicitly conceptualize his work 
in terms of critique.314 I begin in section one with a discussion of his presentation of 
meliorism as a mediating attitude or via media between the temperamental extremes of 
“tender-minded optimism” and “tough-minded pessimism” in his 1906-1907 Pragmatism 
lectures.315 This leads to a consideration in section two of the problematics to which 
meliorism is offered as a response. By turning to James’s earlier psychological and 
ethical work from the 1880s and 1890s, I show how his meliorism functions as a 
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reparative response to crises of agency and action.316 To address such crises, James 
advances an account of reparative agency in texts like The Principles of Psychology and 
“The Will to Believe.” I examine each of these with an eye toward how they refine the 
concept of reparative agency, starting in section three with his description of the two 
pathological types of will and their ameliorative alternative from The Principles of 
Psychology. I then take up in section four his discussion of the “will to believe” as a form 
of reparative commitment that negotiates the tensions of paralyzing doubt and blind faith.  
 
1. Meliorism, Pragmatism, and Reparative Critique 
 Between November 1906 and January 1907, James delivered a series of lectures 
at the Lowell Institute in Boston and at Columbia University in New York. Like many of 
his public lectures, James presents his audience with a dilemma that frames his entire 
address in the form of a response. The lectures begin with a portrayal of a current 
philosophical predicament in terms of two conflicting temperaments. Similar to Kant’s 
presentation of the philosophical clash between empiricism and rationalism in The 
Critique of Pure Reason, James describes the conflict between two philosophical 
temperaments – the “tender-minded” and “tough-minded” – which correspond to the 
positions of rationalism and empiricism, respectively. He then positions pragmatism as a 
philosophical temperament that mediates between these two staunched attitudes. In the 
                                                        
316 I leave aside James’s 1891 essay “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” from this discussion. This 
choice might seem problematic to scholars who regard this essay as the most central of James’s ethical 
writings. Without debating the importance of this paper, I do not discuss it here for the following reasons: 
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focus on here, but rather addresses a set of meta-ethical questions about the origin and meaning of moral 
concepts, and the adjudication of moral ideals; second, the essay is addressed to moral philosophers rather 
than to everyday agents of James’s milieu. This differs from the more general academic audiences that his 
other lectures address; third, the essay does not showcase meliorism explicitly as the other texts I focus on.  
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course of these lectures, James attributes an ethical temperament to pragmatism that he 
calls “meliorism.” Meliorism functions as a reparative alternative to tender-minded 
optimism and tough-minded pessimism. As I argue in this section, meliorism is a 
reparative critical practice insofar as it affirms the redemptive possibilities of conditions 
while countenancing the limits of total salvation.  
In the first of his Pragmatism lectures, James offers a unique rereading of the 
history of philosophy as a “clash of human temperaments.”317 These temperaments, he 
argues, serve as the most important, yet least acknowledged, premises motivating 
philosophical pursuit. Continuing a theme from an earlier paper on “The Sentiment of 
Rationality,” James emphasizes the passional drives and idiosyncratic dispositions that 
inspire thinking. Philosophical temperaments are marked by certain cravings and fears. 
The tough-minded temperament, for instance, longs for facts and expresses an aversion to 
religion, whereas the tender-minded temperament desires religious unity and is repulsed 
by facts. The tender-minded are rationalists or lovers of “abstract and eternal 
principles.”318 They are monistic, dogmatic, idealistic, and optimistic. On the other side, 
the tough-minded favor concreteness. These are empiricists or devotees of facts. They are 
pluralistic, skeptical, materialistic, and pessimistic. Both tempers show disdain toward the 
other: “The tough think of the tender as sentimentalists and soft-heads. The tender feel 
the tough to be unrefined, callous, or brutal… Each type believes the other to be inferior 
to itself.”319 The result of such mutual disdain leaves a problematic philosophical 
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environment for those in James’s milieu insofar as they share both the tough-minded 
craving for facts and the tender-minded craving for religion. The philosophical amateur 
in 1906 “wants facts” and “wants religion,” yet what they find is “an empirical 
philosophy that is not religious enough, and a religious philosophy that is not empirical 
enough.”320  
For James, the tender-minded and the tough-minded suffer from certain mutual 
limitations that prevent either one from adequately fulfilling the perceived desires of his 
audience. Drawing on a 1905 pamphlet on Human Submission by American anarchist 
Morrison I. Swift, James details the limits of tender-minded idealism by recounting the 
tragic story of a struggling clerk, John Corcoran, who ended his life when he could no 
longer feed his family. Tender-minded rationalists tend to obscure the reality of such 
tragic events by treating them as temporary conditions of a more perfect, eternal order. 
The man’s tragic life and death, the tender-minded philosopher would argue, are 
unfortunate, but necessary and meaningful features of the world’s eternal perfection.321 
Hence, the tender-minded explain pain, evil, and tragedy away through a kind of religious 
optimism. As Swift notes in Human Submission, “Religion is like a sleep-walker to 
whom actual things are blank.”322 Expressing a “dissatisfaction with the idealistic 
optimisms now in vogue,” James agrees with Swift that tragic circumstances cannot be 
minimized by invoking religious ideals such as God or Love, for to do so is to evacuate 
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these circumstances of their reality.323 Rather, such harrowing events must be treated as 
actualities that cannot be idealistically nullified or redeemed.324 As James reminds us in 
his 1895 essay, “Is Life Worth Living?,” “We are of one substance with these suicides, 
and their life is the life we share. The plainest intellectual integrity – nay, more, the 
simplest manliness and honor – forbid us to forget their case.”325 Thus, James believes 
that the pragmatist cannot simply turn a blind eye to the tragic and horrific conditions of 
human life as the tender-minded optimist does. 
While agreeing with the tough-minded conviction that tragedy and pain are 
irreducible facts of the world, James does not arrive at the pessimistic conclusion that the 
world is necessarily unjust or wholly irredeemable. This pessimistic outlook reflects the 
limits of the tough-minded temperament in its wholehearted rejection of free-will and 
moral possibility. Throughout the Pragmatism lectures, James aligns pragmatism more 
with the empiricist temperament of the tough-minded than with tender-minded 
rationalism. In the second lecture, “What Pragmatism Means,” he writes that the 
pragmatist’s turn towards concreteness, facts, and action “means the empiricist temper 
regnant, and the rationalist temper sincerely given up.”326 Indeed, the book’s dedication 
to John Stuart Mill reflects James’s epistemological affiliation of pragmatism with tough-
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minded empiricism.327 In spite of this alliance, James distances pragmatism from tough-
minded empiricism in terms of their ethical dispositions and moods.  
This ethical difference comes to the fore in the last lecture from Pragmatism. 
Here James takes up the question of pragmatism’s religious or moral attitude as distinct 
from both tender-minded optimism and tough-minded pessimism. He opens the lecture 
by setting up a dilemma between two possible ways of interpreting a poem by Walt 
Whitman entitled “To You.” The dilemma is between a monistic and pluralistic 
interpretation of the poem. On the monistic interpretation, the poem expresses the quietist 
idea that you are inwardly safe because you are absolutely saved “even in in the midst of 
your defacements.”328 The pluralistic interpretation, however, addresses “your better 
possibilities phenomenally taken, or the specific redemptive effects even of your failures, 
upon yourself or others.”329 The two readings of the poem let loose different dispositions 
and activities in agents that James elsewhere describes as the difference between an 
“easy-going” and a “strenuous” mood.330 Whereas the easy-going mood shrinks from 
present ills through the safety and comfort afforded by a moral holiday, the strenuous 
mood energetically confronts present difficulties by affirming the possibilities for action 
and alteration. The monistic interpretation thus gives way to indifferentism and quietism 
while the pluralistic interpretation encourages restless struggle and endurance.  
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James argues that both tender-minded optimism and tough-minded pessimism 
constitute monistic positions with respect to the question of moral possibility or the 
world’s possible redemption. Optimism and pessimism are monistic because they both 
trade on concepts of totality and necessity. While tender-minded optimism treats the 
world’s redemption as wholly inevitable, and therefore necessarily certain, tough-minded 
pessimism regards the world’s saving as wholly impossible, and thus necessarily 
doubtful. The two positions are like two sides of the same coin in that they both consider 
redemption under the scope of totality and the mode of necessity while qualifying these 
features either positively or negatively such that the world is either sure for complete 
atonement or sure for total damnation. Hence, James argues that the difference between 
the monistic and pluralistic positions “revolves pragmatically around the notion of the 
world’s possibilities.”331 That is, the dilemma consists in treating the world’s redemption 
as either absolute and necessary or as partial and contingent. James explains, “One sees at 
this point that the great religious difference lies between the men who insist that the 
world must and shall be, and those who are contented with believing that the world may 
be, saved. The whole clash of rationalistic and empiricist religion is thus over the validity 
of possibility.”332 Here James attributes a novel moral attitude to pragmatism in the form 
of meliorism as a disposition that embraces the possibility of the world’s partial and 
uncertain redemption.  
For James, a possibility is a hybrid between the actual and the non-existent. It 
may be more bare or abstract when it refers to something that is not impossible, or it may 
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be more concrete when it refers to something for which some of its actualizing conditions 
are present.333 James argues that the world’s redemption constitutes a concrete possibility 
since some of its conditions actually exist. Here we can see James deploying a kind of 
Kantian maneuver as he inquires into the conditions that make redemption possible, 
albeit with two differences from Kant. First, unlike Kant’s transcendental inquiry 
undertaken in The Critique of Pure Reason which investigates the a priori conditions that 
make metaphysical judgments possible, James is interested in the “actualizing 
conditions” that make salvation possible.334 Such conditions are contingent and particular 
rather than necessary and universal. Second, whereas Kant takes possibility abstractly to 
refer to “what agrees (in terms of intuitions and concepts) with the formal conditions of 
experience,”335 James is concerned with concrete possibility or possibility that is 
grounded insofar as some of its actualizing conditions already exist.   
According to James, these conditions can be found in the ideals championed by 
living agents. Ideals are consciously held ideas, projects, or commitments that guide 
one’s life.336 One might have, for instance, an ideal of non-violence that guides one’s 
actions, lifestyle, and choices. When such ideals are actualized or realized – keeping with 
the example, one registers as a conscientious objector to avoid the occasion of possible 
military conflict – these concrete realizations contribute to the world’s contingent 
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salvation in piecemeal fashion. James explains, “Every such ideal realized will be one 
moment in the world’s salvation. But these particular ideals are not bare abstract 
possibilities. They are grounded, they are live possibilities, for we are their live 
champions and pledges, and if the complementary conditions come and add themselves, 
our ideals will become actual things.”337 Hence, salvation is concretely possible insofar as 
living agents supply some of its conditions through the realization of our ideals.  
While meliorism requires that one affirm the possibility of salvation, James 
argues that the meliorist must also countenance its limits. Salvation is limited in two 
ways. First, it is limited insofar as our ideals are never wholly fulfilled, but are often only 
realized when a part of them is “butchered,” to use James’s phrase from “The Moral 
Philosopher and the Moral Life.”338 Our ideals suffer partial losses in the process of their 
realization when they confront the decisive squeeze of the actual. As James notes in the 
same essay, “The actually possible in this world is vastly narrower than all that is 
demanded; and there is always a pinch between the ideal and the actual which can only 
be go through by leaving part of the ideal behind.”339 If our ideals cannot be completely 
realized, then the meliorist must admit that redemption is only piecemeal or partial rather 
than total. Meliorism requires an avowal of loss as unatoned for. That is, the meliorist 
cannot ignore the reality of tragedy and loss as the tender-minded optimist does through 
blind faith; rather, she is “willing that there should be real losses and real losers, and no 
total preservation of all that is.”340 This means that one cannot redeem the death of John 
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Corcoran, the ailing clerk whose suicide James cites in the first Pragmatist lecture. Nor is 
the death of the shipwrecked sailor that James discusses at the end of the last lecture 
saved by future sailors who brave the same turbulent waters.341 While one might work at 
ameliorating the conditions that contributed to their tragic endings, these lives are really 
lost – no amount of transformative effort will ever recover them. Death thus marks a 
further limit of pragmatism’s saving power.342  
By clarifying both the possibilities and limits of salvation, James’s meliorism 
functions as a practice of reparative critique. Meliorism is reparative insofar as it affirms 
the possibilities of atonement and alteration in spite of the very real limits that constrain 
it. Unlike negative forms of critique that regard all objects and practices suspiciously in 
order to denounce them, meliorism constitutes a reparative critical exercise that attends to 
the conditions of redemptive possibilities in order to salvage the chance that the future 
may be different from the present. The negative critic is guided by a pessimistic rejection 
of any chance of transformation or redemption. She is one who, on encountering the 
tragic damages of the world, insists on repeating the bad news. The reparative critic 
engages the world’s dangers and damages differently by seeking to make them more 
bearable through the work of assembling more sustaining relations to them. Reparative 
critique thus begins from the realistic avowal of tragic limits and pursues the possibilities 
of transforming them. In this way, we can position James’s meliorism, which places its 
faith in salvational possibilities, as a reparative critical practice.  
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The hope that results from such an account is a risky and hesitant type of hope. If 
the world is only partially and uncertainly salvageable, then one is left without the 
security afforded by the optimistic and pessimistic treatments of salvation as wholly 
inevitable or totally impossible. This risky feature of James’s meliorism maps well to 
Sedgwick’s description of “fluttering” hope – a restless, ambivalent affect energizing the 
reparative work of extracting sustenance from the objects and fragments of a damaged 
world. Sedgwick writes, “Hope, often a fracturing, even a traumatic thing to experience, 
is among the energies by which the reparatively positioned reader tries to organize the 
fragments and part-objects she encounters or creates.”343 For James, hope is risky 
precisely because it leaves one vulnerable to the uncertainties that come with only 
possible redemption.344 Yet, instead of denying this element of uncertainty by tethering 
one’s faith to absolute concepts of redemption and damnation as the optimist and 
pessimist do, the meliorist garners faith precisely in avowing the uncertainty and 
ambiguity of a hope that is marked by both limits and possibilities. This form of hope is 
far from the paralyzing doubt of the tough-minded pessimist, who rejects the very 
possibility of redemption. It is also distant from the blind faith of the tender-minded 
optimist, who refuses to bear witness to the realities of evil, tragedy, and loss. James 
importantly wrests hope away from the blind faith of optimism by investing it with 
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ambiguity, pain, and tragedy. This hope bears a critical function in his corpus as it guides 
his practice of reparative critique.  
 
2. Meliorism and the Problem of Agency  
I have so far argued that Jamesian meliorism constitutes an exercise of reparative 
critique through its attention to the limits and possibilities of redeeming a damaged 
world. This account, however, does not yet address how meliorism resists the charge of 
political impotence. For James’s portrayal of meliorism in the Pragmatism lectures 
suggests that meliorism is a type of voluntary outlook on par with the attitudes of 
pessimism and optimism. Here meliorism functions as a set of beliefs guiding the 
pragmatist’s ethical perspective of the world. This focus on meliorism as an orientation or 
outlook makes it difficult to see how meliorism functions as a form agency or action such 
that it cannot be called impotent. In Pragmatism, James situates meliorism as a response 
to a philosophical problem about the religious outlooks necessitated by tender-minded 
rationalism and tough-minded empiricism. Meliorism offers a response to that problem 
by offering an alternative outlook to the pragmatist. In earlier texts, however, James 
positions meliorism as a response to a different problematic, one concerning the demands 
of action. That is, if in Pragmatism James clarifies meliorism in terms of belief, his 
earlier work elucidates meliorism in terms of action.345  
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 James’s attention to the difficulty of action comes to the fore in his personal and 
theoretical writings from the 1860s through the 1890s. James famously suffered from 
personal crises with indecision, suicidal depression, and neurasthenic doubt that 
exhausted his nervous energy and depleted his will.346 He captures the problem in a diary 
entry from December 21 1869: “The difficulty: ‘to act without hope,’ must be solved.”347 
The problem names an extreme form of agency experienced by James and others in his 
cultural location that consists in paralysis, inertia, and resignation.348 This type of agency 
maps onto what James calls the “obstructed will” in The Principles of Psychology. When 
the will is obstructed, the agent’s capacity for action is paralyzed. Describing this 
condition as the “Hamletism” of James’s milieu, George Cotkin argues that this 
paralyzed form of agency constituted not simply a personal crisis for James, but a cultural 
crisis for those similarly positioned.349 Contra West, the problem of inhibited agency was 
not simply “personal and existential” for James, but functioned as a socio-cultural 
problem to which he hoped to respond.350 Of course, James would not exactly “solve” 
this difficulty so much as he would perpetually struggle with it.351  
                                                        
346 See Croce, Young William James, for a detailed account of James’s youthful crises.  
 
347 James Diary 1, Dec. 21, 1869, 75. Cited in Croce, Young William James, 215.  
 
348 Upon encountering the world as hollow or evil, James professes, “my will is palsied.” Ibid.  
 
349 Hence, contra West’s depiction of James as attending exclusively to the personal and existential, Cotkin 
writes, “In much of his popular philosophy in this period of cultural crisis, James confronted the problems 
of inertia and tedium vitae, as a prelude to the full development of his own discourse of heroism, individual 
autonomy, and pragmatism.” See Cotkin, William James, 77.  
 
350 James can be witnessed addressing this as a social problem in his 1897 Preface to The Will to Believe 
and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy and in his 1892 public lectures on psychology to teachers and 
students, later published in 1899 as Talks to Teachers on Psychology: And to Students on Some of Life’s 
Ideals.  
 
351 I borrow this language of James’s continuous “struggle” from Croce. See his chapter on “Crises and 
Construction” in Croce, Young William James.  
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He theorizes meliorism precisely out of this struggle by positioning it in his 
philosophical and psychological writings from the 1880s and 1890s as a hopeful response 
to the problem of obstructed agency. In one of the most well-known expressions of his 
meliorism, James professes his decision to believe in free will as a deliberate, yet 
experimental, act: “My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will.”352 Later he 
defines “faith,” a word included in the lexicon of meliorism, in his 1879/1882 essay “The 
Sentiment of Rationality” as “the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue of 
which is not certified to us in advance.”353 In these early writings, meliorism gets 
expressed in terms of willful action, comprising an alternative form of agency from 
which it becomes possible to act with hope.  
  I develop an account of this form of agency – what I call “reparative agency” – 
so as to clarify meliorism as an ethics of action. Reparative agency presents a mid-range 
alternative to the agential extremes of omnipotence and impotence. That is, reparative 
agency involves an avowal of both the limits that impede action as well as the 
possibilities that empower it. Conceptualizing agency in this way entails an account of 
power as relational, dealing in negotiations and exchanges such that one neither wholly 
possesses power nor lacks it absolutely. Agency is taken as a fragile achievement rather 
than as a thing one possesses. James takes an interest in mapping the “limits of human 
power in every conceivable direction” as well as the “various ways of unlocking the 
reserves of power.”354 Reparative agency negotiates these limits and reserves, 
                                                        
352 James, Diary 1, Apr. 30, 1870, 82. Italics added. Cited in Perry, Thought and Character, 147-148. I 
describe the act as experimental insofar as James proffers it to himself as a tentative trial: “At any rate, I 
will assume for the present – until next year – that [a truly free will] is no illusion.” 
 
353 James, “Sentiment of Rationality,” in WTB, 90. Italics added.  
 
354 James, “Energies of Men,” in Essays in Religion, 145.  
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countenancing obstructions to action with the energy that arrives with affirming other 
agential possibilities. This form of agency consists in an affirmation of agents’ ability to 
act without the guarantee that they will act as they so affirm. That is, reparative agency is 
less about the faithful execution of action and more about the possibility of acting.  
 In what follows, I clarify the concept of reparative agency that is tacitly developed 
by James through his accounts of the will in The Principles of Psychology and belief in 
“The Will to Believe.” Whereas the former text specifies the volitional feature of 
reparative agency in terms of effortful attention, the latter text illuminates the type of 
commitment entailed by reparative agency. James forwards a type of reparative 
commitment that is simultaneously hesitant and hopeful, cautious and courageous. 
Reparative agency can thus be understood along the vectors of volition and commitment 
that make possible an ethics of action. I turn first to the account of volition developed in 
The Principles before turning to commitment in “The Will To Believe.”  
 
3. Volition and Reparative Agency  
In an 1895 letter to George H. Howison, James admits, “I am a victim of 
neurasthenia and of the sense of hollowness and unreality that goes with it.”355 Identified 
by neurologist George Miller Beard in 1869, neurasthenia, or “Americanitis,” was a 
diagnosis for physical and psychical symptoms that included fatigue, depression, anxiety, 
irritability, neuralgia, headaches, insomnia, and indecision.356 Beard referred to 
                                                        
355 See James, Letters of William James, Vol. 2, 23; Cotkin, William James, 27; Richardson, William James, 
119; and Croce, Young William James, 125.  
 
356 See Beard, American Nervousness, 9. According to Beard, neurasthenia affected upper-class American 
intellectuals and professionals (or “brain-workers”) whose close proximity to the demands of 
modernization – competition, industry, and urbanization – left them vulnerable to “nervous bankruptcy.” 
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neurasthenia as “nervous exhaustion,” a disease emerging from the enervation of the 
nervous system which drained subjects of their nervous energy. Struggling with his own 
symptoms of lethargy and vacillation, James offers a vocabulary that captures the 
debilitating effects of neurasthenia in the “Will” chapter from The Principles of 
Psychology.  
The primary problem with neurasthenia can be understood in terms of its effects 
on what James calls “voluntary action.” In the “Will” chapter, James concerns himself 
with the physiological and psychological conditions of voluntary action as distinct from 
both wishes and reflex actions.357 In the course of identifying its conditions and features, 
James highlights two types of will that prevent the exercise of voluntary or willful action. 
These are the pathological extremes of the “explosive will” and the “obstructed will.” 
Neurasthenia maps onto the obstructed will, which paralyzes the agent’s capacity for 
voluntary action. The polar opposite of this, the explosive will discharges energy so 
impulsively that the subject becomes overconfident in her capacity as an agent. James 
contrasts the agency associated with these types of will with the agency corresponding to 
willful action. In this section, I develop an account of the volitional feature of this 
reparative type of agency so as to distinguish it from the sovereign agency of the 
explosive will and the paralyzed agency of the obstructed will.  
 At the backdrop of James’s discussion of volition is the theory of ideo-motor 
action. This theory proposes that ideas always discharge themselves immediately and 
                                                        
As the disease drained a person’s nervous energy, Beard proposed treating neurasthenia with rest and 
relaxation. 
 
357 Voluntary or willful actions are different from wishes insofar as they treat an end of desire as attainable 
or within one’s power.  
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unhesitatingly into movements or “motor effects.”358 In cases where a single idea 
occupies the mind, that idea will easily pass over into motion “without express decision 
or effort.”359 Volition arises in response to more complicated cases where multiple ideas 
with conflicting motor effects possess the mind. The functional role of volition is to settle 
or decide the paralyzing impasses between conflicting ideas through a process of 
deliberation. These are circumstances characterized by “that peculiar feeling of inward 
unrest known as indecision.”360   
James gives the example of hesitating to get out of bed on a frigid morning and 
the conflict of ideas presenting two possibilities of action – to stay in the warm bed or to 
get up and face the cold. The paralyzing struggle between these two courses of action is 
overcome by the decisive idea or resolve that one “must lie here no longer.”361 Volition 
thus depends on a prior condition of conflict, hesitation, and indecision concerning the 
discharge of ideas in movement. Such circumstances are overcome through a process of 
deliberation whereby one reaches a decision about a course of action that will resolve the 
dilemma. While James outlines five different types of decision, it is the fifth type that is 
most important for the account of reparative agency developed here.362  
                                                        
358 See James, Principles, 522 and James, Talks to Teachers, 83. In Talks to Teachers, James summarizes 
the theory as follows: “The fact is that there is no sort of consciousness whatever, be it sensation, feeling, 
or idea, which does not directly and of itself tend to discharge into some motor effect.”  
 
359 James, Talks to Teachers, 84.  
 
360 James, Principles, 528. Italics in original. James summarizes this point in Talks to Teachers, “Such acts 
[of will] are often characterized by hesitation, and accompanied by a feeling, altogether peculiar, of resolve, 
a feeling which may or may not carry with it a further feeling of effort.” See James, Talks to Teachers, 83.  
 
361 James, Principles, 524.  
 
362 The five types of decision can be summarized as follows: 1) the “reasonable type,” consisting in the 
patient weighing of alternatives in the mind until one reaches a conclusion favoring one alternative over the 
other; 2) the acquiescing type, whereby one passively and indifferently allows a resolution to be determined 
accidentally “from without;” 3) the “reckless” type which are accidentally determined out of the impulsive 
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The fifth type are decisions that settle a conflict of ideas through the “creative 
contribution” of our “feeling of effort.”363 These kinds of decisions require an agent’s 
effort of attending to one of the clashing ideas and holding it stably before the mind. To 
use an example from his own life, when confronted with the vexing dilemma of suicide, 
James describes attending to a Renouvierian belief in free will to decide his crisis.364 He 
exercises effortful attention in holding fast to the idea of free will so as to settle an inner 
tension of conflicting tendencies for action. James performs the will in his very effort of 
attending to the idea of free will. In doing so, he exercises a type of agency that moves 
him from paralyzing indecision to embrace a course of action without the promise that 
this act will save him from his crisis.  
For James, the effort of attention names just what he means by the ‘will.’ He 
explains, “The essential achievement of the will, in short, when it is most ‘voluntary,’ is 
to ATTEND to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind.”365 The crucial function 
of the will is one of attending. Attending requires an awareness and strenuousness 
whereby one strives to steadfastly commit to a difficult idea (and action) in spite of the 
doubt that accompanies one’s decision. James poignantly captures the pain and struggle 
                                                        
discharge of nervous energy in one direction of the impasse; 4) the “changes of heart” type, consisting in 
sudden or abrupt shifts in temperament that involve a wholesale change in one’s values, motives, impulses, 
and perspective; 5) the effortful type, which are settled by the “creative contribution” of our strenuous 
effort. See James, Principles, 532-534.  
 
363 Ibid., 534.  
 
364 In his famous diary entry from April 1870, James confesses, “I think that yesterday was a crisis in my 
life. I finished the part of Renouvier’s second “Essais” and see no reason why his definition of Free Will – 
‘the sustaining of a thought because I choose to when I might have other thoughts’ – need be the definition 
of an illusion. At any rate, I will assume for the present – until next year – that it is no illusion. My first act 
of free will shall be to believe in free will.” See James, Letters of William James, Vol. 1, 147. Italics in 
original. 
 
365 James, Principles, 561.  
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that pervade situations requiring effortful attention, describing them as “desolate and 
acrid” excursions into “a lonesome moral wilderness.”366 Such decisions are desolate and 
lonesome because they ensnare us in the tragically painful act of consciously and 
deliberately destroying a possibility we desire to enact. Whereas the prior types of 
decision drop one of the alternatives from sight, “here both alternatives are steadily held 
in view, and in the very act of murdering the vanquished possibility the chooser realizes 
how much in that instant he is making himself lose. It is deliberately driving a thorn into 
one’s flesh.”367   
James contrasts volition through effortful attention with two pathological types of 
will: the explosive will and the obstructed will. With the explosive will, impulsive energy 
is discharged so quickly into action that “inhibitions get no time to arise.”368 This type of 
will has the advantage of executing actions promptly and with ease. However, with the 
surplus of impulsive power over inhibition, the explosive will can problematically result 
in reckless and precipitous actions.369 The explosive will is troubling precisely because of 
its sovereign and Promethean relation to agency. As Livingston notes, this type of will 
reflects a “dangerous overconfidence in the self’s sovereign power to master its 
                                                        
366 Ibid., 534. See also James’s description of Robert Gould Shaw’s “lonely courage” in his oration at the 
unveiling of Shaw’s memorial and Livingston’s discussion of this speech in Livingston, Damn Great 
Empires.   
 
367 Ibid.  
 
368 James, Principles, 537.  
 
369 James explains, “It is the absence of scruples, of consequences, of considerations, the extraordinary 
simplification of each moment’s mental outlook, that gives to the explosive individual such motor energy 
and ease; it need not be the greater intensity of any of his passions, motives, or thoughts.” James, 
Principles, 538.  
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world.”370 Without the interruptive force of inhibitive energy, the explosive will remains 
blind to the many obstacles and limits that hinder action.  
The obstructed will, however, faces the contrary problem of resigning to act with 
the disproportionate presence of inhibition over impulsive power. James associates this 
type of will with melancholic and reflective types who display “a condition of perfect 
‘abulia,’ or inability to will or act.”371 The obstructed will cannot translate its ideas into 
action. Unlike the sovereign agency of the explosive will, the obstructed will paralyzes 
the agent’s capacity for action. James explains, quoting Belgian physician Joseph 
Guislain, “Their will cannot overpass certain limits: one would say that the force of 
action within them is blocked up: the I will does not transform itself into impulsive 
volition, into active determination.”372 Incapable of realizing the motor-effects of their 
volitional ideas, the obstructed will leaves agents in a perpetual state of hesitation, 
apathy, and resignation. Hence, this type of will problematically entails an impotent form 
of agency that prevents agents from realizing their capacity as willful agents.  
In contrast to this, the agency that accompanies effortful attention is one that 
energizes an agent’s capacity to will and act in the face of obstruction. This is a type of 
reparative agency that involves a realistic avowal of both the limits that hinder action as 
well as the possibilities that empower it. In the face of indecision, the willful agent 
neither impulsively acts nor shirks from action, but attends to both the inhibitions that 
constrain action and the impulses that stimulate it. Keeping these in view, the agent 
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371 James, Talks to Teachers, 87.  
 
372 James, Principles, 546.  
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affirms her ability to act “under an array of inhibitions.”373 This does not mean that the 
willful agent ignores the hesitations that impede action as the impulsive agent does. Nor 
does she waver perpetually in inaction as does the agent with an obstructed will. Rather, 
she attends to such hesitations and finds her energy precisely in willing to act in the face 
of obstruction. As James explains in Talks to Teachers, “The highest form of character... 
abstractly considered, must be full of scruples and inhibitions. But action, in such a 
character, far from being paralyzed, will succeed in energetically keeping on its way, 
sometimes overpowering the resistances, sometimes steering along the line where they lie 
thinnest.”374  
While the explosive will and the obstructed will hinge on an all-or-nothing 
conception of agency such that one is either completely powerful or powerless, volition 
through effortful attention involves a more complicated understanding of agency. This is 
a type of reparative agency that negotiates the tensions of inhibition and conflicting 
impulses. One does not start out with this type of agency so much as one arrives at it 
through the struggle of work and effort. Hence, for James, it is only through the exercise 
of the will in the face of hesitation that one becomes a volitional agent. Exercising the 
will gives one “a “new range of power” that is unrealized when the will is either 
obstructed or explosive.375 
Through his account of volitional action in The Principles of Psychology, James 
develops a reparative conception of agency that serves as a response to the cultural crisis 
                                                        
373 James, Talks to Teachers, 88.  
 
374 Ibid., 87-8.  
 
375 Ibid., 136.  
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of neurasthenia which afflicted himself and others of his milieu. This type of agency is 
reparative insofar as it transforms the debilitating reality of indecision into the tense and 
lonesome effort of voluntary attention. The reparative agent recognizes the reality of her 
action being limited by a variety of hindrances without arriving at the fatalistic 
conclusion that she is therefore impotent. She attends, rather, to the possibilities that 
remain open for action. When these possibilities conflict, the reparative agent works 
through her hesitation by the effort of attending to one possibility amongst others so as to 
resolve, if only temporarily, her indecision. Action thus becomes possible through the 
work of the will. From this reparative position, James responds to the difficulty of acting 
without hope.  
 
4. Belief and Reparative Commitment  
 James’s preoccupation with the debilitating effects of indecision persisted well 
after the publication of The Principles of Psychology. Indeed, this preoccupation would 
inform some of his most important work in moral philosophy, including his infamous 
essay on “The Will to Believe” from 1896. Many of James’s critics would turn to this 
essay to depict his philosophical position as profoundly acritical. Consider, for instance, 
the criticism forwarded by contemporaries of James like Russell, Dickinson Miller, and 
L.T. Hobhouse who argued that his “will to believe” doctrine amounts to either 
voluntarism or wishful thinking.376 Such critics insist that James gives up criticality 
precisely in his defense of willful belief.  
                                                        
376 See Miller, “The Will to Believe;” Hobhouse, “Faith and the Will to Believe;” and Russell, 
“Pragmatism.”  
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To contest this reading, consider James’s proposal for an alternative title to this 
essay in a 1901 letter written to fellow American philosopher and psychologist, James 
Mark Baldwin. The essay, James regrets, should have been called “Critique of Pure 
Faith.”377 This more Kantian title, he suggests, would perhaps have assuaged some of his 
critics. James clarifies, “What I meant by the title was the state of mind of a man who 
finds an impulse in him towards a believing attitude, and who resolves not to quench it 
simply because doubts of its truth are possible. Its opposite would be the maxim: Believe 
in nothing which you can possibly doubt.”378 James’s invocation of the dual presence of 
doubt and belief in this passage captures something overlooked by critics who take him to 
be replacing doubt with belief. Not only do they ignore his particular understanding of 
faith as “belief in something concerning which doubt is still theoretically possible,”379 
they also overlook the critical dimension of his essay as specifying the conditions of 
willful belief.380 That is, if James’s “Will to Believe” essay is understood in terms of 
critique, that is, as an inquiry into the limits and conditions of belief or faith, then critics 
are quite wrong to take him as defending the boundlessness of the will.  
That James was interested in clarifying the boundaries of belief can be gleaned 
from his 1896 Preface to The Will to Believe and other Essays in Popular Philosophy. 
There he specifies that his defense of faith is addressed to academic audiences, who, 
unlike their popular counterpart, suffer not from a lack of criticality as from a lack of 
                                                        
377 See James, Correspondence of William James, 552.  
 
378 Ibid.  
 
379 James, Talks to Teachers, 90.  
 
380 This overlooking of the conditions of belief is common to both James’s more historical critics like 
Bertrand Russell, Dickinson Miller, and George Santayana as well as his more contemporary advocates like 
Gerald Myers. See Russell, “Pragmatism;” Santayana, Character and Opinion; and Myers, William James. 
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belief. While agreeing with other “rationalizing readers” that “what mankind at large 
most lacks is criticism and caution, not faith,” he notes that his particular audiences 
require a different message.381 Like himself, they suffer from “timorous abulia” and 
paralysis of the will.382 These audiences require a conception and justification of a type of 
faith that “can steer safely between the opposite dangers of believing too little or 
believing too much.”383 That is, they are in need of a faith that navigates between the twin 
hazards of paralysis and recklessness. This is a faith that is precisely critical and cautious 
without thereby being immobilizing. How to defend a critical form of faith?384 This is the 
key question haunting James’s account of belief in “The Will to Believe.”  
This section clarifies the kind of critical faith that James defends in his essay 
through the concept of reparative commitment. This concept illuminates the type of 
conviction entailed by a notion of reparative agency developed in the previous section. 
“The Will to Believe” can be read as continuing the theme of agency that occupies 
James’s attention in the “Will” chapter from The Principles. Hence, he employs the 
vocabulary of paralysis and recklessness, which map onto the obstructed and explosive 
wills respectively, to describe the dual dangers that agents seek to evade in willing to 
                                                        
381 James, Will to Believe, x. According to Paul Stob and Ermine Algaier, James often crafted his lectures 
and writings for his particular audiences. In this case, the lectures comprising The Will to Believe and other 
essays in Popular Philosophy were primarily delivered to academic audiences (especially philosophical 
clubs and theological associations) at universities across New England. See Stob, William James and 
Algaier, “Crafted Texts and Historical Contexts.”  
 
382 James, Will to Believe, x.  
 
383 Ibid., xi.  
 
384 Critical both in the sense of risky or uncertain and in the Kantian sense of inquiring into limits and 
conditions. James alternately poses this problem in terms of the “sisters” of “doubt and hope,” following 
Benjamin Paul Blood’s expression in his 1893 text The Flaw in Supremacy. Blood’s phrase displays the 
connection between doubt and hope, which are understood not as opposites, but as linked concepts whose 
meanings depend on the possibility of the other. See James, Will o Believe, ix and James, Talks to 
Teachers, 90.  
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believe. In “The Will to Believe,” James translates the agential dangers of paralysis and 
recklessness into two extreme hazards of belief, which can be understood in terms of 
either debilitating doubt (i.e., “believing too little”) or blind faith (i.e., “believing too 
much”). He offers willful belief as an alternative to these extreme forms of doubt and 
faith. Reparative commitment names the type of conviction that accompanies willful 
belief. It constitutes a form of commitment that is simultaneously hesitant and hopeful, 
cautious and courageous, thus underscoring the dual presence of uncertainty and faith in 
James’s meliorism.   
In “The Will to Believe,” James proposes that “Our passional nature not only 
lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine 
option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such 
circumstances, ‘Do not decide, but leave the question open’ is itself a passional decision 
– and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth.”385 This thesis defends our right 
to believe in cases that cannot be decided by intellectual proof or evidence. These 
restricted cases are decided by our passional nature which hazards the risk of being 
wrong. The term “passional nature” refers to what James calls “the will” in The 
Principles of Psychology. It includes both our more private deliberate volitions and 
affective motivations like fear and hope, as well as social influences that predispose us to 
certain beliefs. That is, our willfulness is conditioned not only by such idiosyncratic 
features as our emotions, dispositions, and drives, but also by features of our social, 
political, and historical contexts.386  
                                                        
385 James, “Will to Believe,” in WTB, 11. Italics in original.  
 
386 Hence James’s recognition that the afflictions of abulia and neurasthenia that debilitate the will are not 
simply determined by one’s physiological and psychical makeup, but are conditioned by certain 
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The will energizes belief only under specific conditions that comprise what James 
calls a “genuine option.” A genuine option is one that fulfills the following three criteria 
– it must be “live” rather than “dead;” it must be “forced” rather than “avoidable;” and it 
must be “momentous” rather than “trivial.”387 A live, as opposed to a dead, option is one 
that appeals to the belief of the person to whom it is proposed. That is, a hypothesis is 
live when it is capable of being believed by particular individuals. An option is forced 
rather than avoidable when there is no possibility of not choosing one option or the other. 
Suppose I said to you, “choose either steak or chicken.” This option is avoidable because 
you could choose an alternative that is neither chicken nor steak. Conversely, if I said to 
you, “Either come to dinner with me or don’t,” this would be a forced option because 
there is no alternative that allows you to escape the choice. Finally, a decision is 
momentous rather than trivial when it is potentially life changing. These are unique 
opportunities with high stakes insofar as they can impact one’s life irreversibly. Together, 
these three criteria – live, forced, and momentous – constitute a genuine option and 
supply the necessary and sufficient conditions for willful belief. This means, moreover, 
that the contrasting criteria – dead, avoidable, and trivial – function as the boundaries 
circumscribing willful belief. Thus, in his description of genuine options, James 
delineates both the constraining limits and the enabling conditions for belief.   
                                                        
technological, political, economic, and social aspects of a specific historical milieu. The economic and 
technological factors contributing to neurasthenia were especially emphasized by George Miller Beard. In 
American Nervousness, Beard attributes the emergence of neurasthenia to the technical and social 
developments of “steam power, the periodical press, the telegraph, the sciences, and the mental activity of 
women.” See Beard, American Nervousness, iv.  
 
387 James, “Will to Believe,” in WTB, 3.  
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In spite of his careful specification of the conditions under which we are justified 
to believe, many critics accuse James of defending a version of wishful thinking. One can 
witness such an interpretation in Dickinson Miller’s mocking suggestion in 1898 that the 
essay ought to be titled, “The Will to Make-Believe.”388 On this view, James’s account of 
willful belief steers too closely to the danger of reckless faith or the hazard of “believing 
too much.”389 Like the explosive will’s sovereign relation to agency outlined above, a 
reckless form of faith risks placing an overconfidence in its own willing capacity. This is 
a form of faith that is uncritical just insofar as it is blind to its own limits. Cheryl Misak 
offers the most recent critique of James in this regard. She argues that his “will to 
believe” doctrine amounts to a type of wishful thinking that problematically includes a 
subjectivist standard of evidence in the form of “the satisfaction of the believer.”390 
Misak finds this troubling because it links the evidence that warrants belief with the 
desirableness of a belief. Such a view would indeed be concerning if it were the one 
advocated by James in “The Will to Believe.”  
James, however, is not defending the omnipotence of belief as an exercise in 
wishful thinking. As he lays out in the “Will” chapter from The Principles, wishing is 
something distinct from willing in that where the former sets aims one cannot attain, the 
                                                        
388 See Miller, “The Will to Believe.”  
 
389 James, Will to Believe, xi. 
 
390 Misak, The American Pragmatists, 63. On Misak’s reading, James does not so much seek to refute 
evidentialism in “The Will to Believe” as he tries to expand what counts as evidence for the truth of a 
belief. While I agree with Misak that James does not aim to refute evidentialism (precisely because he does 
not think that the ethics of belief is a matter of proof or disproof), I worry that an overemphasis on the 
epistemology of belief in James’s essay potentially undercuts the ethical significance of willing to believe. 
That is, I agree with scholars like Marchetti, Dianda, and Koopman, who emphasize the import of “The 
Will to Believe” as an essay in ethics. See Marchetti, Ethics and Philosophical Critique; Dianda, “William 
James;” and Koopman, “The Will, the Will to Believe, and William James.”  
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latter desires only what is within one’s power.391 Thus, the will to believe realistically 
targets attainable desires while the wish to believe idealistically strives for what it cannot 
possibly realize. Recognizing the bind between the dangers of paralysis and recklessness 
in questions of faith, James proposes a type of belief that “hits the right channel between 
them.”392 This is a critical form of belief that countenances the limits of its efficacy while 
hazarding to act in circumstances where decisive proof is absent. These are cases whose 
truths depend “on our personal action,” which is decided by our effortful volition or our 
willingness to believe.393  
For James, the will to believe comes up against limits that obstruct its willing 
capacity. These limits appear in the form of dead hypotheses, avoidable choices, trivial 
options, as well as idiosyncratic and social influences that habituate the will toward 
specific beliefs. If the hypothesis is dead, the will has nothing to decide because no 
appeal is made to its energizing effort. This situation is much like the one James 
describes in The Principles in connection with the obstructed will. In the lethargic state of 
the will, “ideas, objects, considerations, which... fail to get to the will, fail to draw blood, 
seem, in so far forth, distant and unreal.”394 The dead hypothesis would thus need to be 
transformed into a live one to activate the spark of the will.395 Likewise, avoidable 
choices do not demand willful belief to decide their outcome. And while willful belief 
                                                        
391 James, Principles, 486.  
 
392 James, Will to Believe, xi.  
 
393 James, “Will to Believe,” in WTB, 25.  
 
394 James, Principles, 546-7.  
 
395 James maintains, “In concreto, the freedom to believe can only cover living options which the intellect 
of the individual cannot by itself resolve; and living options never seem absurdities to him who has them to 
consider.” See James, “Will to Believe,” in WTB, 29.  
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can decide trivial options, these do not quiver with the moral and existential weight of 
uncertainty at stake in momentous options. Other obstructions like social habits and 
physical or psychical ailments mark the resistances that the will must face if it is to 
overcome them. Yet, James leaves open the possibility that there are some resistances 
facing the will that may not be ultimately overcome.396 
Just as effortful volition steers between the agential extremes of the explosive will 
and the obstructed will, James’s concept of willful belief navigates between the dual 
dangers of recklessness and paralysis facing belief. By clarifying the enabling conditions 
and constraining limits of willful belief, James supplies a critique of pure faith. Willful 
belief constitutes a critical form of faith that humbly avows the limits constraining its 
exercise without thereby yielding to the paralyzing impotence of the skepticist disavowal 
of decisive action. James is especially concerned with the paralyzing doubt advocated by 
intellectuals like William Kingdon Clifford who demand abstention in questions of faith 
out of a fear of error.397 This fear functions as one possible affective response to 
situations of uncertainty that James contrasts with the hope of willful belief. He writes, 
“To preach scepticism [sic] to us as a duty until ‘sufficient evidence’ for religion be 
found, is tantamount therefore to telling us, when in presence of the religious hypothesis, 
that to yield to our fear of its being error is wiser and better than to yield to our hope that 
                                                        
396 Though James does not explicitly detail such cases, we might consider an example supplied by his 
sister, Alice, in her diary entry from October 26, 1890. After reading her brother’s paper on “The Hidden 
Self,” Alice describes the endless battle between her “body” and her “will” following violent bouts of 
hysteria and the torment of having to abandon the latter to her bodily inclinations: “As I lay prostrate after 
the storm with my mind luminous and active and susceptible of the clearest, strongest impressions, I saw so 
distinctly that it was a fight between my body and my will, a battle in which the former was to be 
triumphant to the end.” See James, Diary of Alice James, 149.  
 
397 See James, “Will to Believe” in WTB, 19 and Clifford, Ethics of Belief, 96. For commentary on the 
debate between Clifford and James, see Aikin, Evidentialism.  
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it may be true.”398 James worries that the skepticist avoidance of reckless belief comes at 
the price of giving up faith altogether. That is, the skeptic champions doubt at the 
expense of belief. In doing so, she not only sets up a problematic dichotomy between 
doubt and belief that clashes with the conception of faith defended by James, but her 
position also has debilitating agential effects insofar as she opts for a state of perpetual 
hesitation in waiting for sufficient evidence to arrive. This is to be in the agential position 
of the obstructed will, where agents are incapable of affirming their willful capacities. In 
terms of commitment, the skeptic essentially commits herself to being uncommitted.  
In contrast to the debilitating doubt of the skeptic, James outlines a form of faith 
that is simultaneously cautious and courageous. To understand the type of commitment 
that the will to believe entails, consider his suggestion from the Preface to The Will to 
Believe: “It does not follow, because recklessness may be a vice in soldiers, that courage 
ought never to be preached to them. What should be preached is courage weighted with 
responsibility.”399 Recognizing the capacity of agents for reckless action, James 
encourages a kind of cautious courage rather than a complete divestment from action. 
This courage is cautious in the sense that it is checked by inhibitions and requires agents 
to take responsibility for risking to believe in conditions of uncertainty. The type of 
commitment that follows from such courage is one that maintains a relationship to doubt 
without thereby being overcome by it. Hence, faith for James does not so much 
extinguish doubt as it keeps it open as a possibility. He clarifies in “The Sentiment of 
Rationality,” “Faith means belief in something concerning which doubt is still 
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399 James, Will to Believe, xi.  
 
 129 
theoretically possible.”400 Whereas the contrary position maintains that one ought not to 
believe in anything that can possibly be doubted, James argues that one is justified under 
specific conditions to believe in something even if it can be doubted. Belief responds to 
conditions of doubt without fully overcoming or being overcome by it. The believing 
subject does not express the full confidence in her faith as does someone for whom faith 
is the negation of doubt. Rather, the believing subject expresses a trembling confidence, 
or a “stuttering conviction” in Livingston’s words,401 as she avows the elements of 
uncertainty and risk that condition and accompany her will to believe.  
Much like the type of hesitant hope offered in the final Pragmatism lecture, James 
places faith on quivering, unsettled ground. This quivering quality specifies how faith is 
held by an agent. Less a steady resolve to execute actions swiftly and without question, 
quivering faith maintains contact with the doubt and hesitation to which it is initially 
responsive. Recall James’s description of the willing function as one that responds to the 
indecision wrought by conflicting impulses. If conviction is not to become the blind form 
of faith that accompanies a reckless will, then it must remain open to doubt, hesitation, 
and uncertainty. This does not mean that one wallows perpetually in doubt, for to do so is 
precisely to be without faith and the action it makes possible. Rather, quivering faith is 
about the movement from doubt to belief and the type of uncertainty that attends such 
movement.402 Resting only on a maybe, faith trembles in the movement from doubt to 
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401 See Livingston, Damn Great Empires, 106.  
 
402 I am reminded, for instance, of the quavering in my voice once I get the nerve to speak. The quavering 
refers to the uncertainty I have about speaking, reflects a vulnerability I assume in speaking, and modifies 
how I speak as a subject. This trembling quality bespeaks the kind of conviction I take on as a speaking 
subject. I am not quite steady, not quite sure, and yet I venture to speak, my words touched with the tremble 
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belief. It trembles because it bears the traces of doubt that condition its prior movement. 
Without uncertainty, there would be no faith and no accompanying risk, for as James 
contends, faith only decides matters that lack evidence or certainty.403 Hence, faith is “the 
readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue of which is not certified to us in 
advance.”404 Without faith, however, subjects would remain indefinitely in the torpor of 
indecision and hesitation, and could not affirm their capacities as willful agents – as 
agents capable of willing and acting without the guarantee that they are right in doing so.  
The agent who risks believing even when doubtful is one who is cautiously 
poised. In being cautious, she does not thereby give up being committed, but rather her 
commitment reflects the caution she maintains in leaving doubt open as a possibility. She 
places a quivering confidence in her capacity as a believing, and hence, willful agent. If, 
for James, “a test of belief is willingness to act,”405 then the type of cautious confidence 
that accompanies belief is the same type that escorts willful action.  
James’s account of willful belief entails a form of reparative commitment. This 
type of commitment is reparative insofar as it posits (and affirms) the possibility to 
believe within specific limits. Subjects engaging the work of reparation aim at salvaging 
possibilities in spite of constraining limits, or, in Sedgwick’s words, they aim at 
“extracting sustenance from the objects of a culture – even of a culture whose avowed 
                                                        
of hesitation. Caution qualifies my confidence as a speaker. This cautiousness does not altogether prevent 
me from speaking, but it permeates my voice insofar as I speak from doubt rather than certainty.  
 
403 These are cases that cannot be “decided on intellectual grounds.” See James, “Will to Believe,” in WTB, 
11.  
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desire has often been not to sustain them.”406 To be reparatively committed means, then, 
to at once countenance doubt as that which limits belief and the action it entails and to 
extract confidence from willing to believe. This is the type of commitment that 
accompanies reparative agency. In being reparatively committed, the agent places trust in 
her capacity to act in spite of the uncertainties that attend her action. This is not the over-
confidence of a Promethean will nor is it the timidity of Hamlet-like indecision.
 Reparative commitment is located along the middle-ranges of conviction and 
doubt. It realizes the extent to which one can be simultaneously cautious and courageous, 
hesitant and hopeful without conviction and possible action being thereby undermined. 
This cautious courage is indexical of the vulnerability an agent assumes in risking to 
believe and act in a world without security or guarantee. The cautiousness does not lead 
to a position of impotence insofar as the subject places faith in her agential capacities. 
Without faith, an agent cannot move from the condition of doubt that incapacitates her 
ability to act. Yet, without being open to doubt, an agent potentially commits herself to a 
form of blind faith and a boundless sense of agency. To be reparatively committed, the 
agent must therefore maintain a relation to doubt by remaining cautious and uncertain 
without giving up her affirmation to hope and act on this hope. What results is a position 
from which it becomes possible to hope so long as one is also open to doubt.407 This 
“fluttering” type of hope thus energizes the reparative work of sustaining possibilities in 
the midst of limits that do not sustain us.  
 
                                                        
406 Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 150-1.  
 
407 I take this to be the meaning behind Benjamin Paul Blood’s declaration that “doubt and hope are 
sisters,” which James quotes in the Preface to The Will to Believe. See James, Will to believe, ix.  
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Conclusion 
In his 1959 conceptual history, Critique and Crisis, Reinhart Koselleck reminds 
us of the historical and etymological connection of crisis and critique. Whereas we tend 
to think of these concepts as designating either a subjective style of thinking or an 
objective state of affairs, Koselleck describes a single concept – ‘krisis’ – deployed by 
the Greeks to refer at once to an ‘objective’ situation and a ‘subjective’ activity.408 
The proximity between critique and crisis can be witnessed in James’s corpus and 
life. As Cotkin argues, his work as a public philosopher consists in addressing specific 
cultural crises that pervaded his milieu. One sees James grappling with the crisis of 
inaction suffered by neurasthenics like himself in The Principles of Psychology and “The 
Will to Believe.” Elsewhere, one finds James engage the political and moral crises 
wrought by America’s practice of imperialism at the turn of the 20th century in his 
editorials and correspondence.409 Yet, James’s more explicit attention too crisis – whether 
psychological, ethical, or political – is coupled with a seemingly absent discussion of 
critique such that it becomes difficult to identify the critical dimension of his work. As I 
have been arguing, however, we would be remiss if we therefore concluded that James 
declines critical practice. We would, furthermore, be mistaken if we also decided that this 
apparent lack of criticality left him in an impotent, uncommitted position. Without 
explicitly conceptualizing his work in terms of critique, James tacitly practices critique as 
a reparative response to crises afflicting himself and others. Hence, in response to the 
central crisis of faith and agency that haunted his milieu, James offers concepts of 
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reparative agency and reparative commitment to incite the possibility of hoping and 
acting even in conditions of uncertainty.  
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PART II 
CHAPTER IV 
REPARATIVE POLITICAL CRITIQUE 
 
Introduction 
 In Part One, I defended reparative critique as an alternative critical practice to the 
paranoid version that has “run out of steam.”410 I then presented varieties of reparative 
critique through the work of Foucault and James. I now turn in Part Two to show how 
reparative critique can be put to work as a method for political theorizing. This chapter 
fleshes out a method of reparative political critique before operationalizing it in Chapters 
Five and Six on specific problems concerning the politics and ethics of contemporary 
digital technology.  
 Using the frame of recent debates over the status of ideal theory in political 
philosophy, I argue that a reparative political critique must be realist rather than 
idealizing in orientation. It must be realist for two reasons. First, insofar as ideal theory 
bears affinities with paranoid critique in terms of their epistemic aims of universalism 
and certainty, reparative political critique must incline itself away from ideal theory. This 
point, however, only states negatively what reparative critique cannot be as a method for 
political theory. The second reason addresses more positively why reparative political 
critique is realist: it offers a fact-sensitive approach that attends to problems of power that 
haunt a particular present. This trifold attention to facts, power, and present problems 
contributes to the realist orientation of reparative political critique.  
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 My argument proceeds in four steps. In section one, I clarify the recent literature 
on ideal theory and realist theory so as to situate reparative critique within the terms of 
that debate. After specifying the epistemic affinities between ideal theory and paranoid 
critique in section two, I then take up in section three the realist position defended by 
Raymond Geuss. Arguing that ideal theory collapses the political with the moral, Geuss 
forwards realist political theory as an alternate approach that is attentive to history, 
context, action, and power. Yet, Geuss’s realism depends on a negative conception of 
critique that falls prey to the problems of paranoia. This leads me to argue for reparative 
political critique as offering a better alternative to Geuss’s realism in section four. I 
suggest that for a method of political critique to be both realist and reparative in 
orientation, it must address some concrete, specific actuality rather than defend idealized 
conceptions (e.g. of justice) which invariably show reality to fall short and thus to stand 
in need of negative judgment.  
 
1. The Ideal and Non-Ideal Debate 
 A contemporary debate in political philosophy about ideal theory has crystallized 
around reactions to John Rawls’s seminal work outlining an ideal theory of justice from 
1971 and 2001. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Rawls’s position received a range of 
critiques concerning its ideal status from political theorists as diverse as Amartya Sen, 
Bernard Williams, Bonnie Honig, Charles W. Mills, and Raymond Geuss, among many 
others.411 As Laura Valentini (2012) has noted, the debate is often difficult to track as it 
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maps multiple concerns.412 In this section, I offer two ways of understanding the debate. 
The first concerns a series of distinctions forwarded by Rawls between alternative ways 
of proceeding within normative political theory. The second way of conceptualizing the 
debate has to do with the meta-theoretical status of normative political theory itself.  
In Political Liberalism, A Theory of Justice, and his 2001 restatement, Justice as 
Fairness, Rawls disambiguates two forms of normative political theory, ideal or “full 
compliance theory” and non-ideal or “partial compliance theory.”413 Following Valentini, 
however, the difference between ideal or full compliance theory and non-ideal or partial 
compliance theory is just one set among three distinctions to map the debates over ideal 
theory.414 In addition to this distinction, Valentini offers those of utopian and realist 
theory and end-state and transitional theory as possible ways of conceptualizing the 
debate. On her view, Rawls’s work provides the source of these distinctions and comes 
under attack by those who claim that his theory is too ideal.415 I briefly clarify each of 
these three distinctions before turning to the second way of understanding the debate. 
Rawls’s ideal theory explicitly specifies the principles of justice under conditions 
of full compliance, which assumes that all pertinent agents comply with the demands of 
justice applying to them and that natural and historical conditions are economically and 
socially favorable.416 Non-ideal theory, in contrast, specifies what is required of agents 
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413 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 284-285; Rawls, Theory of Justice, 8; and Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 
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415 Valentini, “Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory,” 657. There are also theorists who claim Rawls’s position is too 
realist. For an example of this, see Cohen, “Facts and Principles,”  and Cohen, Rescuing Justice.  
 
416 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 285; Rawls, Theory of Justice, 8; and Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 13.  
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under conditions of partial compliance.417 These are conditions whereby agents act 
unjustly or only partially fulfill what justice demands. According to Rawls, ideal theory 
offers “the only basis for the systematic grasp of the more pressing problems of non-ideal 
theory.”418 Valentini argues that Rawls’s view has come under attack with a recent shift 
in political philosophy that questions whether ideal theory can sufficiently clarify the 
requirements of agents in conditions of injustice or partial compliance.419 While it may be 
that ideal theory enables one to identify cases of partial compliance, it does not provide 
guidance about how to respond to such cases.  
The debate can also be understood through the distinction between utopian and 
realist theory, which comes to the fore in Rawls’s description of his own position as 
“realistically utopian.”420 Valentini describes the difference between ‘fully utopian’ 
theories, which reject the necessity of placing feasibility constraints on ideals of justice, 
and ‘realistic’ theories, which accept the need of placing feasibility constraints on 
principles of justice.421 For realists, constraints on feasibility stem from a range of 
physical, psychological, and social facts that limit the viability of agents to uphold ideals 
of justice. In its neglect of feasibility constraints, utopian theory can be understood as a 
fact-insensitive position while realist theory is attentive to facts as setting constraints on 
the design of normative principles.422 Some of these facts involve, for instance, the 
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existence of disagreement, conflict, and relations of power that pervade political life. 
Alice Baderin (2014) specifies the fact-sensitivity of the realist approach as one 
concerned with a practical view of political theory, one that ultimately seeks to guide 
political action.423 This realist approach criticizes ideal political theory for being too 
abstract and for not engaging with the empirical details that shape the requirements for 
‘real,’ practical politics.424 Against this realist position, David Estlund (2014) argues that 
the question of practicality should be kept separate from normative political theorizing.425 
He asserts that the unreasonable fear of utopianism on the part of realists can be 
problematic for political theory insofar as it may “lead to the marginalization of inquiries 
and insights that do not suffer the defects of utopianism properly conceived.”426 As 
Valentini notes, Rawls’s work has been interpreted on both sides of the realist-utopian 
distinction, as either too realistic and fact-constrained, or as too idealistic and insensitive 
to facts.427 
 Finally, the debate also hinges on a distinction central to Rawls’s work between 
end-state or perfection theory and transitional or gradualist theory.428 Whereas ideal 
theory forwards a long-term goal for institutional reform, non-ideal theory forwards a 
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more gradualist position that asks “how this long-term goal might be achieved, or worked 
toward, usually in gradual steps.”429 Rawls gives logical and normative priority to the 
end-state mode of ideal theorizing insofar as it sets the objective or long-term goal that 
transitional non-ideal theory works towards.430 Against this, Amartya Sen has argued that 
end-state or “transcendental” theory, which attempts to articulate the conditions and 
requirements for a fully just world, is neither necessary nor sufficient for transitional 
theory, which attempts to understand how the world might be made more just.431 Thus, 
for Sen, determining possible improvements of justice does not depend upon having an 
ideal account of a perfectly just world. Valentini (2011) and Stemplowska (2008) call this 
position into question by insisting on the import of ideal theory for determining the extent 
to which the world is unjust.432 As Valentini explains, “After all, we do not simply want 
to know what would make the world more just, but also when the world is fully just and 
what full justice demands of us.”433 On this view, end-state theory provides important 
normative guidance for the recommendation of improvements of justice in transitional 
theory.434 
 While the distinctions offered by Valentini concern a set of debates about ideal 
and non-ideal theory that are internal to Rawls’s theory of justice, another way to 
understand the debate concerns the meta-theoretical status of normative political theory 
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itself. Significant for this conceptualization is a line of criticism offered by Bonnie 
Honig, Bernard Williams, and Raymond Geuss. These figures critique the normative 
aspirations of ideal theorists like Rawls for regarding politics as “applied ethics.”435 They 
maintain that politics must be understood in its own terms, not in the terms of moral 
theory. Williams and Geuss call their preferred view “political realism.”436 For Enzo 
Rossi and Matt Sleat (2014), realist political theory insists on the irreducibility of the 
political to the moral. On this view, realism is distinct from non-ideal theory in its 
attempt to give autonomy to the political, while non-ideal theory may still operate under 
the assumption that politics can be reducible to morality.437 Following Rossi and Sleat, 
we miss this characteristic feature of realism if we read it solely through the lens of the 
utopian-realist distinction specified by Valentini (2012) as concerning issues of 
feasibility. I will now summarize this realist line of argument before showing the 
epistemic affinities between ideal theory and paranoid critique in the following section.  
Central for the critique of ideal theory in terms of its meta-theoretical status is the 
role of contestation, disagreement, or conflict in marking the distinguishing feature of 
political life. Among the first to emphasize politics as agonistic, Honig argues that ideal 
theorists like Immanuel Kant and Rawls effectively displace politics by offering safety 
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and stability against spaces and practices of disruption. This “displacement of politics” 
consists in its conflation with administration and juridical settlement.438 Against these 
“virtue theories of politics,” she describes the “virtù theories” of Friedrich Nietzsche and 
Hannah Arendt, who understand politics in terms of disruption, struggle, dissonance, and 
remainders.439 This agonistic depiction of political life disrupts ideal theory’s 
presumption toward consensus and agreement.  
 Like Honig, Williams argues for an alternative approach to political theory that 
contrasts with what he calls “political moralism.” As the name suggests, political 
moralism prioritizes the moral over the political such that “political theory is something 
like applied morality.”440 Linked to a neo-Kantian framework, Williams refers primarily 
to the work of Rawls and Ronald Dworkin as representative of political moralism.441 
Williams contrasts this with his own approach of “political realism,” which insists that 
the concepts, vocabulary, and concerns of politics are irreducible to those of ethics.442 
Akin to Honig’s agonism, political realism affirms conflict or “political difference” as a 
primary feature of politics. Hence, on this view, the first political question is the 
Hobbesian one of securing order, protection, trust, safety, and conditions of cooperation. 
Solving this question is a matter of legitimation. According to Williams, the state must 
meet the basic legitimation demand if it is to be differentiated from an illegitimate state 
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that can too easily become a state of disorder.443 Meeting this demand “implies a sense in 
which the state has to offer a justification of its power to each subject.”444 Unlike forms 
of political moralism, which describes political legitimation as being derived from the 
formal properties of moral law or moral personhood, political realism understands 
legitimation as an historically contextualized practice.445  
 Following Williams, Geuss maintains that political theory ought to proceed from 
an understanding of politics as autonomous from the ethical. In rejecting the idea that 
“politics is applied ethics,” Geuss targets those “ethics-first” approaches that begin by 
specifying ideal ethical principles, values, and precepts which serve as normative guides 
for political action. He explains, “The view I am rejecting assumes that one can complete 
the work of ethics first, attaining an ideal theory of how we should act, and then in a 
second step, one can apply that ideal theory to the action of political agents.” 446 Geuss 
argues that not only is it possible to obtain normative political judgments from distinctly 
political values, but that moral values are insufficient for that task.447 His own realist 
political philosophy proceeds by prioritizing the practice of politics as distinct from that 
of morality.  
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To clarify why reparative political critique inclines itself toward realism rather 
than  idealism, I shall briefly show the affinities between ideal theory and paranoid 
critique before accounting more fully for the realist orientation of reparative critique. 
 
2. Ideal Political Theory and Paranoid Critique 
 As we saw in section one, ideal theory can be understood through its fidelity to 
full compliance, utopian, end-state, and ethics-first theorizing. While these features are 
not all problematic from a reparative perspective, the first two bear meta-theoretical 
affinities with paranoid critique. First, full-compliance presumes a kind of agency that 
maps to the one at work in paranoid critique. Second, the aim of ideal theory for a 
systematic knowledge of justice and injustice resembles the epistemic inclinations of 
paranoia toward totalization and certainty. Finally, while not paranoid in itself, the 
utopian pretensions of ideal theory can result in a paranoid form of critique that regards 
reality as always standing in need of negative judgment.  
 In A Theory of Justice, Rawls forwards his ideal account of justice as a strict 
compliance theory. He is specifically concerned with the task of “examin[ing] the 
principles of justice that would regulate a well-ordered society.”448 A well-ordered 
society is one that assumes full or strict compliance on the part of agents to uphold the 
principles of justice. Rawls explains, “Everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his 
part in upholding just institutions.”449 Hence, a full compliance theory presumes not only 
that agents are capable of acting justly, but that they actually do act in just ways. Such a 
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theory depends on a moral or political psychology that regards humans as cognitively and 
motivationally inclined to fulfill the demands of justice. What results is an ideal 
conception of human agency that obfuscates the myriad limitations placed on human 
action. These limitations include (but are by no means limited to) the specific power 
relations organizing conduct in certain ways, conscious or unconscious barriers such as 
those created through bias, stereotyping, and prejudice, corporeal limits and 
vulnerabilities that differently inhibit action, and epistemic flaws that make the human a 
fallible, error-prone creature.  
The version of human agency offered by ideal theory corresponds to the type of 
agency at work in paranoid critique. This paranoid type of agency assumes an all-or-
nothing form such that subjects are either all-powerful or completely powerless. To be 
omnipotent, agents must be unlimited or unhindered by obstructions that would thwart 
their actions. They are totally capable and confident in fulfilling whatever actions they set 
out to perform. Like the agency theorized by ideal theory, the omnipotent agency 
assumed by paranoid critique is completely blind to limitations. This conception of 
agency cannot account for the limits of human agency that prevent us from acting in full 
compliance. As Elizabeth Anderson (2010) reminds us, “A system of principles that 
would produce a just world if they regulated the conduct of perfectly rational and just 
persons will not do so when we ask human beings, with all our limitations and flaws, to 
follow them.”450 To take seriously the limits facing human action would be to take up 
what Rawls calls a “partial compliance theory.”451 This is a nonideal theory which 
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“studies the principles that govern how we are to deal with injustice.”452 Such a theory 
would require a reparative conception of agency that avows the very real limits 
confronting human action and attends to the possibilities that remain open for 
transforming these limits. A reparative agency would guide a realist political theorist to 
proceed from a consideration of how human conduct is actually limited and how they 
cope with such limits.  
Rawls argues that an ideal or strict compliance theory has the advantage of 
providing “the only basis for the systematic grasp” of the “more pressing problems” 
addressed by non-ideal theory.453 That is, on Rawls’s account, ideal theory offers a 
systematic basis for understanding the injustices that comprise urgent matters for agents 
under conditions of partial compliance. The idea here is that ideal theory can provide a 
way of systematically diagnosing problems of injustice by accounting for the principles 
that would regulate an ideally just (i.e., well-ordered) society. This emphasis on a 
“systematic grasp” of justice and injustice reveals the proclivity of ideal theory for 
systematization that has the potential consequence of imparting the ideal theorist with an 
epistemic authority over her non-ideal counterparts.  
To understand how this ideal aim of systematization can be taken as continuous 
with paranoid critique, consider again the epistemic features of paranoia. Paranoia aspires 
to a systematic, totalized knowledge of what is deemed threatening so as to protect the 
subject from possible harm. This totalized knowledge reduces all phenomena to instances 
of threats. In doing so, paranoia cannot allow anything to be unknown, ambiguous, or 
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uncategorized. Likewise, in seeking a systematic knowledge of justice that would thereby 
give one an orderly account of injustice, the ideal theorist cannot allow anything which 
frustrates or escapes systematization even though such things may be pertinent for 
political theorizing.454 It is unclear, for instance, how ideal theory can respond to a value-
pluralism that is less the reasonable variety articulated by Rawls, but the more intractable 
kind described by someone like Honig or William James.455 That is, ideal theory does not 
seem to be able to countenance a category that defies agreement or resolution, or that is 
not otherwise readily solvable. Such a category might include irreparable remainders, 
stubborn conflicts, or gaps between the ideal and the actual that, in James’s words, “can 
only be got through by leaving part of the ideal behind.”456 This presents a problem 
insofar as an intractable pluralism sets a feasibility constraint on normative political 
theorizing that is evaded by ideal theory. As I will show below, a reparative political 
theory differs from ideal theory on this point as it embraces intractable pluralism as an 
unavoidable feasibility condition.  
A further epistemic point of contact between ideal theory and paranoia can be 
seen from Rawls’s presumption that ideal theory provides the only basis for a systematic 
understanding of injustice. This supposition suggests two things. First, it suggests that 
theorists must arrive at a thorough knowledge of justice in advance of addressing the 
more urgent problems of injustice. This idea maps to the epistemic pretensions of 
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paranoia as it seeks to arrive at a knowledge of threats or “bad surprises” in advance of 
their unfolding.457 The desire for a knowledge made up in advance reflects a dogmatic 
impulse behind paranoia and ideal theory. This inclination not only assumes that such a 
knowledge is possible, it prioritizes this type of knowledge as epistemically advantageous 
over other types that would avow uncertainty rather than seek to escape it. This leads to 
the second point implied by the supposition that ideal theory lends the sole basis for 
systematically grasping injustice. It suggests that ideal theorists are epistemically 
privileged in their systematic knowledge of justice and, hence, of injustice. This bears an 
affinity with paranoid knowing as it assumes that a special train of epistemic advantages 
follow from its conception of knowledge, which takes the form of systematic certainty or 
exposure of hidden truths. Thus, Rawls imparts ideal theory with an epistemic authority 
over other ways of knowing injustice.  
Following Valentini, ideal theory tends to incline itself toward a more utopian, as 
distinct from a more realist, mode of theorizing. This distinction refers to how theories 
regard the placement of feasibility constraints on ideals of justice. Whereas fully utopian 
theories neglect feasibility constraints and are thus fact-insensitive approaches, realist 
theories are sensitive to facts as setting practical constraints on normative principles. This 
distinction can be understood along the lines of a spectrum with fully utopian theories on 
one end and fully realist positions on the other. Rawls’s “realistically utopian” position 
might be placed in the middle of this spectrum insofar as it “probes the limits of the 
realistically practicable, that is, how far in our world (given its laws and tendencies) a 
democratic regime can attain complete realization of its appropriate political values – 
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democratic perfection, if you like.”458 While Rawls is concerned with the feasibility of 
fully realizing a perfectly just society, his position risks being too utopian because it 
assumes strict compliance. As previously discussed, a strict compliance theory is 
insensitive to the limits and flaws of human agency. For Rawls, what sets a feasibility 
constraint on the realization of justice is the fact of reasonable pluralism. This fact alone, 
not the fact of partial compliance, “limits what is practicably possible under the 
conditions of our social world.”459 Yet, insofar as this pluralism does not account for the 
kind of intractable conflict that frustrates agreement, it does not provide a sufficient 
feasibility constraint. Rawls is unconcerned with other facts that would serve as limits on 
the practically possible. Hence, he asserts that he “shall not pursue” the question of “how 
the limits of the practicable are discerned and what the conditions of our social world in 
fact are.”460 In not pursuing such a question, however, Rawls’s ideal theory would seem 
more utopian than realist.  
The problem with more utopian theories is twofold. First, they are inattentive to 
limits that constrain the possible. This is problematic because a neglect of limits, such as 
facts of human agency or intractable conflict, leads to a quixotic conception of political 
possibility that is ungrounded in political actuality. A disregard for limits makes it 
difficult to inspire change in human conduct. For, if an ideal theory advances the 
principles for a perfectly just society that humans are incapable of actually fulfilling, how 
could they reasonably be expected to undertake the change necessary to realize such a 
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society? Rather than theorize the ideally possible (but practicably impossible), political 
theorists would do better to attend to the actually possible. This is a category that is 
sensitive to the feasibility constraints confronting human action without thereby giving 
up the possibility that such action may be changed or ameliorated.  
The second problem with more utopian theories has to do with the kind of 
political critique they encourage. In defending idealized conceptions (e.g. of justice) 
which invariably show reality to fall short and thus to stand in need of negative judgment, 
ideal theory tacitly promotes the practice of paranoid critique. For after describing the 
principles that would regulate an ideal society, how could one look on the world one 
actually inhabits, with its myriad injustices and imperfections, without seeing all the ways 
it falls short of the ideal? This world would have to be perpetually negated in light of that 
other, perfected one. One would thus assume the position of the paranoid critic who 
exercises negative judgment in regarding everything as threatening, bad, or potentially 
harmful. This is problematic insofar as it does not present a realistic image of the world 
as both damaged and salvageable. The overemphasis of the negative leads to the fatalistic 
conclusion that the world is not to be trusted because it inevitably disappoints. From such 
a position, it becomes impossible to realize that the world may be changed.  
 
3. Geuss’s Realist Political Theory 
In Geuss’s work, realist political theory can be understood through its negative 
and positive aspects. Negatively, realism entails a rejection of moralism, a position that 
conceptualizes morality in terms of the absolute knowledge of “good” and “bad” or 
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“right” and  “wrong.”461 Positively, realism approaches political theorizing through an 
attention to history, context, action, and power. It consists in an understanding of politics 
as historically situated and as principally concerned with action and power relations. 
Combining the methods of Foucauldian genealogy and ideology critique, Geuss engages 
the critical-diagnostic work of interrogating forms of power operant in the present.  
 In his lectures comprising Philosophy and Real Politics, Geuss advances four 
theses that undergird a realist approach to politics, which contrasts with the ethics-first 
approach of ideal theory. First, unlike its ideal counterpart, realist political theory begins 
with an analysis of how people and institutions actually act and operate at a particular 
time and in specific circumstances.462 This can be expressed as a focus on political 
actuality. It includes an emphasis on the real motivations and powerful illusions that 
incline humans toward certain actions and discourage them from others. Second, realist 
political theory takes politics to be primarily about action and “contexts of action” rather 
than being about statements or beliefs.463 Geuss does not deny the importance of belief 
and discourse for political inquiry, but understands these in terms of action or what they 
do.464 Third, a realist position embraces the idea that politics is historically located and 
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thus must be studied in terms of its specific historical contexts.465 This thesis entails a 
detachment from entertaining eternal questions of political philosophy about the nature of 
ideals like justice or freedom, and encourages a focus on the changing circumstances that 
condition and inform political life. Fourth, realist theory assumes that politics is more 
akin to the exercise of a craft or skill than to the mastery and application of a set of 
theories and principles. For Geuss, a skill is “an ability to act in a flexible way that is 
responsive to features of the given environment with the result that action or interaction is 
enhanced or facilitated, or the environment is transformed in ways that are positively 
valued.”466 Politics is thus aligned with a type of techné or know-how as distinct from 
epistémé or knowledge-that. 
 I focus on Geuss’s third thesis to consider how an attention to history and context 
informs his realism. Rather than proceed from a timeless position of what politics would 
require of us under ideal conditions, realist theory begins by considering the power 
relations, motivations, and political institutions that exist in one’s historical present. This 
timeless impulse of ideal theory can be witnessed in Rawls’s work through its 
deployment of the original position as a hypothetical, non-historical device that, as Rawls 
emphasizes, has never actually occurred nor could it ever occur.467  
Once politics is understood as historically located and subject to change, political 
theory ought, on this view, to adopt historical inquiry into its methodology. Geuss 
explains, “Political philosophy should become more historical, or, rather, it should 
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recognise [sic] explicitly that it has always had an important historical dimension that, to 
its cost, it has tried its best to ignore.”468 Historical inquiry contributes to the critical task 
of realist theory, which aims to interrogate and diagnose the status quo of one’s current 
context, by showing how certain taken-for-granted concepts, institutions, beliefs, and 
actions came to be contingently established.469  
History informs realist political theory as it temporalizes the political (contra the 
impulse of ideal theory which adopts a timeless perspective) and supplies it with the work 
of inquiring into and diagnosing one’s present political context. Geuss draws on 
Foucauldian genealogy to supply realist political theory with an equally realist historical 
methodology. This methodology can be understood as realist on Geuss’s view insofar as 
it provides contextually-specific histories of present problems through a focus on 
relations of power. That is, genealogy presents a method for the historical analysis of 
political actuality and thus can be positioned as realist in orientation. As Janosch Prinz 
(2016) notes, genealogy contributes to the realist critical task of diagnosing the actual by 
providing historical problematizations of the present.470  
 Geuss’s embrace of Foucauldian genealogy further brings to the fore realism’s 
attention to power relations. This focus on power follows from the way Geuss 
understands the political as addressing the question: “Who <does> what to whom for 
whose benefit?”471 This revision of Lenin’s “Who whom?” formula treats the politically 
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relevant in terms of the power exercised between specific agents for specific interests or 
benefits. On this view, the political is centrally about relations of power. He argues, “To 
think politically is to think about agency, power, and interests, and the relations among 
these.”472 By ‘power,’ he means something more akin to the Foucauldian conception that 
is less identified with coercion or domination and more with an exercise of action or what 
Geuss calls an “ability to do.”473 This actionistic articulation of power does not rule out 
coercion or domination but regards these as possible modes that power can assume. 
Geuss elaborates, “It is probably a mistake to treat ‘power’ as if it referred to a single, 
uniform substance or relation wherever it was found. It makes more sense to distinguish a 
variety of qualitatively distinct kinds of powers.”474  
Realist political theory attends to the operation of plural powers in particular 
contexts of action. For Geuss, one form that power takes is ideology.475 This is an indirect 
exercise of power that results in a distorted set of beliefs, desires, opinions, and attitudes. 
The distortion consists in “presenting these beliefs, desires, etc., as inherently connected 
with some universal interest, when in fact they are subservient to particular interests.”476 
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Hence, ideology transforms the contingent, particular, and variable into the necessary, 
universal, and invariant. Geuss outlines two ways in which political theory could relate to 
a given ideology. The first consists in a “criticism of ideology,” whereby theorists 
progressively seek to combat ideological illusion by revealing the hidden interests and 
power relations that distort certain desires or beliefs. The second entails the ideological 
role that political theory itself plays in contributing to ideological illusions by diverting 
attention from them, by making them more difficult to expose, or by creating new 
ones.477 To ward off the threat of their potential complicity with ideology, Geuss suggests 
that political theorists should always engage in critical self-reflection as a way of 
exposing the entanglement of theory with relations of power.  
 Geuss’s dual use of genealogy and ideology critique informs his account of the 
critical function of realist political theory. This critical function is rather ambiguous in his 
work insofar as it wavers between a detachment from and an embrace of the negative. On 
the one hand, Geuss explicitly claims that to be “critical” is not the same as being 
“negative.” As he writes in Reality and Its Dreams, “Some confusion can be avoided here 
if one keeps in mind that ‘critical’ does not mean ‘negative.’ A ‘critical’ attitude or theory 
is one that evaluates what it is studying, whether that ‘evaluation’ turns out finally to be 
negative or positive.”478 While critique is not negative in terms of its evaluative status, 
Geuss suggests that it can be construed as negative in terms of its destructive activity. He 
argues, for instance, that “an ethos of criticism is…an essential constituent of philosophy, 
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and much of its history is devoted to developing techniques that will allow one to prune 
back any given set of theoretical excrescences and to destroy the surplus value in the 
realm of meaning that philosophy also, and necessarily, produces.”479 For Geuss, this 
“negativism” contributes to the critical impulse of philosophy.480 Hence, his concept of 
critique can be understood as negative insofar as he positions it with destruction.481  
Geuss forwards this account of destructive critique against the demand for 
constructive criticism, or the type of criticism that conserves the status-quo by tacitly 
accepting the terms, actions, and institutions of an existing social formation.482 On the 
constructive view, one can only criticize existing social and political arrangements if one 
has a positive alternative to offer.483 Negative criticism, in contrast, sets itself against the 
status quo by interrogating and diagnosing the present set of actions, terms, and 
institutions that are taken-for-granted in daily political life. If political critique is not to 
blindly conform to the status quo, then it must be a negative, subversive exercise on 
Geuss’s account. For Prinz (2016), this negative conception of critique is “crucial for 
grasping how he [Geuss] understands the critical orientation of political theory.”484 An 
attitude of suspicion informs this negative work of critique as it sets itself against the 
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status quo. As Prinz remarks of Geuss’s view, “Political theorists are advised to approach 
their surroundings with suspicion, to be wary of what is alleged to be actual and to 
inquire into how this has come to be viewed as actual.”485 Hence, critics must be on guard 
and vigilant to detect the ideological illusions and distorted beliefs that present 
themselves as the actual, the true, and the necessary. Not only can this paranoid 
orientation toward critique be gleaned from Geuss’s deployment of ideology critique, it 
can also be grasped from his use of genealogy as a method for historical inquiry. 
Genealogy is here taken to contribute to the negative task of suspiciously interrogating 
and diagnosing present power relations. 
While the critical function of his political realism consists in the negative work of 
destroying the ideological illusions of the status quo, Geuss nonetheless imparts a more 
positive task to realist political theory through the embrace of type of utopianism. Unlike 
William Galston’s (2010) portrayal of realism as “resolutely anti-utopian,” Geuss does 
not oppose his realism to utopian theorizing, but deploys a revised conception of the 
utopian as an imaginative tool for political reflection about one’s present 
circumstances.486 He describes these utopian features of political realism in his essay, 
“Realism and the Relativity of Judgment.” Geuss construes utopianism as less a type of 
idealistic imagining about the future, but as a “realistic” engagement with concrete 
political actuality that partakes of the “wishful vision” of satisfying unrealized desires 
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and needs.487 He explains, “For a number of reasons, it seems a good idea to shift the 
focus of utopian thinking from images of purported future unchanging perfection to a 
more historically informed analysis of existing, but changing, dissatisfactions and needs, 
and possible (contextually and historically specific) ways of satisfying them.”488 On this 
view, realists need not give up utopian thinking altogether, but must detach it from a 
commitment to some final political state of perfection that would be impossible to 
actually realize. This utopianism attends to the “human needs and desires that cannot be 
satisfied in the basic structure of society as it now exists”489 and aspires to their future 
realization.  
Although Geuss emphasizes utopianism as a positive feature of his political 
realism, this feature remains under-developed in his work and can be understood as the 
observe side of the negative (i.e., destructive) work of critique. These dual features of the 
critical and the utopian in his realism shed further light on the way Geuss conceptualizes 
critique as a negative exercise. That is, whereas utopianism is construed as the creative 
and productive aspect of political realism, critique is understood as its destructive and 
negative counterpart.490  The idea here is that critique itself is not creative or 
transformative, but needs to be supplemented by a type of activity which is, and this is 
precisely what utopianism provides. As Geuss argues, “Philosophy is a continual and 
unending sequence of production and destruction, breathing in and breathing out. It does 
not exist except where both of these processes – exaggerating creation of surplus 
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meaning and ascetic pruning/criticism exist in tandem.”491 As I will show in the 
following section, the problem with such a position is that it neglects the reparative 
dimension of critique – the idea that critique is more than a negative activity but engages 
in the creative work of engaging and constructing possibilities for transforming our 
present practices and selves. Contra Geuss, we need not rely on utopianism to supply the 
positive function of realist political theory; rather, what is needed is a more sustaining 
conception of critique. 
 
4. Reparative Political Critique 
 Building on elements of Geuss’s realism, I offer reparative critique as a realist 
method for political theorizing. This method is realist in Geuss’s sense insofar as it is 
prioritizes questions of historical context and power relations as central for political 
inquiry. Unlike Geuss’s realism, however, the realism of reparative critique does not 
embrace a conception of critique as an exclusively negative practice, nor does it 
incorporate utopianism as the positive counterpoint to critique’s negativity. In light of the 
limits of what I have called “paranoid critique,” I argue that a realist method of political 
critique should be reparative rather than negative. I rehearse these limits vis-à-vis 
Geuss’s realist account before fleshing out the realism of reparative political critique.  
 
4.1 Realist Political Theory and Paranoid Critique 
 In the previous section we saw that Geuss’s realism embraces a conception of 
negative critique which consists in the destructive activity of combating and destroying 
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ideological distortions. This negative understanding of critical work maps onto what I 
have called “paranoid critique.” Often identified with critique itself, this paranoid critical 
practice is guided by an attitude of suspicion that informs the negative work of 
denouncing, condemning, or debunking the objects, actions, or beliefs of a culture. 
Paranoid critique positions critics against that which they criticize. This maneuver can be 
witnessed likewise in Geuss’s description of political critique as setting itself against the 
status quo.492 To further clarify how his understanding of critique aligns with this 
paranoid version, I briefly rehearse some of the features of paranoid critique below, 
focusing especially on those that overlap with Geuss’s account. These include the 
affective feature of suspicion and the epistemic feature of exposure or revelation of truth.  
 Central for the practice of paranoid critique is the affect of suspicion. While 
suspicion and paranoia are distinct affects, paranoia captures the problems of suspicion 
when taken to the extreme. Indeed, it becomes difficult to distinguish the two when 
suspicion comes to solely define the work of critique. In its extreme form, then, suspicion 
takes on the qualities of paranoia. These are the qualities of being self-reinforcing, 
totalizing, and intensifying. Together they make paranoia a problematic affect. The self-
reinforcing feature refers to the idea that one can never be paranoid enough because any 
undesirable threat or surprise experienced by the subject only reinforces their paranoia. 
Paranoia also has the totalizing effect of treating all objects, whether known or unknown, 
as suspicious and potentially threatening. Hence, paranoid subjects are always on the alert 
to anticipate dangers that are both familiar and novel. Finally, paranoia is an intensifying 
and contagious affect. It intensifies as its anticipatory strategies fail to shield the subject 
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from bad surprises. This is troublesome, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (2003) explains, 
because paranoia “seems to grow like a crystal in a hypersaturated solution, blotting out 
any sense of the possibility of alternative ways of understanding or things to 
understand.”493 Once paranoia takes hold of subjects, it becomes exceedingly difficult to 
break out of its grip as it intensifies and reinforces itself.  
 When paranoia informs the work of critique, critics affectively engage their 
objects through anticipation, vigilance, and mistrust. Not only does this have the effect of 
reinforcing paranoia in the critic, but it also leads to an identification of critique with 
paranoia such that one cannot imagine conducting critical inquiry without being 
suspicious or paranoid. Significant for paranoid critique is the type of epistemology that it 
assumes. Paranoid knowledge takes the form of exposure or revelation. Akin to what 
Paul Ricoeur calls the “hermeneutics of suspicion,” paranoid knowing aims to reveal a 
truth that is hidden or otherwise unknown.494 This type of knowing can be witnessed in 
critical practices of demystification which strive to unveil the ideologies that structure 
social reality. This epistemic practice can be seen in Geuss’s political realism through its 
embrace of ideology critique.495 Ideology, according to Geuss, is “what prevents the 
agents in the society from correctly perceiving their true situation and real interests.”496 
Realist political theory aids in freeing agents from these ideological illusions by raising 
their awareness of such distortions and the pain or suffering that results from them.497 
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What is problematic about this form of knowledge-as-exposure is that it places a 
remarkable weight on the efficacy of knowledge per se. That is, the paranoid critic 
believes there is something to be gained epistemically in the procedure of exposing 
hidden truths about social and political reality that are assumed to go undetected by 
everyday practitioners. Yet, as Sedgwick points out, “for someone to have an unmystified 
view of systemic oppressions does not intrinsically or necessarily enjoin that person to 
any specific train of epistemological or narrative consequences.”498 Hence, it is not 
necessarily the case that any epistemic privileges or advantages follow from the critic’s 
demystified knowledge of supposedly “hidden” ideological illusions. To assume 
otherwise is to impart an epistemic authority to the critic that is somehow lacking in other 
knowers. 
By relying on a notion of negative critique, Geuss’s realist position suffers the 
limits that accompany a paranoid critical practice. This practice is limited in two ways. 
First, insofar as it equates critical inquiry with paranoia, it is unable to countenance other 
modes of critique that are motivated by a different set of affects. This includes affects like 
hope and care (explored in previous chapters) that showcase the transformative impulse 
behind critique. Paranoia is ill-suited for highlighting the transformative dimension of 
critique insofar as it negatively positions critics against what may be uncertain, 
contingent, and possible.499 These are qualities that inform the transformable as it 
concerns what may be (and hence, uncertainly, contingently, and possibly) changed. 
Second, paranoid critique is limited by the epistemology of exposure which sets critics in 
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an authoritative relation to other knowers as the revealers of truth. This self-serving 
gesture on the part of critics is problematic as it assumes a naiveté in the audiences of 
their demystifications and obfuscates the affective range of other motivations for 
knowing. 
 
4.2 Realism and Reparative Political Critique 
 Having explicated the limits of Geuss’s political realism in terms of its affinities 
with the epistemic and affective features of paranoid critique, I will now clarify, more 
positively, the realism of reparative political critique. I emphasize four realist elements 
that follow from a reparative methodology. First, reparative political critique is a fact-
sensitive approach. In being sensitive to facts, reparative political critique forwards a 
realist understanding of agency that contrasts with idealized conceptions which neglect 
the limits and flaws of human action. Second, reparative political critique attends to 
power relations and their possible alteration. This attention to power relates to Geuss’s 
realist position with the difference that where Geuss emphasizes ideology as the exemplar 
of power, I highlight a more capacious account of power as the organization of conduct. 
Third, reparative political critique is responsive to problems that pervade our present 
practices. Problems refer to unsettled objects of concern that are normatively ambiguous. 
Finally, rather than focus inquiry on a distant idealized future where justice has been 
perfectly achieved, the reparative political critic directs inquiry to the here and now 
which pulses with contestation and conflict. This designates the temporal orientation of 
reparative realism. By attending to the problems permeating the here and now, reparative 
political critique does not pessimistically give up the possibility of their amelioration, but 
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places hope in their present transformation. This realism thus differs from Geuss’s insofar 
as it does not locate the positive function of political theory in a utopianism which is 
separate from the work of critique, but deploys critique as a tool for mending and healing 
present problems.  
 A method of reparative political critique can be understood as realist in 
orientation insofar as it offers a fact-sensitive approach to questions of feasibility. Facts 
are taken to set constraints on what is agentially and politically possible. This feature can 
be gleaned from the reparative critic’s attention to limits. As Melanie Klein (1946) 
argues, a reparative position is one from which it becomes possible for subjects to 
recognize themselves as flawed and ambivalent in their agential capacities.500 What 
follows from this recognition is a “more realistic response” on the part of subjects to the 
power and limits of their own agency.501 On the one hand, subjects realize their power of 
effecting harm on others and seek to make reparations for the injury they inflict. On the 
other hand, they come to understand themselves as limited insofar as there are certain 
actions they cannot perform and insofar as they realize their vulnerability to harm. Hence, 
a reparative position provides a realist conception of agency. This is a relational type of 
agency that realistically reflects the dual presence of limits and possibilities for human 
action. It refers to what Sedgwick calls the “middle ranges of agency” – the idea that 
agents can be relatively empowered or disempowered without thereby destroying or 
being destroyed by another.502  
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A focus on agential limits entails that critics consider relevant facts of human 
psychology and history. This might include, for instance, facts pertaining to habit and 
bias that either consciously or unconsciously affect the behavior and comportment of 
subjects toward others. These would be important to consider insofar as they negatively 
limit our actions and interactions. Political theorists might also consider facts relating to 
human volition and resilience. This would include the kind of inquiry undertaken by 
William James in The Principles of Psychology into the different volitional positions 
assumed by subjects. As discussed in Chapter Three, James provides helpful language for 
conceptualizing the limits and efficacy of the will as an instrument for transforming our 
habits. Volition is a pertinent category for questions of political feasibility as it concerns 
the possibility of acting in the midst of constraints.  
A reparative political critic would also attend to history as supplying certain limits 
that bear upon contemporary agents and the feasibility of remedying present problems. 
This marks a departure from ideal theory, which prioritizes a consideration of the 
principles required of agents under timeless, ideal conditions, and relegates facts about 
history to questions of non-ideal conditions of partial compliance.503 An attention to 
history might take the form of conducting historical inquiry oneself or incorporating 
histories written by others into one’s work. If a political theorist is interested, for 
instance, in understanding contemporary practices of racialized surveillance as limiting 
the kinds of actions available for a specific set of racialized subjects in the U.S., they 
might turn to historical work that narrates the emergence and lineage of such practices.504 
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A reparative critic engages history not simply for the sake of the past, but, for the sake of 
the present and its possible transformation. That is, following the insights of Michel 
Foucault as discussed in Chapter Two, history is taken to inform and is used to intensify 
the problems of our present.505  
A focus on agency and limits invariably brings the reparative political critic to the 
issue of power. Following Geuss, we can think of reparative political critique as realist in 
the sense that it attends to power relations. Like the reparative conception of agency 
expressed above, power is comprehended in relational terms. The reparative critic takes 
their cue from Foucault in conceptualizing power less as a thing possessed than as 
something exercised or conducted. Power can be understood as the organization of action 
or the “conduct of conduct” in the words of Foucault.506 What follows from this is a more 
expansive concept of power than one that is exclusively limited to domination or to 
ideology. The reparative critic attends to power relations that not only take the form of 
suppression, but assume other, productive forms like discipline and biopolitical 
control.507 This marks a difference from Geuss’s realism, which tends to conceptualize 
power in terms of ideology. The reduction of power to ideology is problematic for three 
reasons. First, the concept of ideology operates through an epistemology of exposure that 
separates a false reality from a true one which the critic somehow has access to. As 
discussed above, this imparts the critic with an epistemic authority over others such that 
they can reveal the truth behind distorted beliefs or false consciousness. Second, ideology 
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implies an idealistic conception of power that works primarily on our representations, 
ideas, thoughts, or beliefs. As Foucault forcefully shows in Discipline and Punish, 
however, power does not just work on our ideas, but governs our bodies, habits, and 
conduct.508 Third, ideology involves an understanding of power as repressive such that it 
cannot account for how power can be productive. This point can be gleaned again from 
Foucault, who distances his own analysis of power as creative or productive from the 
negative, repressive understanding of power at work in the concept of ideology.509 The 
reparative political critic thus follows Foucault in providing a capacious conception of 
power that is irreducible to ideology.  
Significant for the reparative critique of power is the space it leaves open for 
transformation. That is, the point of reparative critique is not to say that power is all-
encompassing such that agents have no possibility of escape or resistance, for to do so 
would be to engage power through a paranoid posture. Rather, the reparative critic 
focuses on power with an eye to its possible alteration. This type of political critique is 
invested with a range of affects that orient critics reparatively to power. This includes 
affects like hope and care, which were showcased in the chapters on James and Foucault, 
respectively. To be reparatively oriented toward power means being attentive to power’s 
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contingency and to the ways in which it is contested or experimentally resisted. As both 
James and Foucault contend, power does not tend to go uncontested. James, for instance, 
suggests that critics map both the limits and reserves of human power “in every 
conceivable direction.”510 Foucault likewise encourages a focus on the forms of 
resistance or “counter-conduct” to the governing exercise of power (as the “conduct of 
conduct”).511 As he explains in The Will to Know, “Where there is power, there is 
resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of 
exteriority in relation to power.”512 Hence, resistance is understood as contemporaneous 
and coterminous with power. This point entails a sensitivity on the part of critics to the 
transformability of power relations through techniques of counter-conduct. Critics would 
thus consider the actual practices of resistance that agents exercise to counter specific 
modes of power or would highlight the possibility of transforming a certain power 
relation if such practices did not yet exist.  
A method of reparative political critique proceeds from the present problems and 
conflicts that afflict agents. This realist element can be understood in light of the 
agonistic depiction of political life forwarded by Honig. As noted earlier, for Honig, 
politics has to do with conflict, disruption, discord, and struggle.513 An attention to 
problems specifically, however, is inspired by the realist tendencies of pragmatism and 
genealogy. Though each engages with problems differently, whether by intensifying or 
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ameliorating them, they nonetheless cohere insofar as they view problems as generative 
objects of focus for political inquiry. Problems are unsettled objects of concern. They 
differ from other types of objects (e.g., injustices and harms) in that they are ambiguous, 
uncertain, and contested. That is, their normative status is not as certainly determined as 
it is for things like injustice. An injustice constitutes a normatively unambiguous wrong 
whereas problems are normatively uncertain.514 This feature makes problems at once 
difficult and fruitful objects for political inquiry because they call for clarification, 
critical reflection, and reconstruction. A focus on problems marks a further difference 
from Geuss’s realism which considers the ideological distortions suffered by a social 
group. For Geuss, such distortions are normatively unambiguous in that they depend on a 
clear distinction between the “true” and the “illusory.” Hence, he writes in his 1981 text, 
The Idea of a Critical Theory, that ideology prevents agents from “correctly perceiving 
their true situation and real interests.”515 Problems constitute a different kind of category 
insofar as they do not depend on such normatively clear-cut criteria as the true and the 
illusory, but rather consist in features that are more unclear, complicated, and complex.516  
The reparative critic contributes to the work of clarifying problems by 
undertaking an empirical inquiry into their social and historical construction. This would 
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be the type of inquiry engaged by Foucault, for instance, in his genealogies from the mid-
1970s which problematize contemporary forms of punishment and sexuality.517 Through 
the work of problematization, Foucault both clarifies the historical emergence of specific 
practices that pose problems for our present selves and intensifies these problems as 
fraught openings that invite transformation.518 The reparative critic also adds to the labor 
of reconstructing problems by conducting inquiry that experiments with their possible 
alteration. One might think here of the kind of inquiry pursued by James in his 
ameliorative responses to problems of clashing ideals, human blindness, and paralyzing 
doubt confronting his socio-cultural milieu.519 Like James, the reparative critic engages 
problems as uncertainties standing in need of experimental response.  
The clarification, intensification, and reconstruction of present problems are 
equally necessary for the practice of reparative political critique. Without the clarification 
and intensification of problems, it can be difficult for agents to identify and conceptualize 
specific uncertainties haunting their present. That is, problems are not always readily 
apparent or identifiable as problems and hence must be made problematic, uncertain, or 
fraught. The work of problematization – the activity of making uncertain what is given 
and certain – thus contributes to reparative political critique an invaluable method for 
discerning problems in the present. Yet, without the reconstruction of problems, agents 
would be left with the paralyzing uncertainty wrought by problems without a sense of 
how they can be altered or made less doubtful. Problems can exhaust the agential 
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potential of subjects to transform that which seems intractable and unalterable. Hence, to 
grasp how problems might be transformed in the present and future, reparative political 
critique needs to be informed by reconstructive inquiry.    
The reparative critic’s attentiveness to present problems highlights a temporal 
difference between its realist orientation and the utopian impulse of ideal theory. In 
theorizing justice from the perspective of an idealized future wherein it has been perfectly 
achieved, ideal theory looks away from the problems haunting an actual present. That is, 
by focusing inquiry on a distant future, ideal theory risks an inattention to both the past 
and present. While scholars like Charles Mills (2014) have accounted for this feature of 
ideal theory as an embrace of timelessness, I understand it as a particular kind of 
temporality, one that separates the ideality of the future from the actuality of the past and 
present.520 Instead of contemplating politics from the prospective position of a future 
state of perfection, reparative political critique attends to the problems pulsing in what 
W.E.B. Du Bois once called “this narrow Now.”521 An attention to the here and now 
marks the temporal orientation of reparative realism. The idea here is that critics begin 
political reflection in media res, that is, from the immanent position of one’s present 
circumstances. Central for this perspective is a concern for what permeates one’s present 
– to the problems that collectives encounter here and now and the forms of contestation 
that make the contemporary moment quiver in uncertainty.  
Two things follow from this temporal orientation of reparative political critique. 
First, insofar as the contemporary moment can be subject to contestation, the reparative 
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political critic does not refer to something like the present in the singular, but to plural 
presents that are incessantly struggled over. This entails a meta-theoretical perspective on 
time as something plural, open, and problematic. Following Bruno Latour (1987), we can 
think of time less as something given in advance than as something made, constructed, 
and contested. As Latour contends, “Time – that is, the distinction between moments, is 
the distance consequence of actions to make a particular position durable. It is not, nor 
can it be, a cause.”522 Against the desire to regard time as something already made and 
determined, or already passed and behind us, Latour proposes that we conceptualize time 
as a performative consequence of an ensemble of actors and actions. This perspective has 
the benefit of relieving us of a tendency to regard the present as something singular, 
stable, and determined. Hence, in clarifying present problems, reparative critics must take 
care to specify which present and whose present is uncertain, contested, and subject to 
inquiry.  
Second, in concentrating on the conflicts that pervade a particular present, the 
reparative political critic does not thereby neglect the past or future, but relates to these 
temporal dimensions from the perspective of this “pulsing Now.”523 Whereas idealists 
tend to turn to the past or future as ways of escaping the present, reparative realists turn to 
the past and future as ways of engaging and potentially altering our presents. That is, in 
looking at a present problem from the standpoint of its historical construction, the 
reparative critic is able to see how the past informs what is present and what might be 
needed to transform it. Hence, in understanding how a particular problem in the present 
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was historically made, one can begin to see how this problem might be unmade. By 
attending to the transformability of present problems, reparative political critique can be 
said to entertain a non-idealized form of hope.524 While hope is often aligned with an 
idealistic optimism about the future, the reparative critic finds hope in their realistic 
engagement with the possibilities quivering in the present. Hence, the positive force of 
political theory need not be relegated to the utopian imaginings of future change, but can 
consist in the present consideration of change that is already underway. The desire for 
things to be otherwise can be found in those practices of resistance that agents take up in 
the here and now to contest the limiting effects of power. By positioning change as 
something exclusive to the future, political theory risks neglecting those transformative 
strategies engaged by agents in the urgency of the pulsing, precarious now.  
 
Conclusion 
 In the final pages of Philosophy and Real Politics, Geuss aligns his realism with a 
rejection of constructive criticism, or the idea that “a philosopher (or theorist) must be 
“positive,” i.e., that one may criticize some doctrine or institution only if one has a 
positive alternative to it to propose.”525 “In extremis,” he writes, “Brecht is perfectly 
right: “Nothing but ad hominem abuse; that’s better than nothing.”526 One of the 
contentions of reparative critique is that the work of the critic can (and often does) consist 
in more than the kind of negative labor described by Geuss. It is the function of the 
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reparative in reparative critique to specify just what this more is. It signals the generative, 
mending, and sustaining activity of critics who seek the transformation of contemporary 
problems. 
As I have argued here, for a reparative method of critique to be realist in 
orientation, it must address some concrete problem that permeates our present practices. I 
show how reparative critique can be put to work in this fashion by deploying it in the 
chapters that follow to clarify and ameliorate ethical and political problems arising from a 
digital present. These chapters consider the problems of racial bias and discrimination 
posed by the exercise of power in predictive policing algorithms. The first of these 
(Chapter Five) analyzes the temporal operation of power in algorithms like the Chicago 
Police Department’s Strategic Subject List (SSL). The following chapter (Chapter Six) 
then outlines, in a reparative temper, a set of ethical strategies for transforming the 
practice of predictive policing.  
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CHAPTER V 
ALGORITHMIC PARANOIA AND TEMPORAL GOVERNMENTALITY 
IN PREDICTIVE POLICING 
 
Introduction  
 
 The past decade has seen the emergence of recent techniques in law enforcement 
to forecast and prevent future crimes before they occur. In 2009, the National Institute of 
Justice defined these techniques as predictive policing which involves “taking data from 
disparate sources, analyzing them and then using results to anticipate, prevent and 
respond more effectively to future crime.”527 Currently, predictive policing software is 
employed in 25 major police departments in cities across the United States.528 Two kinds 
of software systems are used in predictive policing, distinguished according to whether 
the software targets places or people.529 Place-based systems like the Los Angeles Police 
Department’s PredPol program make predictions about where and when a future crime 
will occur. Person-based tools like the Strategic Subjects List (SSL), used by the Chicago 
Police Department, predict who is likely to commit or be a victim of crime.530 Both 
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systems rely on algorithms to generate the predictions central to this new proactive style 
of policing.531  
The growing prevalence of predictive policing is a contemporary site of concern 
for a number of civil rights organizations, activists, and theorists. In their recent work on 
pre-crime and big data policing, Jude McCulloch and Dean Wilson (2016), and Andrew 
Guthrie Ferguson (2017) highlight the problems that predictive policing poses to civil 
liberties in the form of heightened surveillance, racial profiling, and bias.532 David 
Robinson and Logan Koepke (2016) warn against the potential of predictive policing to 
“reinforce disproportionate and discriminatory policing practices.”533 These programs, 
they argue, problematically rely on historical crime data, which are often inaccurate 
measures of past rates of crime, to target the places and people of possible future 
crime.534  
 Many criticisms of predictive policing target the privacy and transparency 
violations that arise from this novel practice. But largely left out of these accunts is the 
power exercised by algorithmic predictive policing technologies. By attending to the 
form of power exercised by predictive policing technologies, I do not wish to deny the 
importance of the myriad privacy and transparency issues that accompany these 
technologies. Rather, I worry that critics might miss other concerning features of 
predictive policing that are irreducible to violations of privacy and trust. On this view, 
                                                        
531 For a brief pre-history of predictive policing, see Wilson, “Algorithmic Patrol.”  
 
532 Cathy O’Neil provocatively describes predictive policing as a “weapon of math destruction” – a 
mathematical model that has harmful effects on precarious social groups. See O’Neil, Weapons of Math 
Destruction, 3.   
 
533 Robinson and Koepke, “Stuck in a Pattern,” 1.  
 
534 Ibid., 5.  
 176 
even if the technologies were more transparent, this would not necessarily modify the 
form of power practiced by these technologies. As I shall argue, a framework of trust and 
transparency is insufficient for conceptualizing the power of predictive policing 
algorithms. 
In light of a burgeoning body of critical scholarship emphasizing the power of 
algorithms,535 I argue that predictive policing exercises power through a paranoid style 
that constitutes a form of what I call “temporal governmentality.” I deploy the 
Foucauldian category of governmentality to assess how predictive policing algorithms 
exercise power. Governmentality refers to an organization of power relations, where 
power is understood as something exercised rather than possessed and as entangled with 
knowledge. To inquire into the type of power deployed in predictive policing, I bring a 
focus on temporality to the lens of governmentality in order to produce a hybrid 
analytical category. By “temporality,” I mean a way of relating to time in terms of the 
past, present, and future. Together, temporal governmentality refers to the government of 
time – a way of organizing power through specific temporal relations between the past, 
present, and future.  
While the concept of time has been employed in studying the normativity of 
algorithms more broadly,536 it has yet to be developed in relation to the politics of 
predictive policing. I bring the lens of temporal governmentality to bear upon systems of 
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predictive policing, particularly person-based algorithms like Chicago’s Strategic Subject 
List, that manage a field of possible actions by targeting and preempting future criminal 
behavior. Temporality is especially pertinent to the case of predictive policing as it is 
continuous with a historical racialized practice of organizing, managing, controlling, and 
stealing time. I argue that the racialized time of predictive policing works to forge a 
double closure of the past and the future through a paranoid logic that aims to preempt 
future possibilities of criminal conduct by drawing on a past codified in the form of 
historical crime data. Paranoia – an affect with a distinct way of relating to time – 
captures the racialized temporality of predictive policing. That is, if temporal 
governmentality designates how power functions in predictive algorithms, then paranoia 
names the specific temporal operation of power in predictive policing. Focusing on 
Chicago’s SSL, I illustrate how this predictive algorithm operates in paranoid fashion to 
create a self-fulfilling prophecy by projecting a criminal future on the basis of a criminal 
past.537  
This argument makes two interventions in the existing literature on predictive 
policing. First, while some scholars have noted the preemptive logic at work in predictive 
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policing algorithms, a logic continuous with what Louise Amoore (2013) calls the 
“politics of possibility,” I argue that preemption only partially captures the temporal 
governmentality of predictive policing.538 Predictive policing does not simply detach 
itself from the past as McCulloch and Wilson (2016) contend, but problematically uses 
and reinforces a racialized past to generate its preemptive power. This point leads to what 
I see is the central contribution of this paper as it analyzes how racism functions 
temporally in the case of the SSL, rather than simply pointing out that the SSL is racially 
fraught. While critics have pointed out the problematic racial politics of this technology, 
it is not always clear how this politics is entangled with the way these algorithms work 
temporally. Where scholars have tended to focus separately on the temporality of 
algorithmic prediction and on the politics of race in predictive policing algorithms, I 
contend that the power of predictive policing must be understood in light of what Charles 
Mills (2014) calls the “racialization of time.” This concept refers to the way racism works 
on and through time. While predictive policing has been celebrated by programmers, 
researchers, and law enforcement officers as “blind to race and ethnicity,” the practice 
cannot be extricated from the racial politics of governing time, especially when “doing 
time” in this country is disproportionate between whites and non-whites.539  
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 This chapter proceeds with a review of recent literature on the politics of 
algorithms in section one as a frame for addressing how predictive policing algorithms 
exercise power. Following Tarleton Gillespie (2014, 2016), it proves useful to think of 
algorithms as “sociotechnical assemblages” that refer to a whole network of actors both 
human and non-human. Thinking of algorithms as sociotechnical assemblages makes 
them readily compatible with Michel Foucault’s notion of governmentality. In section 
two, I develop the concept of temporal governmentality and explain its utility for 
analyzing predictive policing. Finally, section three develops an account of the paranoid 
operation of temporal governmentality in Chicago’s SSL. 
 
1. Algorithmic Governmentality 
Algorithms are notoriously ambiguous as objects of study.540 They often refer to 
several things at once: in a technical sense, they represent automated procedures or 
“recipes” composed in a series of programmable steps designed to efficiently achieve 
some desired outcome; in an epistemic sense, algorithms signify objectivity, consistency, 
impartiality, legitimacy, and authority in the production of knowledge; in a sociotechnical 
sense, they refer to an ensemble of actors both human (programmers, coders, designers, 
data miners, users, etc.) and non-human (models, data, target goals, applications, 
software, hardware, etc.).541  
                                                        
540 See Ziewitz, “Governing Algorithms,” 10.  
 
541 See Gillespie, “Algorithm,” 19-22 and Ananny, “Toward an Ethics of Algorithms,” 97.  
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 Keeping in mind the potential risks of conceptualizing algorithms as 
sociotechnical ensembles,542 it is nevertheless useful for inquiring into the power 
exercised by algorithms. Following Foucault’s insightful idea that power is always 
exercised in a distributed network rather than a capacity possessed by (exclusively) 
human agents, we can attend to the power conducted by algorithms as sociotechnical 
ensembles.543 Thinking of algorithms as sociotechnical assemblages makes them 
compatible with Foucault’s concept of governmentality since this idea signals a 
heterogenous set of interdependent actors (human and nonhuman) that are connected in 
historically specific power arrangements.544   
In his 1978-1979 lectures at the Collège de France, published in English as The 
Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault deploys the concept of governmentality as an analytical 
category for studying the emergence of a particular type of political rationality.545 
Scholars working on governmentality tend to define the concept as a political rationality 
that forms the “‘conditions of possibility’ for thinking and acting in a certain way.”546 As 
many have argued, Foucault’s notion of governmentality resonates with his other well-
known category of knowledge/power.547 As such, governmentality remains analytically 
tied to the co-constitutive relation of knowledge and power.548 Foucault describes this co-
                                                        
542 See Gillespie, Algorithm,” 19, 26. 
 
543 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, xx.  
 
544 See Introna, “Algorithms, Governance, and Governmentality,” 19.  
 
545 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics,12-13.  
 
546 See Collier, “Topologies of Power,” 96.  
 
547 See Gordon, “Governmental Rationality;” Lemke, “‘The Birth of Bio-politics;’” and Rose et al. 
“Governmentality.”  
 
548 See Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 19. 
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constituting relation in Discipline and Punish: “We should admit…that power and 
knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge; nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.”549 By analyzing the 
entanglement of power and knowledge in his genealogies from the 1970s, Foucault 
shows how the arrangements (dispositifs) of disciplinary power and biopower emerged in 
the 18th and 19th centuries respectively.550   
This focus on governmentality and knowledge/power relations informs the work 
of a growing body of research on algorithms. Lucas Introna (2016) applies Foucault’s 
notion of governmentality to conceptualize the performative nature of algorithms.551 For 
David Beer (2017), the idea of the algorithm “is evoked to influence and convince, to 
suggest things and to envision a certain approach, governmentality and way of 
ordering.”552 As these and other scholars argue, algorithms are part of a knowledge 
apparatus that governs computational judgment, associational relationships, prediction, 
probabilistic risk-assessment, and processes of decision-making.553 This knowledge 
apparatus contributes to the specific power dynamics of algorithmic ensembles. That is, 
because algorithms produce knowledge, we should expect that they thereby produce 
                                                        
549 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 27a.  
 
550 See Foucault, Discipline and Punish, and Foucault, Will to Know.  
 
551 Introna, “Algorithms, Governance, and Governmentality,” 28. Foucault refers to the exercise of power 
as a “conduct of conducts” (conduire des conduites) in a 1978 essay translated from the French as “How is 
Power Exercised?” See Foucault, “How is Power Exercised,” in EW3, 341. 
 
552 Beer, “Social Power of Algorithms,” 9.  
 
553 See Harcourt, Against Prediction; Amoore, Politics of Possibility; Gillespie, “Relevance of 
Algorithms;” and Beer, “Social Power of Algorithms.” 
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power. Thus, if their mode of knowledge has been specified,554 what remains to be 
analyzed is the mode of power correlative to such an epistemology.  
Pursuing this, scholars have recently accounted for the mode of power exercised 
by algorithms by applying familiar Foucauldian typologies of power such as sovereign 
power, disciplinary power, and biopower to the study of cybernetic categorization, 
Facebook’s EdgeRank algorithm, and e-Borders algorithms.555 In the case of algorithms 
used in predictive policing, we might be inclined to see the power enacted in this practice 
as continuous with the techniques of surveillance deployed through the exercise of 
disciplinary power.556 Foucault’s famous discussion of Bentham’s Panoptic architectural 
schema offers a potential heuristic for analyzing the technology of power deployed in 
predictive policing. The architectural arrangement of Bentham’s Panopticon consists in a 
circular structure with a central watch-tower and a shorter annular building along the 
periphery.557 As Foucault explains, Bentham’s Panopticon functions as an apparatus of 
surveillance, inducing in the subject (e.g. an inmate) a “state of conscious and permanent 
visibility that assured the automatic functioning of power.”558 The Panopticon thus 
organizes conduct through a schema of constant, yet unverifiable visibility.  
While one might apply the disciplinary schema to account for how predictive 
policing governs, this approach risks obfuscating what may be unique, singular, or new to 
                                                        
554 See Gillespie, “Relevance of Algorithms.”  
 
555 See Cheney-Lippold, “New Algorithmic Identity;” Bucher, “Want to be on the Top;” and Amoore, 
Politics of Possibility, respectively.  
 
556 Foucault, Discipline and Punish. 
 
557 Ibid., 200.  
 
558 Ibid., 201.  
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predictive policing as a contemporary practice made possible by the knowledge/power of 
algorithmic ensembles. Rather than assume that older forms of power simply proliferate 
and appear in new contexts, we should attend first to the specific strategies, goals, 
relationships, and processes at work in a contemporary technology of power, a point I 
adopt from Colin Koopman (2013, 2014). Taking this approach, what is striking about 
the exercise of power in predictive policing is the explicit aim of governing and 
controlling time. What is thus needed is an analytic of temporality, as distinct from an 
analytic of disciplinary visibility, for specifying the governmentality of predictive 
policing algorithms.559  
 
2. Temporal Governmentality 
As scholars like Elena Esposito (2015) and Amoore (2013) have recently shown, 
a focus on time is useful for understanding the function and politics of predictive 
algorithms.560 Time is relevant just insofar as these algorithms aim at predicting and even 
producing a desired future. To conceptualize this type of power at work in predictive 
algorithms like the SSL, this section develops an analytic of temporal governmentality. 
This concept refers to the way predictive policing algorithms exercise power by 
controlling and governing time. I will suggest, moreover, that an understanding of the 
                                                        
559 I follow scholars like Bucher (2012) and Ananny and Crawford (2016) who have shown the limits of an 
analytic of visibility and an accompanying ethics of transparency to the critical study of algorithms. Bucher 
shows how the Facebook EdgeRank algorithm works differently from the Panoptic form of surveillance 
insofar as it imposes a ‘threat of invisibility’ on users. See Bucher, “Want to be on the Top.” Ananny and 
Crawford explore the limits of the ideal of transparency for understanding governing algorithmic systems 
and for holding these systems accountable. See Ananny and Crawford, “Seeing without Knowing.” 
 
560 See Esposito, “Beyond the Promise,” 93-94 and Amoore, Politics of Possibility, 9. Where these scholars 
tend to focus on the temporality of predictive algorithms more generally, my own analysis is more attentive 
to how temporality is racialized in the specific case of predictive policing algorithms like the SSL.  
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temporal governmentality at work in predictive policing helps illuminate the racialized 
dimensions of the politics of these algorithms.    
Temporal governmentality depends on a distinct conception of time as something 
made, constructed, created, and negotiated rather than as something given in advance. 
Against the desire to think of time as ready-made and determined, it proves fruitful to 
think of time as a performative consequence of an ensemble of actors and actions.561 That 
is, while we tend to understand time in spatialized terms as an external frame of reference 
in which events take place, I am proposing that we regard time as an artifact or product of 
the actions and interactions of different actors. Consider, for instance, the way Amazon’s 
recommendation algorithm generates a future when consumers purchase a product 
suggested to them. Here the algorithm, in concert with the consumer, is not just acting on 
time, but is actually creating a future that is different from the consumer’s present insofar 
as they do not yet have the item. Hence, to understand how algorithms can be productive 
of a future, we must conceptualize time as something that can be made or produced.  
If we combine this focus on temporality with the concept of governmentality 
described above, we get a hybrid analytical category I call “temporal governmentality.” 
This category is meant to give inquirers a grip on how algorithmic power works – a way 
of governing conduct through the mode of time. Predictive algorithms, specifically those 
used in predictive policing software, exercise power by setting up, organizing, and 
                                                        
561 This performative understanding of time is inspired by Bruno Latour. This performative understanding 
of time is inspired by Bruno Latour. In his ethnographic studies of scientific practices, Latour 
operationalizes his actor-network methodology to show how time is constructed through the costly and 
intensive labor of different actors. In Science in Action, Latour problematizes the tendency that historians of 
science and technology have of spatializing time by regarding time as a stable, external frame of reference 
in which events take place. He distinguishes this from his own approach of tracking “how… different times 
may be produced inside the networks built to mobilise [sic], cumulate and recombine the world.” See 
Latour, Science in Action, 228. Italics in original.  
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managing specific temporal relations between the past, present, and future. This control 
over time (and temporal relations) constitutes the core of temporal governmentality.  
The idea of temporal governmentality helps clarify how predictive policing 
exhibits the fraught politics of what Charles Mills calls “the racialization of time.” This 
idea refers to “particular dispositions and allocations of time that are differentiated by 
race.”562 It is clear to most scholars that predictive policing is riddled with problematic 
racialization. But what the concept of temporal governmentality helps us see, in 
conjunction with Mills’ work, is that the racializing function in predictive policing 
depends on a specific kind of algorithmic technology that previous kinds of police work 
did not have access to.  
The racialization of time contributes to racial political work that not only takes 
time away from people, but transfers time from “one set of lives to another.”563 The 
future is thus held open for whites on the very basis that it is closed off from a set of 
racialized subjects who are relegated to a “futureless past.”564 Through the 
representational production of white time, whites self-position themselves as the “masters 
of their own time,” and differentiate themselves from those who are “mastered by 
time.”565 This imposed practice of racializing time sets up a problematic hierarchical 
division between those (whites) who master, manage and appropriately use time and 
those (non-whites) who squander, waste, and are managed by time. On this account, the 
racialization of time refers to a management of possibilities – a way of organizing, 
                                                        
562 Mills, “White Time,” 28.  
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564 Ibid., 31.  
 
565 Ibid., 31.  
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allocating, and fixing possible actions through the racial separation of a “white time” of 
the open future and a “non-white time” of the futureless past.  
As I now show, the temporal governmentality of predictive policing consists in 
the racial political work of closing the past and the future for non-whites through a 
paranoid logic that aims to preempt future possibilities of criminal conduct on the basis of 
a racialized criminal history.   
 
3. Predictive Policing and Temporal Governmentality  
The above two sections have offered an outline of an analytic for conceptualizing 
the specific shift involved in predictive policing. I argue that this analytic enables us to 
see the shift in policing tactics from a reactive practice to a proactive one in terms of 
time. As a reactive practice, policing consists in responding to crimes after they have 
been committed.566 Reactive policing depends upon a temporal vision that is backward 
looking – it focuses on counteracting crimes that have already occurred. Here the time of 
crime is relegated to the recent past.567 Reactive policing regards the temporality of crime 
as already given or determined because the delinquent action has already taken place. 
This style of temporal governmentality – governing conduct through time – differs from 
the one at work in proactive policing both insofar as reactive policing relies on a 
divergent conception of time – as given in advance, as already passed – and insofar as it 
involves a distinct temporal pattern that aims to police past crimes in the present.  
                                                        
566 See Maguire, “Policing by Risks and Targets.”  
 
567 This reactive style of policing is at work in disciplinary power, which proactively shapes the prisoner 
only after it first situated them as a prisoner by reacting to their crime. Disciplinary power thus does not 
capture the temporal governmentality of predictive policing insofar as it is reactive to crime where 
predictive policing is proactive. 
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To grasp the temporal difference between reactive and proactive policing, we can 
consider the problem to which predictive policing offers a solution. In the first 
symposium on predictive policing sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, 
researchers and law enforcement leaders describe the proactive function of predictive 
policing in terms of forecasting, anticipating, and preventing future criminal activity.568 
How does one prevent some possible crime in advance of its uncertain occurrence? For 
Charles Beck, chief of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), the question is “how 
to effectively deploy resources in front of crime, thereby changing outcomes.”569 
According to Beck, one of the greatest advantages of predictive policing is the discovery 
of new or formerly unknown patterns related to crime. Beth Pearsall adds, “Just as 
Walmart found increased demand for strawberry Pop-Tarts preceding major weather 
events, LAPD has found its own subtle patterns when examining data that have helped 
the department accurately anticipate and prevent crime.”570  
Anticipation and prevention of future crime are the two primary objectives of 
proactive policing tactics. These objectives are not quite separable from one another, nor 
are they identical, but they are coordinated in the following way: the prevention of future 
crime relies upon the anticipation of future crime, which is anticipated only so that it can 
be prevented. This coordinated activity contributes a temporal rhythm to policing’s 
predictive practice. To prevent an anticipated future in the present, the future has to be 
                                                        
568 See NIJ, “Predictive Policing Symposium,” 3-4 and Bratton et. al, “Fighting Crime,” 1-4.  
 
569 Beck and McCue, “Predictive Policing,” 20. Italics added.  
 
570 Pearsall, “Predictive Policing,” 17.  
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acted on as if it will have happened. How to prevent something that may or may not 
happen? Act as though it will happen in advance of its (possible) happening.  
One can witness this preemptive temporality at work in Chicago’s controversial 
SSL or “heat list.” Developed in collaboration with the Illinois Institute of Technology 
(IIT) after receiving a $2 million grant from the NIJ in 2009, the Chicago Police 
Department’s (CPD) SSL is a person-based predictive algorithm that generates a ranked 
ordered list of subjects according to their risk of being involved in a violent crime, as 
either a victim or perpetrator. These risk scores are calculated and positioned on a scale 
ranging from 0 (extremely low risk) to 500 (extremely high risk), with 250 being the 
minimum score warranting “heightened police attention.”571 Scores are available to law 
enforcement personnel through their dashboard, a database used to obtain information 
including dates of arrest, warrants, and crime history.572 Since its initial deployment by 
CPD in late 2013, the algorithm has been applied to hundreds of thousands of subjects.573 
According to Special Order S09-11, the purpose behind the SSL is to “develop a subject-
based prediction model to proactively identify and address crime problems.”574  
While the algorithm is protected as proprietary technology of the CPD, they were 
forced to release a version of the dataset in 2017 after a prolonged legal dispute with the 
Chicago Sun-Times.575 Developed between August 1, 2012 and July 31, 2016, this dataset 
                                                        
571 See Dumke and Main, “A Look Inside” and Posadas, “How Strategic.”   
 
572 See Kaplan, “Predictive Policing.”  
 
573 See Chicago Data Portal, “Strategic Subject List.”  
 
574 Chicago Police Department, “Special Order S09-11,” 1.  
 
575 See Posadas, “How Strategic.”   
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includes a list of some 400,000 de-identified subjects.576 According to Chicago’s Data 
Portal online site, eight variables contribute to the calculation of risk scores in former 
iterations of the SSL. These variables include: 1) “number of times being the victim of a 
shooting incident;” 2) “age during latest arrest;” 3) “number of times being the victim of 
aggravated battery or assault;” 4) “number of prior arrests for violent offenses;” 5) “gang 
affiliation;” 6) “number of prior narcotic arrests;” 7) “trend in recent criminal activity;” 
and 8) “number of prior unlawful use of weapon arrests.”577 These variables are 
differently weighted for the production of a risk score and are continually being revised 
as the SSL gets updated. For instance, factors like gang affiliation and number of prior 
narcotic arrests have been removed in the latest iteration of the SSL because they have 
been found to not significantly impact the score.578 Other variables, such as age at most 
recent arrest and recent shooting incidents, are given more weight since these are 
observed to have more impact on the overall score.579  
SSL scores can be used as “an investigative resource” for the patrolling and 
inspecting of crime by police professionals.580  While the SSL is not explicitly used to 
arrest persons on the list, the system works in concert with CPD’s “Customs 
Notifications” program as part of its Violence Reduction Initiative.581 Established in 
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2013, this program “identifies potential criminal actors and victims associated with the 
continuum of violence.”582 Once the potential criminal is identified, they are “notified of 
the consequences that will result should violent activity continue.”583 This program 
operationalizes the SSL to identify those subjects most at risk of “victimization or 
engagement in criminal activity” and provide them with access to social services.584 
Working with social workers and community leaders, the CPD delivers a letter in person 
to high-risk individuals to warn them of the “arrest, prosecution, and sentencing 
consequences they may face if they choose to or continue to engage in public 
violence.”585 The letter incorporates known factors about an individual’s prior arrests, 
associates, as well as potential sentencing outcomes for future criminal behavior. If a 
custom notification recipient is later arrested for any crime, the “highest possible charges 
will be pursued” by the district commander.586 Thus, the SSL functions together with the 
Customs Notification program to anticipate and forewarn the subject’s possible 
involvement in criminal violence.  
The SSL works to preempt the future possibility of criminal violence by 
assessing, inferring, and flagging who might be subjects of crime. In doing so, the SSL 
conflates potential victims with potential perpetrators, treating such subjects equally as 
                                                        
582 Chicago Police Department, “Special Order S10-05,” 1.  
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possible criminal actors. The SSL thus allows law enforcement personnel to act on the 
basis of who subjects might become as prospective actors involved in violent crime. To 
prevent some possible unfolding of gun violence in the city, law enforcement must 
anticipate this future in the present, acting presciently as though the crime were an 
inevitability.  
This preemptive activity maps onto the temporal functioning of risk-assessment 
algorithms in general. According to Amoore (2013), all such algorithms operate through 
a preemptive temporality, which makes a future uncertainty actionable in the present.587 
This style of temporal governmentality looks at a possible crime from the perspective of 
the future perfect participle – the crime will have happened from the decisional 
standpoint of the present. It turns a future possibility into a momentary inevitability so as 
to act in advance of the crime’s eventual unfolding.588  
Predictive policing closes off the open possibilities of the future by preempting 
their unfolding in the present. Yet, where this preemptive activity can also be found in 
other predictive algorithms, it is distinctly racialized in the case of predictive policing.589 
That is, policing algorithms like the SSL do not close off the uncertain future for all 
subjects equally, but for a certain set of racialized subjects. While critics have pointed out 
                                                        
587 Amoore links this preemptive activity of risk-assessment algorithms with the strategy of juridical 
decision associated with sovereign power. See Amoore, Politics of Possibility, 41, 82-83.  
 
588 While the continual revision of the SSL might seem to challenge this preemptive activity, it is ultimately 
updated in order to improve the algorithm’s predictive power, and hence to better preempt future crime. 
The idea here is that preemption contributes to the aim of predictive policing technologies and guides their 
revisions even when (or especially when) they are not successful in preempting crime.  
 
589 This marks a difference between Amoore’s account of preemption in predictive algorithms and my own 
insofar as I understand preemption to be racialized in the case of policing algorithms like the SSL. While 
Amoore presents preemption as a general feature of risk-assessment algorithms that appears to apply 
equally to all subjects, my own view is that preemption is differentially applied to racialized subjects, and 
thus cannot be fully understood without considering how it is entangled with a racial politics of time.   
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the problematic racial politics of this technology, it has not always been made clear how 
this politics is entangled with the way these algorithms function temporally. On my 
analysis, the racial politics of predictive policing cannot be understood without clarifying 
how their algorithms govern temporally.  
The preemptive, racialized temporality of Chicago’s SSL highlights what Ta-
Nehisi Coates calls the “paranoid style of American policing.”590 The concept of paranoia 
helpfully captures the temporal governmentality of predictive policing. As Eve Sedgwick 
(2003) notes, paranoia works temporally through anticipation to stave off threats and 
other “bad surprises.”591 It is linked to preemption insofar as it strives to act as though the 
worst will have happened to prevent its actual happening. That is, paranoia closes off the 
future from contingency and turns it into an inevitability. Sedgwick remarks, “No time 
could be too early for one’s having-already-known, for its having-already-been-
inevitable, that something bad would happen. And no loss could be too far in the future to 
need to be preemptively discounted.”592 As a paranoid practice, predictive policing seeks 
to dispel possibilities deemed ‘dangerous,’ ‘bad,’ ‘threatening,’ or ‘criminal’ by treating 
them as necessary and certain. Unlike reactive policing, which reacts too late to crime 
that has already occurred, proactive policing can never be too early to respond to crime 
that has not yet occurred.  
Consider first the CPD’s visitations to subjects with high risk scores under the 
Customs Notifications program. The CPD warns these subjects of violent crimes that 
                                                        
590 See Coates, “Paranoid Style of American Policing.” Coates is here mimicking the title of Richard 
Hofstadter’s influential 1963 essay “The Paranoid Style in American Politics.” See Hofstadter, “Paranoid 
Style.”  
 
591 Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 130. Italics added.  
 
592 Ibid., 131. Italics added.  
 193 
they are predicted to be involved in but that have yet to occur. Rather than wait for the 
occasion of crime, law enforcement officers act in front of the crime as though it were 
always, already known. This   way of relating to criminal activity is paranoid insofar as it 
suspects the threat of crime as though it always will have been. RAND Corporation’s 
external evaluation of the SSL’s first iteration has demonstrated that subjects on the SSL 
may be more likely to be arrested for a shooting.593 Indeed, when gun violence escalated 
in Chicago in May 2016, CPD made nearly 200 arrests of people on the heat list.594 This 
highlights the way in which the SSL functions to raise police suspicion toward subjects 
placed on the list with higher risk scores. Furthermore, this heightened paranoia is 
racialized insofar as the public dataset from 2012-2016 reveals that more than half of the 
subjects with risk scores over 250 are identified as Black and roughly 90% of the 154 
subjects with scores of 500 (the highest score) are identified as Black.595   
 Consider next how predictive policing algorithms like the SSL use historical 
crime data to calculate risk scores. The CPD notes, “The software is generated based on 
empirical data that lists attributes of a person’s criminal record, including the record of 
violence among criminal associates, the degree to which his criminal activities are on the 
rise, and the types of intensity of criminal history.”596 Some of the variables used for 
                                                        
593 Saunders, Hunt, Hollywood, “Predictions Put into Practice,” 364. This study also found that “at-risk 
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prior iterations of the SSL include previously collected data about subjects’ criminal 
history, arrest records, contact with law enforcement, and gang affiliation.597 As argued 
by Moses and Chan (2016), O’Neil (2016), and Ferguson (2017), using past crime data is 
problematic because this data does not necessarily offer an accurate depiction of criminal 
activity within a given area. It is often limited by “what individuals choose to report and 
what law enforcement officers directly observe.”598 Furthermore, crime data hides the 
racially fraught processes that went into its collection and classification. In other words, 
data is by no means “raw,” but comes already processed, worked over, or “cooked.”599 
Even if race is not expressly considered in predictive algorithms like the SSL, they can 
still produce or intensify discriminatory outcomes insofar as they rely on input data that is 
entangled in historically biased policing practices. Ferguson argues, “While race would 
never be included as part of the algorithm, many of the variables (police contacts, prior 
arrests, gang affiliations) directly correlate with racially discriminatory law enforcement 
practices. If the data is colored black, it means that the predictive policing systems (using 
that data) could generate biased results.”600 Hence, the collection, categorization, and use 
of historical crime data cannot be easily disentangled from the legacy of discriminatory 
policing practices.  
 The temporal danger with the use of historical crime data is that the data codifies 
and stabilizes the past, turning it both into something that is bound to repeat in the future 
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and into something that can be securely acted on in the present. This codification of the 
past in the form of data functions to close the past off from possibilities of what could 
have been. No longer open or negotiable, the past gets preformed and packaged in the 
shape of data as something already given.601 Hence, the pre-crime tactic of predictive 
policing does not simply detach itself from the past as some scholars have argued, but 
depends upon a process whereby the past takes the form of usable and storable data.602 
Predictive policing techniques not only remain anchored in the past through their reliance 
on historical crime data, they projectively extend this data in the future to generate risk 
scores. That is, they use and reinforce the past in the form of historical crime data to 
produce their preemptive power.  
The most pressing worry presented by the SSL’s use of the past is that it 
potentially replicates a problematic history of discriminatory policing tactics. If the data 
that goes into the algorithm was collected and produced in a racially biased fashion, then 
the predictions that are generated by the algorithm will reflect these biases.603 This 
creates a troubling self-fulfilling prophecy whereby the past foretells who will be likely 
of being involved in a crime on the basis of a subject’s past contact with police. Since 
police contact remains racially disproportionate in major cities like Chicago, the 
                                                        
601 As historian Daniel Rosenberg reminds us, ‘data’ is the plural form of  the Latin ‘datum,’ the past 
participle of the verb ‘dare’ – to give. Hence, the plural ‘data’ and the singular ‘datum’ literally mean 
“something given” or “something taken for granted.” See Rosenberg, “Data Before the Fact,” 18.   
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Impact,” 674.  
 
 196 
algorithm forecasts young men of color as subjects with the highest risk scores.604 This 
self-fulfilling prophecy results in the practice of overpolicing, producing a harmful, self-
perpetuating feedback loop as the existing data draws police into areas they are already 
policing, thereby producing further crime data that further justifies and fosters increased 
police presence in those areas.605 The temporal rhythm of such a practice can be captured 
by the circular process of reproducing a racially discriminatory past in the future as an 
inevitability. The SSL thus “burrows both backward and forward” in the words of 
Sedgwick, informing law enforcement of who to police, surveil, and caution in the future 
on the basis of who has been policed in the past.  
The Strategic Subject List exemplifies the temporal governmentality of predictive 
policing algorithms that simultaneously stabilize and transform the past into a prophecy 
of future risk, which is preemptively avoided by turning this possible future into an 
inevitability. The paranoid rhythm of predictive policing consists in a double-closure of 
the past and the future such that the past becomes functional insofar as it is codified in 
historical crime data that is used to generate and preempt future criminal behavior. 
Predictive policing depends on a closed, racialized past and produces a closed, racialized 
future. This temporal racialization splits the future into two racially distinct times – a 
(white) time that is futurally open and a (non-white) time that is futurally closed. Thus, 
following Mills, whites perpetuate a racial historical practice of mastering and 
transferring time – the time non-whites “would have had” – from “one set of lives to 
                                                        
604 According to a 2017 investigation by the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, patterns of 
racially discriminatory conduct pervade the Chicago Police Department. See Department of Justice, 
“Investigation of the Chicago Police Department,” 15.  
 
605 See Završnik, Big Data, 12.  
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another.”606 This practice of mastering time is a quintessential exercise of power in the 
way Foucault defined it in 1982 – as a “conduct of conducts” and “a management of 
possibilities.”607  
 
Conclusion 
The paranoid, preemptive temporality at work in the practice of predictive 
policing constitutes a form of temporal governance that, as I have argued, must be 
understood in relation to the racial politics of time. In Between the World and Me, Coates 
testifies to a profound truth of being “drafted into the black race:” “It struck me that 
perhaps the defining feature of being drafted into the black race was the inescapable 
robbery of time.”608 This robbery of time occurs not only through the racialized closure of 
the past whereby non-whites are relegated to the prehistorical past of (white) European 
“civilization,” but also through the racialized closure of the future which can be 
witnessed in predictive policing tactics like Chicago’s SSL. Much like how geography 
and space can function as proxies for race (as we see in discriminatory practices like 
redlining), time can also problematically function as a proxy for race, such that, as 
Brittney Cooper emphasizes, “If time had a race, it would be white. White people own 
time.”609  
                                                        
606 Mills, “White Time,” 28.  
 
607 Foucault, “Subject and Power,” in EW3, 341.  
 
608 Coates, Between the World and Me, 91. Italics added.  
 
609 See Cooper, “Racial Politics.”  
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Much of the criticism of predictive policing in news articles and scholarly writing 
is informed by a paranoid affect that surfaces through recurrent invocations of Philip K. 
Dick’s 1956 short story-turned 2002 film “The Minority Report.”610 Written in the midst 
of the Cold War, this science fiction story depicts a specialized police department known 
as Precrime where detective-psychics or “precogs” foresee and arrest future suspects 
before they commit their crimes. Dick, a master of paranoia, uses this affect in “Minority 
Report” to engage the reader’s imagination of a future where personal freedom is 
threatened by technologies of social control. This paranoia is performed in the ominous 
closing advice that the story’s protagonist, John Anderton, gives to his successor as head 
of the Precrime Division: “Better keep your eyes open. It might happen to you at any 
time.”611  
The same advice might be gleaned from reports on predictive policing programs 
like Chicago’s SSL insofar as they suspiciously treat such programs as threats to be 
exposed, identified, and deterred.612 These reports share an affective affinity with 
predictive policing in their deployment of paranoia to reveal the dangers of this practice. 
Such affective mimicry is perhaps not surprising given the contagious quality of 
paranoia.613 Hence, to understand the danger of a paranoid practice of policing, one must 
                                                        
610 Consider news headlines on Chicago’s SSL program like the following: ‘Chicago goes Minority 
Report;’ ‘Pre-crime is Here;’ and ‘Minority Report is Real – And It’s Really Reporting Minorities.’ See 
Ernst, “Chicago goes ‘Minority Report’”; McDurmon, “Pre-crime is here;” and Smith, “‘Minority Report’ 
is Real.”  
 
611 Dick, Minority Report, 102.  
 
612 See Ernst, “Chicago goes ‘Minority Report;’” McDurmon, “Pre-crime is here;” Smith, “‘Minority 
Report is Real;’” Day, “Tech Startup;” Hvistendahl, “Can ‘Predictive Policing;’” McCulloch and Wilson 
Pre-crime; Asher and Arthur, “Inside the Algorithm;” Dumke and Main, “A Look Inside;” Posadas, “How 
Strategic;” and Wilson, “Algorithmic Patrol.” 
 
613 See Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 131.  
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precisely imitate the paranoia at work in such a practice. This presents a challenge for 
critics who critique contemporary practices not with the aim of reproducing their 
troubling affective features, but with the reparative hope of outlining other possibilities of 
feeling, relating, and acting. In the next chapter, I move beyond such paranoid critiques 
by outlining strategies for reparatively transforming predictive policing algorithms like 
the SSL.  
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CHAPTER VI 
REPAIRING PREDICTIVE POLICING 
 
Introduction 
 
 In the previous chapter, I examined the way predictive policing technologies 
exercise power through a paranoid temporality that aims to preempt future possibilities of 
crime for a set of racialized subjects on the basis of a criminal past. This emphasis on the 
paranoia of predictive algorithms, however, presents a problem for my conception of 
reparative critique, for it would seem that my exercise of critique in the chapter is a 
paranoid one. That is, in pointing out the paranoid operation of power in predictive 
policing, I run the risk of engaging in a paranoid practice of critique. This problem stems, 
in part, from the contagious quality of paranoia. As Eve Sedgwick notes, paranoia is 
contagious such that it requires being imitated to be understood.614 Hence, to comprehend 
the danger of a paranoid practice of policing, one must imitate the paranoia at work in 
such a practice. This poses a challenge for the reparative method of critique I am 
advancing, which is less concerned with exposing threats or exercising negative judgment 
as it is with extracting sustenance and hope in the face of the limits of our objects and 
practices.  
 To push beyond a paranoid critique of technology, this chapter deploys reparative 
critique as a way of addressing the transformative possibilities of predictive policing. In 
highlighting the transformability of predictive policing techniques, I aim to show how 
these technologies might be altered so that they become less harmful to the subjects they 
                                                        
614 Sedgwick writes that paranoia “seems to grow like a crystal in a hypersaturated solution, blotting out 
any sense of the possibility of alternative ways of understanding or things to understand.” See Sedgwick, 
Touching Feeling, 131. Italics in original.  
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seek to police. I am primarily concerned with advancing strategies for ameliorating the 
damaging effects of predictive policing algorithms. As shown in the previous chapter, 
these algorithms disproportionately affect Black men and women in a way that is 
continuous with the historically discriminatory tactics of policing and the larger criminal 
justice system in the U.S. As such, any strategy for improving predictive policing 
algorithms would need to address their problematic racial politics which involves the 
enduring legacy of racial bias, surveillance, overpolicing, and what Michelle Alexander 
calls “the new Jim Crow.”615  
 Most scholars working on the ethics of algorithms tend to emphasize transparency 
as an ideal for their normative improvement. This ideal aims to address the problem of 
opacity common in predictive algorithms. Opacity refers to the way algorithms resist 
comprehension (on either the part of the public or on the part of data analysts) such that 
we do not know how or why an algorithm generates particular outputs on the basis of its 
inputs. As Jenna Burrell suggests, this lack of transparency is often due to the fact that the 
inputs are either entirely unknown or only partially known.616 For many theorists of 
technology, opacity presents one, if not, the most pressing ethical challenge of machine 
learning and predictive algorithms.617 Consequently, ideals of transparency and trust are 
valued as imperatives for ameliorating algorithmic opacity.  
                                                        
615 See Alexander, New Jim Crow. 
 
616 Burrell, “How the Machine ‘Thinks,’” 1.  
 
617 For scholarship on the problem of opacity as central to algorithms and machine learning, see Dwork et 
al., “Fairness through Awareness;” Sandvig et al., “Auditing Algorithms;” Pasquale, Black Box Society; 
O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction; Burrell, “How the Machine ‘Thinks;’” and Veale, Van Kleek, and 
Binns, “Fairness and Accountability.”  
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 Other scholars including Shannon Vallor, Mike Ananny, and Kate Crawford have 
recently called the ideal of transparency into question as a normative value for the use of 
technology. In Technology and the Virtues, Vallor argues that the “cult of transparency” 
which guides a “sousveillance society” promotes an impoverished understanding that 
does not contribute to human flourishing.618 In a sousveillance society, citizens 
participate in multiple forms of watching and being watched through wearable tracking 
devices. Devices like Fitbits and Apple watches function as surveillance technologies 
designed to make our actions, habits, and bodies more transparent to us. For Vallor, this 
ideal of transparency is troubling because it unquestioningly prioritizes truth over other 
moral values like trust, compassion, humility, and respect, which add to the richness of 
moral life and encourage human flourishing.619  
 Akin to Vallor, Ananny and Crawford show the limits of the transparency ideal 
and its prioritization of truth in the context of governing algorithms. On their view, 
transparency functions as an epistemic norm that assumes a direct correspondence 
between observation and truth – the more we can see and observe about a thing, the more 
truth we will have about it.620 As Ananny and Crawford note, the tacit assumption 
involved in appeals to transparency is that “seeing a phenomenon creates opportunities 
and obligations to make it accountable and thus to change it.”621 This ideal is problematic 
not only because the inner workings of technical systems can be impervious to 
                                                        
618 Vallor, Technology and Virtues, 188. Sousveillance refers to multiple forms of watching and being 
watched “from below” such that agents participate in their surveillance by using or wearing, for instance, 
recording and tracking devices (such as smart phones or Fitbits).  
 
619 Ibid., 192.  
 
620 Ananny and Crawford, “Seeing without Knowing,” 2.  
 
621 Ibid., 2.  
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observation, but also because it assumes that seeing is equivalent with understanding. 
That is, even if we could observe the inner workings of complex systems like algorithms, 
that does not mean we thereby understand them.622 What is needed, they suggest, is an 
alternative conception of algorithmic accountability that aims at understanding how these 
systems work across networks of humans and nonhumans.623  
 Building on these critiques of the ethics of transparency, I develop a framework 
for addressing the ethics of predictive policing algorithms that pushes beyond the limits 
of the transparency ideal. One major problem with this ideal, which is unacknowledged 
by Ananny and Crawford as well as Vallor, is that it reduces ethics to the purview of 
epistemology. Here ethical action consists primarily in knowing how an algorithm 
generates its results in order to make it less opaque. According to the transparency model,  
predictive policing systems would be ethically improved if we could observe and know 
exactly what went into their algorithms to produce their particular predictions. While I 
agree that making predictive algorithms more transparent is important for ameliorating 
some of their harmful effects, I do not think this is sufficient for addressing the power 
exercised by these algorithms. What I suggest in this chapter is that we think about ethics 
less as an epistemic problem than as a problem for conduct or practice.624 Drawing on 
William James’s conduct-centric approach to ethics and Michel Foucault’s account of 
                                                        
622 Ibid., 9.  
 
623 They frame this as a “pragmatic approach to epistemology” in contrast to the representational account of 
knowledge at work in the transparency ideal. See Ananny and Crawford, “Seeing without Knowing,” 11.  
 
624 In distinguishing between epistemology and practice, my intent is not to set up an unnecessary dualism 
between them, but rather to say that epistemology is one kind of practice among many others. That is, the 
idea that ethics is a question of doing (or practice) includes knowing as one type of ethical action but does 
not reduce ethics solely to that type of action.  
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ethics as counter-conduct, I develop an ethical framework for responding to the power at 
work in predictive policing systems.625 This framework consists in a set of socio-
technical practices for resisting predictive policing’s operation of power. By thinking of 
ethics in terms of resistant practices, we can begin to consider a notion of responsibility 
that holds us and the technologies we bind ourselves to accountable for the harms created 
by this bond. Hence, if the power operant in predictive policing is made possible by the 
ensemble of actions afforded by humans and algorithms, then the conduct for countering 
and transforming this power will likewise be made possible by the joint techniques of 
humans and machines.  
To flesh out this ethical framework, I begin (in section one) by fleshing out 
James’s understanding of ethics as a problem of action or conduct before clarifying (in 
section two) Foucault’s ethics of counter-conduct, which he develops in his 1977-1978 
lectures at the Collège de France. Building on Vallor’s use of Foucault’s late work on the 
care of the self to address ethical questions related to technology, I attend to his account 
of counter-conduct as a useful frame for thinking through the transformation of 
algorithmic ensembles such as that of predictive policing.626 As I argue, Foucault’s notion 
                                                        
625 This understanding of ethics is inspired by the work of both William James and Michel Foucault. In his 
ethical writings, James is concerned with motivating agency in the midst of constraints that inhibit or 
otherwise paralyze action. As I argued in Chapter Three, the paralysis of action prevalent in James’s 
historical and social milieu constituted an ethical problem, one that required a rethinking of agency in terms 
of willful action. Similar to James, Foucault conceptualizes ethics in terms of conduct or action, which he 
develops in his work from the late 1970s and early 1980s. I draw specifically on Foucault’s account of 
ethics as counter-conduct in this chapter because it offers a way of thinking about ethics in the context of 
power relations, and thus offers a continuity with the argument about the power of predictive policing 
algorithms I developed in the previous chapter (Chapter Five). 
 
626 I am here drawing a connection between Foucault’s concept of the care of the self, which he develops in 
various essays, course lectures, and the third volume of The History of Sexuality from the early 1980s, and 
his notion of counter-conduct, which he forwards in his 1977-1978 course lectures at the Collège de 
France, published in English as Security, Territory, Population. In these lectures, Foucault describes 
spiritual movements that constituted forms of counter-conduct to the conducting power of the pastorate. He 
argues that these movements sought “to escape direction by others and to define the way for each to 
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of counter-conduct helpfully moves us beyond the position that ethical action consists in 
altering either our technologies or our selves. Rather, his analyses of power show us that 
resistance depends on the counter actions of socio-technical arrangements.  
After discussing counter-conduct as a frame for theorizing the ethics of 
algorithms, I then describe (in section three) four examples of counter-conducts that 
resist the power operationalized by predictive policing algorithms like the SSL. These 
practices can be understood as socio-technical responses to the issues of predictive 
policing described in the previous chapter. As I analyzed there, person-based predictive 
algorithms suffer from racial bias insofar as they disproportionately target Black men and 
women as subjects warranting heightened police attention. The strategies developed in 
this section seek to address these algorithms at the level of their problematic racial 
politics. I argue that any attempt to ameliorate predictive policing technologies must 
reckon with their participation in an enduring legacy of racial injustice at work in a 
constellation of criminal justice practices in the U.S. 
 
1. Ethics as a Problem of Conduct 
As recent scholars observe, James’s writings on ethics assume a diffuse form – they 
are less organized in a coherent system than they are scattered across a variety of essays, 
monographs, and notes.627 In spite of this, one can identify a theme running throughout 
                                                        
conduct himself [sic].” This description of counter-conduct in terms of a relation of self-conduct is 
proximate to the way Foucault accounts for the care of the self as a relation of self to self. That is, in 
establishing a conducting relation of self to self, counter-conduct can be understood as one way of 
practicing the care of the self. See Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 195 and Foucault, 
“Technologies of the Self,” in EW1, 255.  
 
627 See Marchetti, Ethics and Philosophical Critique, 17-18 and Koopman, “The Will, the Will to Believe,” 
491.   
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his early corpus, specifically from the period between the late 1860s through the mid 
1890s.628 The problem of motivating action in the midst of constraints haunts these 
writings. As James attests in the Preface to his 1897 collection of essays, The Will to 
Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, paralysis and “timorous abulia” plague 
his fellow academics and prevent them from committing to action.629 For James, the 
paralysis of action prevalent in his historical and social milieu constituted an ethical 
problem that required a dual rethinking – first, a rethinking of ethics as a problem of 
action or conduct, and second, a rethinking of agency in terms of willful action.630 I 
clarify the first of these before turning to Foucault’s account of ethics as counter-conduct 
as a further specification of James’s conduct-centric conception of ethics.  
 As Sarin Marchetti has argued, James’s relation to ethics consists less in offering 
a positive normative theory to be included among those of deontology, virtue ethics, or 
consequentialism, but rather in developing a metaethical perspective from which to 
clarify what it means to engage in ethical inquiry in the midst of a messy and complex 
moral life.631 Part of the reason for the disparateness of James’s ethical writings has to do 
with the way he approaches ethics less as a problem for systematic theorizing than as a 
                                                        
628 One could argue that the theme I identify in James’s early corpus is also present in his later work. 
Without fully getting into this debate here, I will say that I see a discernible shift in James’s work around 
the late 1890s where the focus on action as an ethical problem seems to be supplanted by an attention to 
experience as a metaphysical problem. I am less committed to the precise dating of this shift (indeed, one 
can witness traces of attention to experience in the early James and traces of attention to action in the later 
James) than I am to the claim that there is a difference in focus between these two things. For an account of 
James’s turn to metaphysics and his metaphysics of experience more broadly, see Rosenthal, Speculative 
Pragmatism; Seigfried, William James’s Radical Reconstruction; Lamberth, William James; and Bordogna, 
William James at the Boundaries. 
 
629 James, Will to Believe, x. 
 
630 See Chapter Three, where I develop an account of James’s notion of willful action in terms of reparative 
agency.  
 
631 See Marchetti, Ethics and Philosophical Critique, 49.  
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problem of practice – that is, of the actual ways in which we conduct our moral lives. 
This focus on practice, action, or conduct is, of course, central to the method of 
pragmatism that James develops in his 1898 lecture at the University of California, titled 
“Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,” and in his 1906-1907 Pragmatism 
lectures.632 Prior to this work, however, James expresses a concern for action as a deeply 
personal, social, and ethical problem. What does it mean to think of action or conduct as 
a problem for ethics and ethics as a problem of conduct?  
 While one might be tempted to interpret James’s reflections on ethics as primarily 
epistemological insofar as he focuses on concepts like belief and faith,633 he proposes 
understanding these concepts in terms of action or conduct. In one of his first published 
essays from 1879, “The Sentiment of Rationality,” James proposes a conception of faith 
as “the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue of which is not certified to us in 
advance.”634 Elsewhere he asserts the primacy of action by drawing on the physiological 
theory of reflex action, arguing that “perception and thinking are only there for 
behavior’s sake.”635 One can also find a preoccupation with action in his infamous 1896 
defense of “The Will to Believe,” where he contends that “belief is measured by 
action.”636 Hence, while James’s ethical lexicon includes epistemic concepts of belief and 
                                                        
632 See James, “Philosophical Conceptions,” in Writings of William James, and James, Pragmatism.  
 
633 For accounts of James’s ethics that are more focused on epistemology, see Slater, William James; 
Haack, “Ethics of Belief;” Misak, American Pragmatists; and Aikin, Evidentialism.   
 
634 James, “Sentiment of Rationality,” in WTB, 90. Italics added.  
 
635 James, “Reflex Action and Theism,” in WTB, 114.  
 
636 James, “Will to Believe,” in WTB, 29n1.  
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faith, the primary focus for James is the way these categories encourage or discourage 
action.  
This concern for action comes into relief when one considers the problem of 
neurasthenia confronting James and others similarly positioned in his historical and social 
milieu. As discussed in Chapter Three, neurasthenia was diagnosed by George Miller 
Beard in 1869 as a form of nervous exhaustion that emerged from the enervation of the 
nervous system.637 Psychical and physical symptoms of neurasthenia include fatigue, 
depression, headaches, insomnia, anxiety, neuralgia, irritability, and indecision. This 
condition not only threatened James’s mental and physical health; it also jeopardized his 
capacity as an ethical agent insofar as it hindered his ability to act. The danger here is that 
if one is in a perpetual state of hesitation, one cannot act, and this leaves one without the 
resources for realizing the possibilities of changing oneself and the world. That is, the 
capacity for action is a necessary condition for the possibility of change, and, for James, 
transformation of self and world is the primary matter of ethics.638  
While James provides a general framework for understanding ethics as a problem of 
conduct or action, he does not clarify how ethics relates to questions of power. This 
presents a challenge for my argument just insofar as I am working to develop an ethics of 
predictive policing in response to the way these technologies exercise power. What is 
needed, then, is a conception of ethics that coheres with James’s conduct-centric account, 
                                                        
637 According to Beard, neurasthenia affected upper-class American intellectuals and professionals (or 
“brain-workers”) whose close proximity to the demands of modernization – competition, industry, and 
urbanization – left them vulnerable to “nervous bankruptcy.” As the disease drained a person’s nervous 
energy, Beard proposed treating neurasthenia with rest and relaxation. See Beard, American Nervousness, 
9.  
 
638 For more on this conception of ethics in James, see Welchman, “William James’s ‘The Will to 
Believe;’” Uffelman, “Forging the Self;”  Marchetti, Ethics and Philospohical Critique; Livingston, Damn 
Great Empires; McGranahan, Darwinism and Pragmatism; and Koopman, “The Will, the Will to Believe.”  
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but that specifies ethics and the kind of conduct it engages in relation to power. For this, I 
turn to the work of Foucault as supplying a concept of ethics as counter-conduct that 
resists the operation of power. 
 
2. Ethics as Counter-Conduct 
In a lecture from 1 March 1978 at the Collège de France, later published as 
Security, Territory, Population, Foucault deploys the concepts of conduct and counter-
conduct to analyze 16th century techniques of governmentality linked to what he calls 
“pastoral power.” As Arnold Davidson suggests, these concepts offer a hinge for 
connecting Foucault’s earlier work on power with his later turn toward ethics.639 This 
connection comes to the fore when we consider how Foucault increasingly utilizes the 
language of conduct to describe what he means by power. Power, as he puts it in a 1982 
essay, can be understood as a “conduct of conducts” – that is, a way of acting on the 
actions of others.640 Here Foucault clarifies a direct relation between power, conduct, and 
governmentality:  
Basically, power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or their mutual 
engagement than a question of “government.” This word must be allowed the 
very broad meaning it had in the sixteenth century. “Government” did not refer 
only to political structures or to the management of states; rather, it designated the 
way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed – the 
government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick... To 
govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others.641 
 
                                                        
639 Davidson, “In Praise of Counter-Conduct,” 26.  
 
640 Foucault, “Subject and Power,” in EW3, 341.  
 
641 Ibid.  
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Conduct can be understood as the activity and object of power. It refers simultaneously to 
the activity of conducting (i.e., directing) and to action as the object of this activity. If 
conduct names what Foucault means by power (or governmentality),642 then counter-
conduct designates what he means by ethics – acts that counter or resist the conduct of 
power.643 Counter-conduct refers to “the sense of struggle against the processes 
implemented for conducting others.”644 Hence, Foucault’s lecture articulates a way of 
thinking about ethics in terms of conducts of resistance or struggle.  
 The historical practices of resistance outlined by Foucault in these lectures take 
governmentality, specifically the pastoral mode of governmentality, as their primary 
target of contestation. In the sixteenth century, a specific form of power emerges through 
the Christian pastorate that assumes the object of governing the conduct of men and 
women. Pastoral power bears affinities with the form of power described by Foucault in 
his 1975 text, Discipline and Punish. Disciplinary power emerges in the nineteenth 
century as a novel form of power that functions through the machinery of imprisonment 
in order to address the souls or consciences of criminals and to produce docile bodies.645 
Like disciplinary power, the Christian pastorate is an individualizing power that functions 
by acting on individuals with the aim of directing their behavior. To fulfill this aim, 
                                                        
642 Ibid.  
 
643 As he explains in his lecture from 1 March 1978, counter-conduct is “the sense of struggle against the 
procedures implemented for conducting others.” Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 204. 
 
644 Ibid., 201.  
 
645 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 130-131, 298-301. Disciplinary power also serves as a backdrop for 
predictive policing insofar as the practice of policing deploys techniques of surveillance and imprisonment 
to govern and produce docile bodies. For more on the connection between policing and disciplinary power, 
see Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 213 and Johnson, “Foucault,” 5-6.  
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pastoral power both relies on and produces knowledge about individuals, especially 
concerning the state of their soul, through techniques like the examination of 
conscience.646 Such techniques function to create a relationship of subordination between 
an individual and their spiritual director.647 In the midst of this formation of pastoral 
power, Foucault locates several revolts of conduct undertaken by individuals and groups 
within convents and political institutions whose object was “to be conducted differently” 
and “to escape the direction by others.”648 In other words, these movements of resistance 
were concerned with the conducting activity of power and were developed in direct 
relation to it. 
 For Foucault, counter-conduct does not exist in complete exteriority to power, but 
rather bears an immanent relation to it. As he notes in Security, Territory, Population, 
“the struggle was not conducted in the form of absolute exteriority, but rather in the form 
of the permanent use of tactical elements that are pertinent in the anti-pastoral struggle, 
insofar as they fall within, in a marginal way, the general horizon of Christianity.”649 A 
year prior in the publication of the first volume of The History of Sexuality, The Will to 
Know, Foucault makes a similar point about the relationship between power and 
resistance. There he writes, “Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather 
                                                        
646 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 183-4.  
 
647 Ibid., 182.  
 
648 Ibid., 194-195. These pastoral counter-conducts took five main forms in the Middle Ages: asceticism, 
communities, mysticism, Scripture, and eschatological beliefs. See Foucault, Security, Territory, 
Population, 214.  
 
649 Ibid., 215. 
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consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.”650 
Resistance is thus not outside of power, but is contemporaneous and coterminous with it.  
A few consequences follow from this view. First, against the idea that power is 
totalizing or all-encompassing, Foucault suggests that power is accompanied by a 
plurality of fractures, contestations, and counter-movements. Contrary to critics who 
claim that Foucault’s analyses of power evacuate subjects of any sense of agency, his 
attention to acts of resistance and counter-conduct point toward how agents can transform 
power relations.651 Second, just as there are multiple forms of power, there are plural 
strategies of resistance whose efficacy partly depends on addressing the object, tactics, 
and techniques of specific modes of power. “Hence,” Foucault explains, “there is no 
single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the 
revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case.”652 
Third, power and resistance share certain tactical elements that can be used to bolster a 
particular mode of governing our conduct or to create a counter-conduct. This is to say 
that the form resistance takes is parasitic on the form that power assumes. As Foucault 
makes clear in the lectures from Security, Territory, Population, counter-conduct arose as 
a specific way to resist the type of power that took the conduct of people as its object. 
Thus, counter-conduct acts on the same material as pastoral power – conduct – but acts 
on it differently and for different ends.  
                                                        
650 Foucault, Will to Know, 95.  
 
651 See Smart, “Foucault, Sociology;” Deveaux, “Feminism and Empowerment;” Newton, “Theorizing 
Subjectivity;” Caldwell, “Agency and Change;” and Bevir, “Governance and Governmentality.”  
 
652 Foucault, Will to Know, 95-96.  
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Foucault lands on the concept of counter-conduct in his lecture after considering 
other alternatives for designating what he means by resistance. He rejects notions of 
‘revolt,’ ‘disobedience,’ ‘insubordination,’ ‘dissidence,’ and ‘misconduct’ for being 
either too strong, too weak, too localized, too sacrilizing, and too passive. Unlike these 
other terms, counter-conduct allows him to analyze the dimensions or components 
involved in “the way in which someone actually acts in the very general field of politics 
or in the very general field of power relations.”653 The focus here is less on the people 
behind the actions than on the actions themselves and the ways in which they are 
performed. This also enables Foucault to identify and group certain counter-conducts 
together and specify their features. Hence, as he clarifies through the counter-conducts of 
asceticism and communities, there may be more than one method of resistance that  aim 
at modifying different features of a power formation.654  
Foucault’s account of counter-conduct offers a useful heuristic for thinking 
through the ethics of predictive policing. It is helpful, I argue, as it points us toward 
practices of contestation that could be undertaken to  help transform the power deployed 
in predictive policing. In the next section, I develop four strategies of counter-conduct 
that aim at resisting the governmentality of predictive policing algorithms like the SSL.  
 
 
                                                        
653 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 202.  
 
654 Foucault shows how the counter-conducts of asceticism and those of communities comprised different, 
even opposing, ways of resisting pastoral power. Where ascetic practices tend to have an individualizing 
function that contests pastoral power by setting up an ethical relation of self to self, what Foucault would 
later describe as “care of the self,” communities contest pastoral power by developing alternative religious 
groups with divergent organizations to that of the Church. See Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 
204-208 and Foucault, Care of the Self.   
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3. Counter-Conduct and Predictive Policing 
I think of ethics in the context of predictive policing as a set of strategies of 
counter-conduct for resisting the mode of governmentality specific to this practice. The 
concept of counter-conduct is especially useful in light of the argument I made in the 
previous chapter concerning the temporal governmentality of predictive policing 
algorithms. In that chapter, I argued that person-based algorithms like Chicago Police 
Department’s Strategic Subject List (SSL) exercise power through a paranoid temporality 
directed at preempting the future possibilities of crime for a set of racialized subjects by 
drawing on historical crime data. This operation of power functions to close off the future 
and the past from uncertainty, chance, and surprise for subjects identified as Black. Thus, 
predictive policing governs through what Charles Mills calls “the racialization of time,” 
which effectively splits the future into two racially distinct times – a (white) time that is 
futurally open and a (non-white) time that is futurally closed.655 Counter-conduct is an 
effective ethical category for analyzing predictive policing as it targets both the 
conducting (or governing) activity of predictive policing as well as its object, its 
governing of possibilities for past, present, and future action.  
I propose we think of counter-conduct as a set of socio-technical strategies.656 
Against the tendency to think that technology can be completely detached from the 
context in which it is created and mobilized, I suggest we begin ethical reflection by 
attending to the ethical challenges that arise with the entanglements of specific conducts. 
                                                        
655 Mills, “White Time,” 27.  
 
656 I adopt the language of the socio-technical from Bruno Latour, who deploys the method of “actor-
network-theory” to overcome the purification of the social from the technological by tracing the 
associations and networked relations of heterogenous agents. See Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 6, 
13-14 and Latour, Reassembling the Social, 46-47.   
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The idea here is that if the power of predictive policing is distributed across a network of 
agents (law enforcement officers, programmers, academic researchers, social service 
workers) and technologies (algorithms, computer databases, historical crime data, police 
dashboards), then we ought to understand resistance or counter-conduct as dispersed 
along socio-technical relations. This is to say that the alteration of predictive policing will 
depend on transforming our practices and our technologies.657 While we can distinguish 
between strategies of counter-conduct that aim at modifying the technical aspects of 
predictive policing (e.g., its algorithms, input data, variables, software, and design) or its 
more social features (e.g., the police officers, programmers, researchers, and workers 
involved in its use and design), they cannot ultimately be kept apart if we endeavor to 
transform the governmentality of this practice.  
In what follows, I outline four distinct strategies of counter-conduct for resisting 
and transforming the governmentality of predictive policing. These strategies are distinct 
insofar as they aim at altering different aspects of predictive policing, from the algorithms 
deployed to generate predictions about crime and possible criminal actors to the law 
enforcement personnel who make use of these algorithms to the specific bodies affected 
by this practice. In outlining these four methods of resistance, I am suggesting that I do 
not see a single solution to the problem of governmentality at work in predictive policing. 
I do not believe that predictive policing will be improved simply by making its 
algorithms more transparent because doing so will not necessarily make them less 
racially biased. Even if we knew exactly how the algorithm produced its results, this does 
                                                        
657 The alteration of our practices and prostheses is a theme in the work of James’s fellow pragmatist, John 
Dewey. In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey argues that ethical transformation depends on not just 
altering individual behavior but also the environments that we transact with, which include our institutions, 
tools, and prostheses. See Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, 22 and Hickman, John Dewey, 12.  
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not address the surrounding conditions that inform and affect these results – e.g., the 
enduring legacy of structural racism that conditions the entire criminal justice system in 
the U.S. The danger here is that the transparency model potentially blinds us to problems 
that are irreducible to opacity. The ethical challenge presented by predictive algorithms 
like the SSL is not just that the public has no knowledge of how the scores are actually 
produced, but also that the algorithm enables law enforcement to target certain 
populations that have historically been subjected to higher rates of incarceration, police 
surveillance, and brutality. It is thus not only a problem of knowledge, but also a problem 
of power. 
 
3.1 Counter-Conduct 1: Auditing the Algorithm 
 In 2016, researchers at RAND Corporation undertook an external audit of the 
Chicago Police Department’s pilot SSL program. In their study, Saunders, Hunt, and 
Hollywood identify the impact of the SSL on individual- and city-level gun violence. 
Drawing on mixed methods, including statistical analysis, interviews with police 
officials, and observation of COMPSTAT (a police management tool) meetings, the 
authors demonstrate that subjects on the SSL were neither more nor less likely of 
becoming a victim of a homicide or shooting, thus indicating the limits of the SSL for 
predicting and preventing violent crime in Chicago.658 Furthermore, their study reveals 
that individuals on the SSL were more likely to be arrested for a shooting, suggesting that 
the SSL led to “increased contact with a group of people already in relatively frequent 
                                                        
658 Saunders, Hunt, Hollywood, “Predictions Put into Practice,” 361-363.  
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contact with police.”659 Hence, the results of this research highlight some of the 
challenges facing the SSL as it is shown to be ineffective in its aim of decreasing violent 
crime and raises the possibility of arrest for individuals and groups that are routinely 
subjected to higher rates of police suspicion and surveillance. 
Despite being limited to the first iteration of the SSL, this audit can be understood 
as an example of one possible strategy of counter-conduct for resisting predictive 
policing. The aim of this strategy, which I call “auditing the algorithm,” is to assess the 
particular effects of a predictive policing algorithm. Without accounting for the effects of 
these technologies, we will not know, for instance, whether they are effective in 
achieving their aims, whether their predictions reflect racial bias, or whether they result 
in over-policing. That is, auditing an algorithm is a way of tracking what an algorithm 
does and the results of this activity. While the concept of auditing has typically been used 
by scholars in new media studies as a response to problems of algorithmic opacity,660 I 
find it useful as a method for tracking the effects of algorithmic power rather than 
illuminating the inner workings of a black box. This can be understood as a strategy of 
counter-conduct insofar as it offers a way of assessing the governing conduct of 
predictive policing algorithms– what they do, to whom, and for what purpose. Hence, 
auditing the algorithm functions as a form of resistance by  enabling subjects targeted by 
predictive policing to track how it has governed them such that they might contest this 
exercise of power.  
                                                        
659 Ibid., 363.  
 
660 See, for instance, Burrell, “How the Machine ‘Thinks;’” Sandvig et al., “Auditing Algorithms;” and 
Pasquale, Black Box Society.  
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The audit is historically tied to the domain of finance and accounting and refers to 
a systematic assessment of accounts, records, books, and documents of an organization 
by an independent body in order to ascertain the fairness and accuracy of its financial 
statements.661 In the context of information systems, the audit has been used to examine 
the efficiency and effectiveness of a system’s infrastructure. Similar to the financial audit, 
algorithmic audits have been conceptualized as a means for identifying an algorithm’s 
internal logic in order to make it more fair and trustworthy.662 In The Black Box Society, 
Frank Pasquale, for instance, argues that algorithms could be regulated by relying on 
“trusted auditors” who have access to the algorithm’s code and ensure that it is non-
discriminatory.663 Distinct from financial audits and information system audits, social 
audits were developed in the 1970s as field experiments designed to detect and diagnose 
various forms of discrimination. These were originally used by government researchers in 
the U.S. to identify racial discrimination in housing.664 Sandvig et al. have recently 
outlined a set of idealized algorithmic audit studies designed to investigate discrimination 
on online platforms.665  
My approach to the strategy of auditing algorithms combines features of the 
financial audit with the audit study. Like the financial audit, the auditing of predictive 
policing algorithms would rely on systematic assessments made by independent 
researchers or auditors. These assessments would be conducted in the service of 
                                                        
661 See Puttick and van Esch, Principles and Practice, 1-4.  
 
662 Burrell, “How the Machine ‘Thinks,’” 9.  
 
663 Pasquale, Black Box Society, 141.  
 
664 See Mincy, “Urban Institute Audit Studies.” 
 
665 Sandvig et. al, “Auditing Algorithms,” 8.  
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comprehending the effects of algorithmic power, and thus, like audit studies, could be 
used to detect forms or patterns of discrimination. As with the RAND study of the SSL 
described above, it is important that the audits of predictive policing algorithms be 
undertaken by an independent body of researchers who do not share the interests of 
police agencies, city officials, or programmers for the assessment to be fair and accurate. 
Currently these assessments are conducted by nonprofit agencies like the RAND 
corporation and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), but an independent body of 
algorithmic auditors does not yet exist and there are no standard set of regulations or 
procedures for auditing algorithms. While a set of standards for auditing algorithms need 
not exist for this to function as a strategy of counter-conduct, it would lend a sense of 
unity and coherence to otherwise disparate auditing methods. Likewise, creating an 
organization of algorithmic auditors would resolve any uncertainty about the agents 
responsible for auditing these technologies. In attending to the discriminatory effects of 
predictive algorithms, auditing would not only represent a descriptive practice of 
reporting what an algorithm does, but would be self-consciously involved in the resistant 
practice of contesting the disproportionate impact of its actions. As a mode of counter-
conduct, the auditing of algorithms expresses a concern for those affected by predictive 
policing’s exercise of power.  
 
3.2 Counter-Conduct 2: Repairing the Algorithm 
 A second strategy of counter-conduct takes the form of tweaking or repairing the 
algorithm as a way of ameliorating its racially biased results. This strategy aims at 
altering an algorithm’s design by modifying its input data, weighing its variables 
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differently, or by relying on different sources of data. Now, simply tweaking the 
algorithm does not make it a strategy of resistance insofar as predictive algorithms are 
constantly being modified to improve their predictive power. For example, the Strategic 
Subject List has undergone several iterations and updates since its initial deployment in 
2013.666 These modifications are adopted to make the algorithm more predictively 
efficacious. To constitute a type of counter-conduct, a predictive policing algorithm like 
the SSL must be repaired so as to attenuate its discriminatory effects – the way it 
disproportionately targets Black men as subjects warranting heightened police suspicion 
and attention. This strategy thus contests the governing conduct of person-based 
predictive algorithms, which assign risk scores to populations that are routinely 
incarcerated and profiled at higher rates, by attempting to ameliorate their problematic 
racialized effects. 
 In taking aim at an algorithm’s design by altering its input variables and training 
data, this method of counter-conduct builds on the first strategy outlined above, that of 
auditing an algorithm. If the first strategy allows one to assess the effects of an algorithm, 
this tactic enables the tweaking of an algorithm so as to modify its effects. Without 
knowing the actual effects of predictive policing algorithms in the first place, we will not 
quite know in what ways they need to be improved. Building on the audit conducted in 
the RAND study described above, individuals on the SSL are more likely to be arrested 
for a shooting and are also more likely to come into contact with police. Since the 
majority of subjects with SSL scores are Black males, this means that one of the 
consequences of the SSL is that it can lead to the arrest of a population that already faces 
                                                        
666 According to the Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, Eddie T. Johnson, there have been 
five different versions of the SSL as of August 2016. See Johnson and Guglielmi, “CPD Welcomes,” 1.  
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the highest rates of incarceration in the U.S.667 From this perspective, the SSL is a cause 
for concern because it potentially perpetuates forms of structural racism that are present 
in our criminal justice system.  
 To redress this troubling effect of the SSL, the algorithm would need to be altered 
by drawing on data that does not reflect problematic racial bias. While the Chicago Police 
Department insists that its algorithm is not biased because it does not use personal 
attributes like race, gender, or ethnicity, it neglects how the use of crime data can already 
be caught up in problems of bias.668 That is, to assume that data supplied by criminal 
records and rap sheets is completely free from bias not only overlooks the ways in which 
individual prejudice can impact the collection of crime data, but also how more systemic 
features of racism can inform the practice and institution of policing. Rather than rely on 
historical crime data supplied by policing agencies to train predictive algorithms like the 
SSL, these algorithms could draw on other sources of crime data. The SSL, for instance, 
could generate its predictions based on non-police crime data collected and supplied by 
sources like the National Crime Victimization Survey or the Census Bureau. These 
alternative sources of crime data could serve the function of being predictively 
efficacious while potentially not reflecting the problematic racial bias that goes into the 
production and collection of existing crime data by police agencies. This would constitute 
one way of repairing an algorithm at the level of its input data.  
                                                        
667 See Alexander, New Jim Crow, 6-7.  
 
668 The Superintendent and Director of the CPD state, “It is important to note that no version of the SSL 
model has used personal attributes of an individual that would be discriminatory, such as race, gender, or 
ethnicity. The model also does not use information that might indirectly reveal those personal attributes; 
thus, the model does not make use of the neighborhood in which an individual lives, or which gang he or 
she is a member of. The model also uses nothing beyond standard crime records that might violate an 
individual’s privacy rights.” See Johnson and Guglielmi, “CPD Welcomes,” 2.  
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While it may not be possible to completely remove racial bias from crime data 
(even from data provided by non-policing agencies), the data supplied by other sources 
potentially reflects more realistic trends in crime. Since this data tracks crime occurring 
outside of police contact, it is less skewed by enduring institutional biases involved in 
policing. For example, in a simulation of a place-based predictive policing algorithm in 
Oakland, California, the algorithm disproportionately targeted Black neighborhoods for 
illicit drug use based on data provided by the Oakland Police Department even though 
data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the National Survey on Drug Use and 
Health (NSDUH) reflect illicit drug use in different neighborhoods across the city.669 As 
the authors argue, this discrepancy between the predictions generated by the police data 
and the patterns of drug use revealed in other data suggests that “while drug crimes exist 
everywhere, drug arrests tend to only occur in very specific locations – the police data 
appear to disproportionately represent crimes committed in areas with higher populations 
of non-white and low-income residents.”670 What this study shows, then, is that the 
source of data – where it comes from and how it was collected – has a significant impact 
on an algorithm’s predictive outcomes, and thus, on the lives affected by these 
predictions. By relying on non-policing data, algorithms could produce predictions that 
are at once more representative of actual crime trends and less entangled in the 
discriminatory tactics of policing. This repair of the algorithm via the modification of its 
input data would constitute a strategy of counter-conduct insofar as it seeks to ameliorate 
the racializing effects of predictive policing.  
                                                        
669 Lum and Isaac, “To Predict and Serve,” 17.  
 
670 Ibid.  
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3.3 Counter-Conduct 3: Altering the Algorithm’s Implementation 
The development of Chicago Police Department’s Strategic Subject List was 
inspired by the work of Yale sociologist, Andrew Papachristos, who applies a public 
health approach to the study of violence. In a study from 2015, Papachristos and his co-
authors show that 70 percent of nonfatal gunshot victims in Chicago can be located in a 
network of less than six percent of the city’s overall population.671 What this suggests is 
that gun violence, like infectious disease, is concentrated in rather small social 
networks.672 Violence thus “spreads like an infection among individuals as they engage in 
risky behaviors.”673 On the basis of this analogy between violence and disease, 
Papachristos advocates for treating violent crime as a public health problem. Hence, 
interventions of violent crime “must be conducted with a victim-centered public health 
approach in mind – one based on risk assessment and observation, rather than prediction 
– that involves not just law enforcement, but social services and community members.”674  
Papachristos’ public health approach to crime highlights another type of counter-
conduct to predictive policing that is less concerned with the results of algorithms like the 
SSL than with the way these results are implemented. This strategy contests current uses 
of predictive algorithms that contribute to toxic policing practices like overpolicing, 
hyper surveillance, aggressive patrolling, augmented sentencing, and police brutality. 
This strategy of counter-conduct seeks to alter such problematic implementations of 
predictive algorithms by suggesting alternative applications. For example, whereas the 
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673 Papachristos, “Use of Data,” 1.  
 
674 Ibid.  
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SSL tends to be implemented as way of identifying and surveilling potential perpetrators 
of crime, it might be used to identify and provide help to potential victims of violent 
crime. This strategy is thus distinct from the others insofar as it aims at intervening in the 
algorithm’s execution – how it is used – rather than in its design or construction. 
This tactic of altering an algorithm’s implementation in the context of predictive 
policing draws on the idea that there are other, arguably more humane, methods for crime 
prevention. Policing is a method of crime response and prevention that depends on a 
particular conception of crime as a matter of unlawful acts undertaken by groups and 
individuals. The problem with such a conception is that it does not consider how social, 
historical, and environmental conditions impact criminal activity. Such conditions call for 
different types of responses to crime than that of policing precisely because policing does 
not address these underlying conditions, and may even exacerbate them. In the words of 
Aderson B. Francois, they require “less coercive social tools to deal with the trauma of 
economic distress, family dislocation, mental illness, environmental stress and racial 
discrimination that often masquerade as criminal behavior.”675 Other social tools for 
preventing crime might take the form of social support from community organizations 
and social workers, counseling services from clinical psychologists, medical attention 
from clinicians and doctors, and housing and financial assistance from social service 
programs.676 In addition, if crime prevention is to address the historical and 
                                                        
675 Francois, “When it Comes to Policing,” 1.  
 
676 This is referred to in criminology literature as “community crime prevention.” According to Tim Hope, 
community crime prevention “refers to actions intended to change the social conditions that are believed to 
sustain crime in residential communities. It concentrates usually on the ability of local social institutions to 
reduce crime in residential neighborhoods. Social institutions encompass a diverse range of groupings and 
organizations – including families, friendship networks, clubs, associations, and organizations – which 
bring people together within communities and, by doing so, transmit guidance concerning conduct in the 
locality.” See Hope, “Community Crime Prevention,” 21.  
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environmental conditions of crime, it may require more radical measures like the 
desegregation of cities and schools, the redistribution of land and property, and 
reparations for the damages incurred under redlining practices.677 
To clarify what this strategy might look like, consider a shift in the 
implementation of the SSL that treats subjects with risk scores as possible victims of 
future violent crime. If such a shift took place, there would be less of a need for police 
involvement than for the services and support provided by other entities like doctors, 
psychologists, churches, non-partisan coalitions, social assistance agencies, and families. 
While the Customs Notification Program, which is currently used in conjunction with the 
SSL, seeks to adopt a more community-based approach to crime prevention by 
incorporating social workers and community members in visitations to notify potential 
victims of gun violence, the presence of police officers during the visit sends a mixed 
message to these subjects. It tells them that they are at once perceived as a possible 
perpetrator of violent crime such that they need a personal warning by law enforcement 
to desist from engaging in crime unless they want to face severe legal ramifications, and 
as a possible victim of violent crime that warrants a reminder from community agents of 
existing resources for social support. If this program were only concerned with the 
victimization of subjects with SSL scores, why would police need to be present at the 
visitation at all? Part of altering the SSL’s implementation would thus involve modifying 
the Customs Notification Program to rely on methods of community based crime 
prevention without the intervention of police. Here community members and social 
                                                        
677 See Shihadeh and Maume, “Segregation and Crime;” Bjerk, “Effects of Segregation;” and Coates, “Case 
for Reparations.”  
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service agents would make visitations to predicted victims of gun violence with resources 
for public assistance. 
As a strategy of counter-conduct for resisting predictive policing by advocating 
for alternative implementations of predictive algorithms, this tactic identifies a central 
assumption at work in predictive policing – namely, that policing is the best way to 
prevent crime. This is troubling, as Aderson B. Francois contends, because “predictive 
policing does not and cannot account for the reality that often law enforcement is the 
default but destructive policy with which American society deals with real and perceived 
ills in communities of color in general and black [sic] communities in particular.”678 To 
push beyond this default assumption, predictive algorithms should be utilized for 
methods of crime prevention that address the historical and social conditions contributing 
to crime. Only then will these algorithms not contribute to the repetition of discriminatory 
policing tactics that rob the lives of men and women of color through surveillance, 
incarceration, and brutality.  
 
3.4 Counter-Conduct 4: Protesting Predictive Policing 
The killing of seventeen year old Laquan McDonald by now-former Chicago 
police officer Jason Van Dyke in October 2014 sparked city-wide protests across 
Chicago. Van Dyke shot McDonald sixteen times in response to a call about a teenager 
breaking into vehicles. After the release of the dashcam footage of the shooting in 
November 2015, demonstrators took part in a Black Friday shopping boycott, shut down 
roadways, and called for the removal of Mayor Rahm Emanuel, police superintendent 
                                                        
678 Francois, “When it Comes to Policing,” 1.  
 227 
Garry McCarthy, and state attorney Anita Alvarez for their mishandling of the case.679 
During Van Dyke’s trial, chants of “16 shots” and “Justice for Laquan” could be heard 
outside of the courtroom as activists staged “die ins” to protest police violence and the 
lack of accountability by the Chicago Police Department.680  
The protests organized around McDonald’s death is one of many large scale 
demonstrations against police brutality that have ignited in cities across the U.S. in 
response to the killings of unarmed Black men and women.681 These demonstrations offer 
another possible model of counter-conduct for contesting predictive policing. This type of 
counter-conduct takes the form of public protest that both draws attention to and calls 
into question the use of predictive algorithms by police agencies. This strategy of 
resistance thus serves two functions – it highlights the growing rise of predictive policing 
technologies and contests the seemingly benign use of such technologies. By taking the 
form of public protest, it also serves to underscore the continuity between the racial bias 
at work in predictive policing and systemic problems of racial injustice operant in the 
criminal justice system. On this view, the racial politics of predictive policing is not an 
isolated problem, but is continuous with the shootings of unarmed Black men and women 
by police officers and with the disproportionate arrests and incarceration of Black 
                                                        
679 See Rubenstein, “Verdict then Protest” and Husain, “Laquan McDonald Timeline” for a report and 
timeline of the shooting.   
 
680 A report conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2017 highlights the extent of misconduct and 
excessive use of force by Chicago police officers. See Department of Justice, “Investigation of the Chicago 
Police Department.”  
 
681 These include the killings of the following Black men and women: Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown, 
Freddie Gray, Philando Castile, Terence Cruther, Samuel DuBose, Alton Sterling, Jamar Clark, Jeremy 
McDole, William Chapman II, Walter L. Scott, Akai Gurley, Laquan McDonald, Eric Harris, Tamir Rice, 
Akai Gurley, Eric Garner, Sandra Bland, Charleena Lyles, Shukri Ali, Deborah Danner, Rekia Boyd, Mya 
Hall, Miriam Carey, and Aiyana Stanley-Jones.  
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Americans. Hence, this type of counter-conduct directs its contestation to a network of 
discriminatory policing practices and institutions of criminal justice, which include 
prisons and courts. 
In Chicago, Black-led organizations like the Black Youth Project 100 (BYP100) 
have been active in contesting police brutality as well as the use of a gang database by 
CPD.682 This database was generated as a subset of the SSL to track subjects on the list 
with gang affiliations.683 This database has been used to criminalize Chicago’s Latinx, 
Black, and immigrant communities.684 Like the SSL, it has been criticized for being 
prone to error and for having harmful effects on populations that are already subjected to 
higher rates of police attention. Together with other activists groups like Organized 
Communities Against Deportations (OCAD), BYP100 Chicago has used direct action 
and grassroots organizing to call for an end of the CPD’s gang database. 
Other organizations like Black Lives Matter Chicago (BLM Chicago) have been 
active in protesting police brutality and the criminalization of Black communities by 
holding town hall meetings on police accountability, vigils for Black men, women, and 
children killed by the CPD, offering support for families, and initiatives dedicated to 
communal healing. Like BYP100, the BLM movement was formed by three Black queer 
                                                        
682 BYP100 was formed in 2013 in response to the verdict of Trayvon Martin’s killer, George Zimmerman, 
who was found not guilty. They are a national, member-based organization of Black activists and 
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people” through “transformative leadership development, direct action organizing, advocacy, and political 
education using a Black queer feminist lens.” See https://byp100.org/about-byp100/#mission.   
 
683 See Yousef and Moore, “Young Activists.”  
 
684 In March 2017, Wilmer Catalan-Ramirez, a Guatemalan national, was arrested by Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement officers after being wrongfully placed on the gang database, which ultimately led to 
his immigration arrest. After examining city data, Odette Yousef and Natalie Moore found that roughly 
65,000 Chicagoans on the SSL are considered “gang affiliated,” and more than 95 percent of these subjects 
are Black, Latino, or both. See Yousef and Moore, “Young Activists.”  
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women, Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi in response to the acquittal of 
George Zimmerman.685 The movement mobilized through the use of hashtags 
(#BlackLivesMatter) on social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook. An early 
Facebook post from Patrisse Cullors specifies the purpose behind the #BLM movement: 
“#blacklivesmatter is a movement attempting to visibilize what it means to be black in 
this country. Provide hope and inspiration for collective action to build collective power 
to achieve collective transformation. rooted in grief and rage but pointed towards vision 
and dreams.”686 While the organizing tactics of BLM Chicago are less directed at 
protesting the SSL specifically, they attend to a network of problems connected to 
policing, including surveillance, violence, overpolicing, incarceration, and the 
disinvestment of community resources. For instance, one of their coalitional campaigns, 
#NoCopAcademy, contests mayor Rahm Emanuel’s plans to fund $95 million for a large 
training center for Chicago police on the West Side of the city. #NoCopAcademy 
activists call for the money to be redirected to invest in community needs like education, 
youth programs, job training, and mental health facilities. 
The counter-conduct strategy of protesting predictive policing involves already-
existing organizations like BYP100 and BLM to draw attention and call into question the 
racially discriminatory effects of predictive algorithms like the SSL. By attending to the 
populations that are disproportionately targeted, incarcerated, and killed by police, these 
movements could serve to highlight the continuity between the bodies that are assigned 
with the highest risk scores, those that are routinely incarcerated, and those that are 
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vulnerable to police brutality. That is, by mobilizing these social movements for the work 
of contesting predictive policing, this mode of counter-conduct addresses the problems of 
predictive policing as part and parcel of a whole network of practices and institutions that 
contribute to historical and ongoing forms of racial injustice.  
 
Conclusion 
In early 2018, For the People Artists Collective held a month-long exhibition 
titled “Do not Resist?” that chronicled a history of police violence in Chicago. The 
organizer of the event, Monica Trinidad, describes the exhibition’s title as a play on the 
police’s command when making arrests, “do not resist.” She asks, “How can you not 
resist all of this violence in our communities? Do not resist? Really? After 100 years of 
police violence and impunity?”687 For Trinidad, the purpose of the exhibition was to 
encourage the imagining of “a different way of living,” one without the ever-present 
threat of police surveillance, violence, and death.688 What would it be like to not fear the 
obliteration of one’s body at the hands of police? What would it mean to live without the 
paranoia of having to constantly monitor one’s body, one’s actions, one’s location, one’s 
relations as a matter of survival? What would it be like to live otherwise? 
 The practices of counter-conduct described above seek to address these questions 
by supplying different strategies of resistance to the power exercised by predictive 
policing algorithms. That is, they embody distinct ways of imagining a different mode of 
living without the racialized threat of police surveillance, brutality, and incarceration. 
                                                        
687 See Misra, “Stories of Reform.”  
 
688 Ibid.  
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These counter-conducts thus aim at transforming the practice of predictive policing such 
that it might less harmful, less damaging to the subjects it seeks to police.  
The strategies of resistance outlined here contribute to an ethical framework for 
responding to the issues of racial injustice in predictive policing without relying on the 
ideal of transparency. This ideal is limited in two ways. First, it does not allow us to 
address the problem of power at work in predictive policing, a problem that is irreducible 
to one of opacity. Second, in reducing ethics to an epistemic issue, it neglects the racial 
politics that condition and inform predictive policing insofar as it leads us to think that 
just by knowing how the algorithm makes its predictions, its racial bias will be 
ameliorated. To contend with the problem of power of predictive policing, I have argued 
that we conceptualize ethics as a practice of counter-conduct which works to resist the 
troubling racialized effects of predictive policing algorithms. This is done in the service 
of highlighting alternative modes of living without the racializing paranoia that governs 
predictive policing. It offers a way of cultivating possible futures for subjects whose 
futures are preemptively foreclosed by the practice of predictive policing. In doing so, it 
seeks to alter the governmentality of predictive policing by contesting its unquestioned 
foreclosure of a contingent past and future for non-whites.  
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 In “What is Enlightenment?,” Foucault describes critique in terms of what he calls 
the “attitude of modernity.” This attitude consists, he argues, in a particular way of 
relating to one’s present in order to “heroize” it. To heroize the present is not so much to 
sacralize it as a means for its maintenance or perpetuation; it is rather “to imagine [the 
present], to imagine it otherwise than it is, and to transform it not by destroying it but by 
grasping it in what it is.”689  
This account supplies a way of thinking about the relation between time and 
critique. How, one might ask, does the critic relate to her present? Does reparative 
critique demand a specific mode of relating to one’s present and what does this relation 
consist in? How do different affects of critique such as paranoia (discussed in Chapter 
One) and care (discussed in Chapter Two) comprise distinct ways of relating to one’s 
present? I address these questions by way of conclusion to offer a final reflection on what 
it means to engage the sustaining work of critique. 
When critique is defined solely through the work of denunciation, critics treat 
their present as that which stands in need of negative judgment. Fueled by affects of 
suspicion and paranoia, critics assume a defensive posture toward the present moment, 
which is taken as threatening or destructive. The activity of critique on this view entails 
guarding against the threats pervading the present. This conception of critique is 
consistent with a kind of utopianism that places faith in the ideal of future bliss as 
security against present dangers and hazards. The paranoid critic cannot rest or find 
                                                        
689 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?,” 311.  
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solace in the present and so must construct a future where security can (or will) be found. 
There is at once a defeatism on the part of critics with respect to the present and an 
optimism toward the future.  
What would it mean for the critic to regard the present not from the paranoid 
perspective of fear, but from a reparative position of care and hope? This is precisely the 
position from which one seeks to transform the present “not by destroying it,” in 
Foucault’s words, “but by grasping it in what it is.”690 Reparative critique offers a way of 
relating to the present as a complex and fecund site that pulses with possibilities for 
pleasure, joy, and sustenance. Borrowing from Audre Lorde, we might think of this as an 
“erotic” relation to the present.691 The erotic can be understood as a capacity for joy that 
energizes subjects toward creative work and connection with others.692 To relate 
erotically to the present would be to find in the present opportunities for connection, 
nourishment, and joy. The reparative critic thus does not engage the present as that which 
is lacking or threatening, but as generative and nourishing. The present is here viewed 
less as oppositional to the future, than as creative of the future. As Lorde attests in her 
poem, “A Litany for Survival,” what this perspective seeks is “a now that can breed 
futures.”693 To regard one’s present in this way is not to vindicate it, for to do so would 
be to neglect the ambiguities, wounds, and injustices that throb within it. Instead, the 
reparative critic offers a tenderness toward her present – a way of holding it in its 
                                                        
690 Ibid.  
 
691 Lorde, “Uses of the Erotic.”  
 
692 Lorde, “Uses of the Erotic,” 56-57.  
 
693 Lorde, “Litany for Survival,” 255.  
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complexity, with its lacerations and scars, its mournful sighs and hopeful longings – in 
order to establish a more sustaining relation to it.  
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